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ABSTRACT 
The issuing of the Drill Reglement foi· the whole 
Austrian infantry in 1749 was an important part of the 
centralizing reforms of Maria Theresa and marked a turning 
point in the development of the Austrian army. 
Constitutional and financial conditions, among other~ 
had delayed the effective centralization of state and army 
administration before the reign of Maria Theresa; and 
during the later years of Charles VI's reign the army had 
deteriorated through neglect and lack of control from 
above. The lack of drill and duty regulations for the 
whole army, such as then existed in Prussia, had con-
tributed to the weaknesses of the Austrian army. At the 
end of Charles VI's reign, in 1737, a drill manual was 
issued which was to have been adhered to by all infantry 
regiments. Various circumstances, however, prevented its 
general acceptance. 
In 1748, after the Wars of the Austrian Succession, a 
military commission was set up to effect a thorough reform 
of the military system. One of the major tasks of this 
commission was the composition of a drill and duty Regle-
ment for the whole army. In 1749 a general Reglement was 
issued to all regiments and its application was strictly 
enforced. The much i mproved performance of the Austrian 
army during the Seven Years War was due, to a great degree, 
to this. 
Although the contents of this Reglernent have been 
known, the deliberations of the military commission of 
174-8 on this topic are here discussed for the first time. 
Furthermore, new light has been shed through new research 
by this writer on the origins and roots of this Reglement. 
Whereas military historians have, up to now, considered 
this reform, especially this Reglement of 174-9, as a copy 
of Prussian practices and manuals, this writer's research 
shows that there is no indication of a conscious or in-
tentional copying from the Prussian model as far as the 
Drill Reglement of 1?49 is concerned. 
i 
PREFACE 
The Austrian army of the eighteenth century has been 
treated by English speaking historians as a neglected step 
child. Whereas a fair number of monographs and short 
articles has been published in English on the French and 
Pruss:ian armies of that period, very little on the Austrian 
army has appeared in print. It may be the lot of the van-
quished to be neglected and forgotten by later generations. 
To fill a small part of this gap, this thesis pro-
poses to trace one facet in the development of the Austrian 
army during the first half of the eighteenth century: the 
development of the drill regulations, leading to the first 
general Reglement in 1749.1 Introduced much later than in 
Prussia, general drill regulations for the whole Austrian 
army are said to have followed the Prussian example, to 
have been adopted because the proven superiority of the 
Prussian army had forced the Austrians to bring their army 
up to the Prussian standards.2 
1The contemporary Austrian term was Exercitium Regu1ament. 
2e.g.: Max J§.hns, Geschichte der Kriegswiss:enschaften, 
(Munich:189l),vol.3, ·p.2560; Grosser Genera1stab, Der 
Siebenjghrige Krieg, (~er1in: 1901), vol.l, p.l43; G.Ange~ 
Il1ustrierte 'G·eschichte der k.k. Armee, (Vienna: 1887), 




It is the intention of £his study to show the motives 
for the development of general drill Reglements and to 
examine the extent to which the Prussian model was in fact 
follmved by the Austrians. 
In 1748, following the setbacks of the Wars of the 
Austrian Succession, a military commission was formed in 
Vienna to devise a whole new military system.l Although 
the reforms introduced by thi.s commission are welr !mown, 
the commission's deliberations have not previously been 
exploited. The minutes of the commission's sessions, memo~ 
randa by commission members and · other generals, and reports 
on the conditions in the army; therefore constitute the 
major original sources for the main part of this s·tudy. A 
brief exposition of the administrative and financial prob-
lems of the monarchy is necessary in order to elucidate the 
conditions under which the new general drill Reglements 
were formulated. For the sake of brevity, and because of 
its direct relevance to the purpose of this study, the dis-
cussion of drill and tactics· during the period preceding the 
Wars of the Austrian Succession will concentrate on those of 
the infantry. Any reference to the situation in Hungary 
lThe documents in the KA refer to this commission as MilitHr 
Commission. The references to its deliberations are base~ 
unless otherwise stated, on the minutes (Protocolli) of 
the commission's sessions in 1748; KA, Mem 1748, 9 - 152. 
and on the Military Border has b~en omitted, as, to deal 
at all effectively 'tvi th these matters, would necessitate 
treating a host of special questions and would exceed the 
proper scope of this study. 
All translations from the original sources are, unless 
otherwise stated, by this writer. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The term 'Austrian army' is correct only when applied 
to the standing army of the Austrian Habsburgs as it de-
veloped after the Peace of Westphalia.l The process by 
which the Austrian army evolved from its. two roots,. an 
Imperial German army and the levies of the hereditary Habs-
burg lands, was a gradual one. When, after 1648, Emperor 
Ferdinand III retained several regiments, · he initiated the 
birth of the standing army; but these regiments can only 
be regarded as the embryo of the army which was to emerge 
during the following one hundred years. 
Constitutional conditions, technological advances, 
rivalry and wars among the major European powers, a new 
system of recruiting, and changing strategic and tactical 
ideas were the main factors involved in the development of 
the standing armies of this period. These, in turn, led 
to the development of the formalized warfare and rigid 
lThis writer cannot agree with E. Herschmann 1 s th~sis -E • . 
Herschmann, Die AnfHnge des stehenden Heeres in Osterreich, 
(Vienna: 1925) - that various regiments retained after the 
· end of campaigns during the ·sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries for periods of up to several years·, can be re-
ferred to by the term Austrian army. · The concept of a 
standing army and proposals to create one, however, do 
antedate 1648. 
v 
military doctrine characteristic of the second half of the 
eighteenth century. 
When Maria Theresa succeeded her father,'Charles vr; in 
1740, several of the European powers 1vere anxious to deprive 
her of her heritage, notwithstanding their recent agree-
ment to the Pragmatic Sanction. At this time of great 
danger to the House of Habsburg, she found herself depend-
ent upon an army which she considered to be in a deplorable 
condition: 
Who would believe that no regulations existed 
in my army? Each (regiment) made a different 
maneuver on marches, in drill and in everything. 
The same commands were interpreted differently •••• l 
How was it possible that· the Austrian army, an army 
with such glorious traditions and history, had fallen into 
such a deplorable state? 
The fact that the Austrian army had no general drill 
regulations, conducted no maneuvers and had no training 
camps during the period preceding 1748, occasioned little 
or no concern from its greatest field marshals, Montecuccoli 
and Eugene of Savoy,2 in view of the fact that the armies 
lJosef Kallbrunner, ed., Kaiserin Maria Theresias 
Politisches Testament, (Vienna: 1952), p.72 
2Raimund Fftrst Montecuccoli, Imperial field marshal, Presi-
dent of the Hofkrie~srat from 1668. to 1681 
Eugene Franz, Prinz von Savoyen, Austrian field marshal, 
President of the Hofkriegsrat from 1703 to 1736 
of Austria's enemies did not have them either. More-
over, Austria had in these men generals who could out-
maneuver and defeat the greatest generals of their time 
with an army which was ill paid, poorly equipped and not 
drilled to general regulations. 
v~ 
During their periods, Montecuccoli and Prince Eugene 
had focused their complaints on administrative defects and 
shortcomings rather than on matters of training. They 
deplored the lack of funds, the problems arising from the 
lack of co"·operation between the Hofkriegsrat and the 
Hofkammer,l and the intrigues and jealousies within the 
Imperial Court, central government departments and the 
officer corps. 
With the death of Prince Eugene in 1736, the suc-
cession of outstanding imperial generals came to a close. 
Thus, with a dearth of brilliant military leaders, and, 
faced in 1740 with an ememy - Prussia - whose army had 
recently undergone intensive reforms and training, the 
shortcomings of the Austrian army with regard to tactical 
training and drill became readily apparent. Thes~ ~ere 
the greatest defects of her army in the eyes of Maria Theres~ 
lHofkriegsrat: Imperial War Council, the central admini-
strative department for military affairs 
Hofkammer: The central finance department which controlled 
most of the finances, including those of the Hofkriegsrat 
vii 
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Expedit; register of in-coming mail at 
Hofkriegsrat 
(Alte) Feldakten in Austrian War Archives 
Field Marshal 
Feldzeugmeister; General 
Feldmarschalleutenant; Lt. General 
Feldwachtmeister; Major General 
Hofkammer (Finance Department) 
.Hofkriegsrat (War Council) in foot-
notes: collection of HKR documents 
Kriegsarchiv; Austrian War Archives in 
Vienna 
Kriegswissenschaftliche Memoiren; 




Registratur; register of out-going mai] 
at Hofkriegsrat 
Swine feather, Swedish feather; a stake, 
several feet in length, pointed at both 
ends, to be placed at an angle into the 
ground in front of the infantry lines,as 
a protection against cavalry attack. 
Several S. could be pushed through holes 
in an horizontal beam to produce the so-
called cheveaux de frise 
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THE STATE FINANCES 
The income of the crown from its dom~ins, the town 
taxes, the indirect taxes and the regalia, all admini-
stered by the Hofkammer, was used to cover the expenses 
of the court, the administration of the state and the 
ex gratia payments. Military expenses had to be covered 
by a special tax, called after 1621 the Kontribution, re-
quested from and approved by the Estates of the various 
LM.nder. (In 1627 the rights of the Bohemian Estates were 
restricted to the acceptance of royal proposals only).l 
The income from the Kontribution never wa.s sufficient for 
the efficient upkeep of an army engaged in practically 
uninterrupted wars. From the sixteenth century on, the 
history of Austrian state finances is largely one of public 
debt.2 The system of financial administration,3 the 
lF.M. Mayer, Geschichte Osterreichs, (Vienna: 1909) vol.II, 
p.282ff 
2H.L •. Mikoletzky, Osterreich: Das grosse achzehnte 
Jahrhundert, (Vienna: 1967), p.26 
3For a detailed description see: Thomas Fellner, Die Oster-




nearly permanent state of war, corruption, and the excess-
ive generosity of many of the emperors were the main 
'reasons for this sorry state of the Austrian finances. 
The foundation of the Hofkammer in the sixteenth century 
by Maximilian I and its reorganization by Ferdinand I did 
not lead to a true centralization of financial admini-
stration, as the dualism in the various LHnder continued: 
the Estates retained the right to grant taxes, to collect 
them and even to decide on their use. Thus, the un-
comfortable co-existence of the Hofkammer with the finance 
departments of the Estates in the LHnder prevented the 
Hofkammer from controlling expenditures and revenue 
efficiently.l Corruption among ministers, as exempli-
fied by the exposure of one Count Sinzendorf, who was tried 
and convicted in 1670, was sufficient to lead a civil 
servant to advise Leopold I that "Your Majesty had suffered 
less damage through wars than through a greedy minister. 11 2 
The generosity of the emperors added to the problems. Gifts 
ranging in value from a few thousand to more than a hundred 
thousand Gulden were freely distributed to individuals while 
lH.L •. Mikoletzky, op.cit., p.85 
2FJM. Mayer, op.cit., vol.II, p.288 
at the same time the armies lacked the most basic necessi~ 
ties. In 1703, for example, the widow of a court 
chamberlain received 120,000 Gulden in recognition of her 
husband's long, faithful service.l The expenses of the 
court were high, yet they were comparable with those of 
the other great courts of Europe. Throughout the seven-
teenth and early eighteenth centuries court expenses con-
tinued to rise drastically, as the 'court' degenerated 
from a governing body into an organism with purely pres-
tige value. The numbers of the members of the court 
rose from 451 under Ferdinand I to 2175 under Charles VI.2 
During the reign of Leopold I even parts of the crown 
treasure had to be pawned to cover expenses and only in 
1716 were the last of these redeemed in Amsterdam and 
Hamburg.3 
Additional expenses arose from the cost of embassies 
and receptions of foreign ambassadors. This was especi-
ally the case with regard to Turkey. In 1719 the ambassa-
dor of the Porte stayed in Vienna for over one year with 
lLoc.cit. 
2H.L. Mikoletzky, op.cit., p.87 
3Ib.:id· ~.;~ p.89 and F.M. Mayer, op.cit., p.287 
an entourage of 736 persons - at the expense of the 
emperor.l 
The high cost of wars constituted the major expense. 
The Turkish wars, which ended with the Peace of Passaro-
witz in 1718, for example, cost the emperor approximately 
twenty million Gulden. Of this amount, only two thirds 
could be covered from the income of the state. As the 
collection of these sums was subject to frequent delays, 
the army continually suffered from lack of funds.2 
The state finances were dependent on the reluctant co-
operation of the Estates, on foreign loans and on money 
lenders, of whom Samuel Oppenheimer, ( in Vienna from 1677 
to 1703 ), was the least · selfish.3 
Exact figures on the financial situation of the mon-
archy during the period before Maria Theresa are unfortun-
ately unavailable.4 In spite of this, the situation is 
clear: the state was continuously balancing along the abyss 
of bankruptcy. That it did not in fact become bankrupt, 
was one of the miracles of the House of Habsburg. The 
situation becomes even clearer considering that, in 1739, 
lH.L. Mikoletzky, op.cit., p.ll5 
2Loc •. cit. 
3see Maria Theresa's two Denkschriften in Kallbrunner, 
op.cit ~;'passim 
4-E. Guglia, Maria Theresia, (Munich: 1917), vol.I, p.48 
with a budget of approximately forty million Gulden, the 
deficit amounted to. eighty-three million. In the same year 
the state debt reached one hundred million - an increase of 
forty million Gulden since 1711. This imbalance in re-
lation to the income of the state presented a dangerous 
situation.l Although Austria then had a larger territory 
than France and a population about equal to that of France, 
the income of the state was only about one fifth of that of 
France.2 
li..lUJ!~., ; p.49 
2G. Anger, op,cit.., vol.II, p.964 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY AFFAIRS 
Any study of military developments, whether it concerns 
the fields of tactics, strategy, doctrines of war or lo-
gistics, etc., has to be concerned with the system of 
administration of military affairs, with the apparatus under 
which the military has to function. To-day's war mini-
stries are, of course, of rather recent creation. The 
Feudal Age did not know central state departments concerned 
with military affairs; neither did they exist during the 
early part of the Age of Absolutism, during which the 
administration and conduct of warfare were divided between 
the ruler, the Estates and the great captains of the 
mercenaries. 
During the sixteenth century the continuous and in-
creasing Turkish threat, and the desire to centralize the 
administration of the various L~der, led to the establish-
ment of a central department for military affairs. In 1526, 
when Austria became a great power by uniting Hungary and 
Bohemia with the Habsburg crown, military administration in 
each Land was placed under a Landeshauptmann (provincial 
governor) and a war council, an attempt to centralize mili-
tary administration at least in each Land. In 1556, 
7 
Ferdinand I created a permanent war council - after 1564 
called the Hofkriegsrat -1 with the function of administer-
' 
ing the armories, fortresses, supply, organization and 
direction of the army of the monarchy.2 From its creation 
the Hofkriegsrat was made d·ependent on the Hofkammer for 
funds- a dependence w~ich, originally, the latter did not 
desire,3 but eventually guarded jealously. As the !iQ!::: 
kriegsrat continued to remain dependent on the Hofkammer, 
a great conflict between these two central governments 
developed. 
The situation was complicated by the fact that, from 
1578 on, there existed a separate Hofkriegsrat in Graz for 
Inner Austria and a military department in Tyrol, each con-
cerned with the defense measures for its respective area. 
These separate war councils existed until 1705, when, with 
the waning of the Turkish danger, Joseph I subordinated them 
to the Vienna Hofkriegsrat, which from then on handled all 
military affairs for the whole Habsburg territories.4 
In 1615, under Mathias, the field of competence of the 
Hofkriegsrat became more clearly defined. 
lF.M. Mayer, op.cit., vol.II, p.275 
2Loc. cit. 
30skar Regeie, Der Osterreichische 
(Vienna: 194_9), p.l 
4Ibid., p .32 
It was entrusted 
6 - 1848 
with all matters of defense, its competence in Turkish 
affairs was emphasized and it was made directly re-
sponsible to the emperor. Thereafter,all decisions by 
the Hofkriegsrat had to be submitted directly to the 
emperor, whose placet put them into effect •. l Further-
more, Hofkriegsrat and Hofkammer were declared govern-
ment departments of equal rank. As the competence of 
a-
the Hofkriegsrat extended only to purely military matters, 
all financial matters being dealt with by the Hofkammer, 
the latter exerted great legal and even greater non-
legal influence over the freedom of action of the Hof-
kriegsrat. Thus the insufficient supply of the army 
with money and equipment can be attributed to this 
division of competences and should not be used as an argu-
ment for the incompetence of the Hofkriegsrat. During 
the Thirty Years War this arrangement proved inadequate 
and only the ability, the financial resources and the 
personality of Wallenstein were able to solve the problems 
of supply, recruitment, pay and equipment of troops. 
After the Thirty Years War the Hofkriegsrat under-
went a reorganization. It was divided into four depart-
ments, one for food supply, one for equipment (arsenals, 
artillery, ammunition, etc.)., one for recruiting and 
remounts and the fourth for fortification and other 
lrbid., p.42 
9 
building. In addition, a new supordinate office was 
established: the General Kriegs Kommissariat, with 
control over the financial administration of .the various 
army units (regiments).l 
The separation of competences, the equal rank 
accorded to the heads of the Hofkriegsrat, Hofkammer, 
and General Kriegs Kommissariat added intrigue and cabal 
to the difficulties~ In addition, many of the positions 
in these departments were staffed by civilians, .a prac-
tice which was repeatedly criticized by Austrian generals. 
In 1670, Field Marshal Montecuccoli, in his capacity as 
President of the Hofkriegsrat, informed the emperor of 
the Hofkr~egsrat's shortcomings and complained about 
civil personnel being· in charge of military affairs and 
about the complet~ financial dependence of this depart-
ment on the Hofkammer.2 Similar complaints were raised 
by Prince Eugene, whose military correspondence3 is full 
of desperate appeals for funds to cover the basic needs 
of his army and of complaints about the corruption and 
intrigues in the Vienna central government departments. 
1IQ19..' p.l9 
2A. Veltze~ Ausgewllhlte Schriften Montecuccolis,(Vienna: 
1899-1909J, vol.III, p.385r 
3Eugen ·von Savoien, Die milit~rische Korrespo~denz des 
Prinzen Eugen von Savoien, P. Heller, ed., (Vienna:l848) 
lQ . 
His letters of complaint to the emperor and especially 
those to his trusted friend, the Hofkammerrat von Palm, 
are, and this is not a journalistic exaggeration, cries of 
frustration. 
Like most of the Habsburg central government depart-
ments, the Hofkriegsrat increased rapidly· in size. In 
1556, at the time of its foundation, its personnel amounted 
to one president, four councillors and a few secretaries 
and messengers.l By 1672 this number had risen to one 
president, eight councillors, five secretaries, fourteen 
lower clerks and three servants.2 In 1719, under Prince 
Eugene, eleven generals were added as councillors, thus 
decreasing the civilian influence in this department. The 
greatest increase came under Charles VI. By 1740 the 
number of councillors had increased to thirty-six, the 
total personnel now numbering 144. On her accession, 
Maria Theresa reduced the personnel drastically.3 
It would appear, however, that, to some extent at least, 
the increase in the clerical staff and in the number of 
councillors was prompted by necessity, if one considers the 
wide field of competence of the Hofkriegsrat, the methods 
of office work and the difficulties of communications during 
lQskar Regale, op.cit., p.42 
2Gilbert Anger, op.cit., vol.II, p.943 
30skar Regale, opecit., p.42 
ll 
this period. Aside from administering the military affairs 
'of a widespread realm - from the Netherlands to the South 
of Italy, from Spain to the borders of Russia and Turkeyl -
it was also in charge of foreign relations with Turkey, 
Poland and Persia, and, until 1720, with Russia. Aside 
from purely administrative work, the Hofkriegsrat had to 
concern itself also with matters which to-day would be the 
concern of a general staff - that is, with the planning of 
operations and strategy. 
The extensiveness of the Hofkriegsrat•s field of com-
petence can be seen from a list in the FeldzHge des Prinzen 
Engen von Savoyen, (Vienna: 1876- 1892), vol.I, p.l91, 
quoted in Oskar Regale, op.cit., p.2lf. It comprised: 
1. The transmission of orders from the emperor 
to generals and army units and the drafting 
of directives given by the emperor 
2. Ali. organizational regulations 
3. The more important personnel problems; for 
example, field commanders, commandants of 
fortresses, colonels-in-chief, generals, 
staff officers, etc., the emperor reserving 
· for himself the final decision · 
4. Replacements of men and material, but in 
agreement with Hofkammer and General Kriegs 
Kommissariat 5. Table of organization and authorized strength 
of army in agreement with General Kriegs 
Kommissariat 
6. The main directives concerning supply and pay 
in agreement with General Kriegs Kommissariat 
and Central Supply department 
7. Matters concerning weapons 1 artillery, equipment 
and munitions through the otate and Court 
Quartermaster's Department 
lrbid., appendix 17 
8. Matters concerning fortification and other 
military building, through commandants of 
fortresses and through paymaster's office in 
the Department of Fortifications 
9. Affairs concerning river transport and bridge 
building through respective departments 
This list shows that the Hofkriegsrat could act in-
dependently in only a few of the fields it was concerned 
with •. 
12.. 
Many excuses and explanations for the cumbersome system 
of military administration can be given. There was, first 
of all, the complexity of the far-flung Austrian terri-
tories with their territorial, or provincial, privileges, 
with a lack of anything even faintly resembling 'national' 
unity. Although great strides tovrard the centralization 
of government had been made during the two centuries pre-
ceding Maria Theresa's reign, they were of necessity slower 
than similar strides made in states like France and Prussia. 
In addition to the political and constitutional problems 
there were the above mentioned financial ones, which, in 
turn, were linked closely to the system of taxation, under 
which the Estates had to approve the annual financial re-
quests of the crown. Under Pruss·ia 1 s very real threat to 
the existence of the monarchy, Maria Theresa was able to 
improve this system by the introduction of the Ten-Year 
Recess, a tax approved by the Estates of some of the LMnder.l 
lAlfred Ritter von Arneth, Maria Theresia, (Vienna:l863-79), 
vol. IV, p.l3ff 
The Estates of--Styria, Carniola, Goricia and Gradiska 
agreed only to a Three-Year Recess and Carinthia refused 
any co-operation. Maria Theresa was forced to collect 
the tax in Carinthia "jure regio die Praestanda",l i.e. 
the tax was collected by imperial officials. 
13 
The slowness of the Hofkriegsrat can be partially ex-
cused by the methods of clerical work and the conditions of 
communications in this period. Detailed and precise 
records of all decisions and correspondence had to be made 
to enable pinpointing of responsibilities. 2 This need for 
extreme exactness further aggravated the naturally slow pro-
cess of hand copying. In many cases, however, faster re-
action could have been expected: in 1702 Prince Eugene 
requested repeatedly the emperor's decisions in important 
matters of strategy and supply and complained to his friend 
von Palm of the incredible fact that he, as the commanding 
general of the army in Italy, had been kept in ignorance for 
more than a quarter of a year in these matters.3 The slow-
ness of the administration was also compounded by the diffi-
culties of extricating funds from the Hofkammer and the 
lErste Denkschrift Maria Theresias, J. Kallbrunner, op.cit., 
p.61 
2oskar Regele, op.cit., p.47 
3Eugen von Savoien, MilitHrische Korrespondenz ••• , vol.I, 
p.354 letter to von Palm, 29 May 1702 
additional clerical work involved in this area. Communi-
cations from the Hofkammer to the Hofkriegsrat usually 
•took from two to four \'leeks, and only in the most urgent 
cases could these delays be shortened.l In short, the 
military administration suffered from a complexity 'ivhich 
was too great for the technical means of the period. 
loskar Regele, op.cit., p.47 
14 
15. 
THE RISE OF THE STANDING ARMY 
Three things are necessary for the conduct of war: 
money, money and money. This old dictum, made popular by 
Montecucc·oli, applies to the rise of the standing armies in 
Europe during the second half of the seventeenth century. 
A well developed money economy was the prerequisite for 
the creation of the . large armies of the eighteenth century, 
and there lies one of the reasons why the Habsburgs ivere at 
a disadvantage. Emperors before Maria Theresa had been 
unable to eliminate the authority of the Estates in tax-
ation and administration, which seriously limited the ability 
of the crown to tap the resources of the monarchy through 
taxation. This financial weakness may have been one of 
the reasons why some of the military theorists of this 
period still advocated armies of rather limited size. 
Nontecucc·oli proposed 30,000 men as the optimal size of an 
army: "One fights more with the brain than with the body, 
therefore great numbers are not always advantageous. 111 
Field Marshal Khevenhtiller2 suggested that "the size of an 
lRaimond Montecuccoli, Gesammelte Schriften, vol.l pp 3~7 
and 3641 quoted in Hans Delbrllck, Ges~hichte der Kriegs-kunst, ~Berlin: 1962), vol.IV, p.l+29f 
2Ludwig Andreas, Graf Khevenhfiller, (1683- 1744), Austrian 
field marshal during Wars of the Austrian Succession 
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army should be 1) according to (the strength of) the 
1nemy, 2) according to the terrain, 3) according to the 
fortresses, 4) as small as possible.nl There were other 
reasons for this advocacy of small armies besides the 
financia-l and organizational problems. The slow-firing 
matchlock musket was being replaced by the faster firing 
fusil which, together with the adoption of the bayonet, 
was leading to the complete disappearance of pikemen. 
Although these advances in weaponry brought with them 
changes in tactics which required well-drilled troops, 
they were not paralleled by the development of uniform 
drill regulations. For this reason, large armies, not 
drilled uniformly, would have been unmanageable. Prob-
lems: of supply also were responsible for the limited 
size of the armies. 
Considerations of both foreign and internal politics 
promoted the emergence of standing armies. In the Habs-
burg lands two specific reasons can be discerned: the 
increasing and continuous threat to the borders . by the 
Turks during the late seventeenth century and the proven 
unreliability of the levies of the Estates during the 
Thirty Years War, 1.,rhen, for example, the Bohemian levi.~s 
had turned against the Habsburgs. Of course, the 
lAndreas Khevenhfiller, Kurzer Begriff aller militHrischen 
Operationen, (Vienna: 1738), P•7 
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aggressive policies of Louis XIV, whose army could be called 
a standing army, also added to the desire to create a perman-
ent force under the direct control of the emperor. 
The armies of mercenaries of the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries were not state institutions. The 
Imperial army of the sixteenth century still consisted of 
the feudal levies, mercenaries of the emperor himself, 
troops recruited by the Ll:l.nder, the militia of the Estates 
and the Hungarian Insurrektion (the feudal levies of the 
Hungarian magnates).l 
By the early seventeenth century the legal basis for 
feudal levies was still extant, but the levies were no more 
used. During the Thirty Years War mercenaries and the 
troops of the Estates had proven untrustworthy, so that 
the recruiting system was the only solution left. \vall en-
stein, with his great financial resources, developed it 
into what was really more a private than an Imperial army.2 
In Wallenstein's day, regimental patents were issued to 
experienced colonels or captains, who had to finance the 
recruiting and outfitting of their units. Sometimes patents 
were issued for smaller units - FMhnlein or companies. The 
patents were issued at first by the emperor, later during 
the war by Wallenstein himself, and each holder of such a 
loskar Regele, op.cit., p.l7 
2G. Anger, op.cit., vol.I., p.695ff 
patent was allotted a recruiting district. In spite of 
' Wallenstein's popularity, reputation and resources, volun-
teers were not plentiful enough.l Hence, the excesses of 
recruiting parties, which had their better known equivalent 
in the English press gangs, developed. In addition, in 
spite of strict laws forbidding excesses toward the civilian 
population, the newly recruited soldiers, mostly old, tough 
veterans: or the scum of the towns, commit ted excesses, which 
the authorities were unable to prevent. Therefore, towns 
often tried, successfully, to buy themselves off from being 
declared as recruiting places. Nuremberg, in 1626, paid 
hundred thousand Gulden to free itself from the burden of 
becoming a recruiting area and fifteen thousand Thaler to 
free itself from the billeting of newly recruited soldiers 
within its walls.2 The excesses connected with the recruit-
ing parties were to last well into the eighteenth century 
and were partly res·ponsible for the high rate of desertion 
in the armies of the late seventeenth and the eighteenth 
century. Not until the introduction of conscription under 
Joseph II were these shortcomings eliminated to any consider-
able degree. 
During the early seventeenth century troops were re-
cruited for a specified time, at least for the duration of 
libid., vol.I, p.697 
2Ibid., vol.I., p.696 
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the war, although several regiments were dissolved during 
periods of lulls in the fighting, e.g. in 1630.1 The 
dismissal of troops always posed a danger to the country-
side, as bands of discharged soldiers terrorized the peasants. 
There is a dual aspect to the development of large 
standing armies during the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries in Central Europe. On the one hand, 
the struggle for supremacy in Europe that began with the 
reign of Louis XIV called for far larger armies than con-
templated by Montecuccoli. On the other hand, the creation 
and maintenance of large standing armies necessitated wrest-
ing financial authority and control of military admini-
stration away from the Estates and combining control of 
financial and military affairs in the hands of the crown. 
Such central control was imperative to make standardized 
drill and training feasible. At the same time, the creation 
of a large standing army under central control placed an 
instrument in the hands of the crown to enhance yet further 
its authority at the expense of the Estates. 
The first step in this direction was taken in 1627 -
after the army of the rebellious Bohemian Estates had been 
decisively defeated in the battle of the White Mountain in 
1621 - with the Verneuerte Landesordnung for Bohemia, which, 
among other points, forbade the Bohemian Estates the re-
libid., vol.II, p.703 
2Q 
·-cruiting of troops. In 1635 Ferdinand II declared the ius 
belli armorum in Bohemia his privilege. 
Even before the end of the Thirty Years War, Field 
Marshall Montecuccnli advocated the formation of a standing 
army. In his De constituenda militia perpetua in statibus 
Austriacis, (1648), he advocated the formation of standing 
forces and the building of barracks, and he argued against 
the supply of food to the troops by the population.l (The 
latter two suggestions had to wait to be implemented until 
Maria Theresa's reign). In his Memorie he argued the ad-
vantages of a standing army, which would raise the prestige 
of the state and make it possible to preserve peace or to 
make vrar at an opportune time or to aid frien~s, as there 
would always be trained soldiers at hand. He pointed out 
that the upkeep of a standing army would be cheaper than 
the frequent dissolution and subsequent re-recruitment and 
training of regiments.2 He suggested that a certain number 
of homes in each village be assessed with the upkeep of one 
soldier •. 3 That the field marshal 'l.vas no politic ian is 
shown by his naive argument that "··· the Estates would not 
really use their powers if they would permanently approve 
lF.M. Mayer, op.cit., vol.II, p.276 
2wallenstein, too, had tried to prove this point. See: G. 
Anger, op.cit., vol.II, p.703 
3Max JHhns, op.cit., vol.II, p.ll68 
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the sums they now approve annually."l 
The legal basis for the creation of a standing army was 
the resolution by Ferdinand III in 1649 to retain nine 
infantry regiments, nine cuirassier regiments and one 
dragoon regiment, all of which had been formed during the 
war. They were to receive replacements by handling their 
own recruiting and thus were not subject to the contri-
butions of the LHnder. All other regiments were dissolved.2 
It is of interest that, although ninetee.nth and twenti-
eth century historians consider the above date the birth 
date of the Austrian standing army, Hoyer, writing in 1797, 
does not call these retained regiments a standing army. 
He feels that the nearly continuous wars of the late seven-
teenth century led to recurrent diss:olution and recreation 
of regiments, thus giving a semblance of a standing army.3 
The retained regiments of Ferdinand III can, ho,.,rever, safely 
be called the core of the Austrian standing army. The 
following table shall illustrate this point. As some regi-
ments· were dissolved after each war, new ones were formed 
soon after and the number of regiments steadily increased. 
1 loc. cit. 
2A •. Wrede, Geschichte der k.u.k. Whermacht, (Vienna:l898) 
vol. I, p.13 
3J. Hoyer, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, (G8ttingeri: 1798) 
vol.I, p.3 
1649 9 infantry regiments· 10 cavalry regiments 
1672 19 " " 20 II tl 1705 37 II tl 35 tl II 
1710 40 II II 37 II " 
1728 65 It " 54 " II 1740 52 tl " 40 II " 1 · 
However, central control and inspection of the in-
dividual regiments remained insufficient. This became 
evident in the corruption connected with recruiting and 
promotions as well as in the continued lack of general 
reglements and uniform practices in field tactics. 
lA. Wrede, 9p.c1t., vol.I, p.l4 and 
Franz Mfiller~ Die kaiserl. k8nigl. 8sterreichische Armee, 
(Prague: 184,), vol.II, Po279ff 
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TACTICS OF THE EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
During the seventeenth century the whole system of war-
fare was in a state of flux and underwent one of the most 
drastic changes in military history. Minor tactics changed 
radically as a result of changes and advances in weaponry 
and of practical experiences gleaned during the long wars. 
Before the fifteenth century the main striking force 
of an army was the knightly cavalry. The appearance of well 
disciplined and long-serving infantry,! trained to withstand 
cavalry, led to a gradual decline in the importance of this 
knightly cavalry. However, with its transformation into a 
recruited force during the seventeenth century, the impor-
tance and relative strength of cavalry rose again. Where-
as, during the sixteenth century it had formed only a small 
part of an army, during the Thirty Years War the cavalry 
formed at times half of a typical army.2 
At the beginning of the Thirty Years lvar the pikemen 
formed the majority and the main striking force of the in-
fantry, outnumbering the musketeers three to one.3 By the 
lor which the English long-bow men and the Swiss pikemen 
of the fifteenth century were the outstanding examples 
2Hans Delbrftck, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, (Berlin: 1962), 
vol.IV, p.328 
3-Lynn Montross, War through the Ages;:, (New York:l960) ,p.2270 
~nd of the war the number of pikemen had drastically de-
clined, although the exact relation of pikemen to musketeers 
varied in different armies. By 1670, in the imperial army 
under Montecuccoli, pikemen formed only one third of the 
infantry.l 
Although steadily decreasing in number, pikemen were re-
tained in all armies until about 1700, notwithstanding that 
doubts regarding their value had been expressed since early 
in the seventeenth century. Rarely did it come to a c1ash 
of pikemen during a battle; one side usually retreated before 
it came to hand-to-hand fighting. The German writer 
Grimmelshausen, who had fought in the Thirty Years War, 
stated in his Seltsamer Springinsfeld, (1670), that "the man 
who kills a pikeman, kills an innocent man: although these 
poor fellows are supposed to protect their brigades from 
cavalry attacks, they hurt no one and the man deserves his 
fate, who runs into a pike." He vouched that he had rarely 
observed a pikeman killing anyone.2 
The controversy over the armament lasted for over a 
century. The pike was considered the only effective means 
of defense against cavalry and the pike squares formed the 
backbone· of the armies of the seventeenth century. The pike 
1Raimund Montecuccoli, Besondere und Geheime Kriegsnachrichten 
(Leipzig: 1736), p.2~ 
2G. Anger, op.cit., vol.II, p.736 
squares were reinforced by musketeers, who, however, had to 
~etreat behind or to within the squares in case of cavalry 
a-ttack. Such retreats often resulted in confusion and 
opened gaps between the pike squares. Yet, in spite of 
this, the number of musketeers rose continuously. 
The administrative unit of an army was the regimen~, 
the average size of which was between seven hundred and one 
thousand five hundred men.l The tactical unit, however, 
was the battalion, a name given to any number o~ infantry 
united in the field into a square. · (e.g.: during the battle 
of Leipzig, 1631, : two thousand men).2 
The usual battle order consisted of infantry squares in 
the center, flanked by cavalry. The army was arranged in 
two lines with a third line sometimes as tactical reserve. 
Each infantry square consisted of a core of pikemen, flanked 
by ranks of musketeers, often with one or two ranks of musket-
eers in front. At the beginning of the Thirty Years War 
these squares were usually ten deep. Various considerations-
the clumsiness of the massive.formation, its· vulnerability to 
artillery and even musket fire, and the difficulty of obtain-
ing pikemen in sufficient numbers - they had less oppor-
tunity to loot than the musketeers, who could be used in the 
"small war" - led to a gradual reduction in the depth of the 
lJ.G .. Hoyer, op.cit., vol.I, p.333f 
2rbid., vol.I, p.465 · 
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formation. By the end of the war, the imperial infantry 
was arranged six deep. 
At the beginning of the war the musketeers, standing 
eight to ten deep, on the flanks of the pike squares, fired 
by using the caracole.l Gustavus Adolphus reduced the depth 
of the musketeer formation to six ranks. He also intro-
duced an alternate method of firing, the peloton fire.2 
The development of faster firing muskets made this 
shallower formation possible and desirable, as it permitted 
fuller use of . f.i.r.epower. over a broader front. Moreover, 
this increased fir..epo:we~. · gradually transformed the battalion 
into a force armed for fire action rather than shock action. 
Thus, the increase of "f:.irepo.wer·, the reduct! on of the 
number of pikemen and the thinning of the formation went 
hand in hand. 
Firing and loading was very cumbersome and slow. . Nearly 
one hundred moves -were necessary and prescribed for this pro-
cess. No wonder that the musketeer found · time for firing 
only a few rounds during a battle. At Kinzingen, in 1636, 
lin this maneuver the first line, after having fired, parted 
in the center, ran along the front and around the formation 
where it reformed behind the last rank. The other ranks 
followed the same maneuver in sequence. A variation pro-
vided for the musketeers to run through the lines to reform 
in the rear, a faster method, but it made the formation more 
vulnerable to cavalry attack because of the wider intervals 
necessary •. 
2The peloton was a subdivision of the battalion. 
of pelotons per battalion varied. 
The number 
_ the Swedish infantry was praised because even the slowest 
musketeer fired at least seven rounds during the battle, 
which lasted several hours.l 
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The · actual ·proc:ess· of a battle was still simple at the 
beginning of the war: infantry and cavalry advanced at the 
same slow speed toward the enemy. Maneuvers and evolutions 
during the battle were made nearly impossible by the clumsi-
ness of the massive formations. Gustavus Adolphus intro-
duced several changes which were eventually copied by other 
armies: deviations from the standard battle order according 
to the terrain and the observed position of the enemy, intro-
duction of simple maneuvers during the battle and reduction 
of the depth of the formation to six ranks. 
The Peace of Westphalia marked the end of a period in 
military tactics. Tentative innovations and experiments 
made during the war, especially by the Swedes, were in part 
adopted by other armies. During the second half of the 
seventeenth century the basis for eighteenth century warfare 
and tactics were laid by the initiative of French and Austrian 
generals •. 
lJ.G. Hoyer, op.cit., vol.I, p.446 
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THE LATE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
The outstanding Austrian - or Imperial - general of 
the late seventeenth century was Raimund Prince Montecuccoli, 
President of the Hofkriegsrat from 1668 until his death in 
1681. He was the first important Austrian military theore-
tician and writer and the only one before Field Marshal 
KhevenhUller, who wrote during the third and fourth decades 
of the eighteenth century. In this area Austria clearly 
lagged behind France and Italy, whose military writers were 
the leading theoreticians of the period between the Thirty 
Years War and the middle of the eighteenth century. How-
ever, Montecuccoli and KhevenhUller were men of practice 
rather than inventors of systems, unlike, for example, Folard 
and the marechal de Saxe, and, as ~ such, their writings 
constitute a more valuable source for actual battle tactics 
of their times. 
In spite of the now increased fire power, a result of 
improved weapons, Montecuccoli still considered the pike im-
portant for the infantry - 11 the queen of vreapons. nl He did 
not believe that musketeers alone could withstand a cavalry 
lRaimund Montecuccoli, op.cit., p.l2 
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attack.l He therefore insisted that the front of musket-
eers between the pike squares be no wider than seventy to 
eighty men,2 as otherwise cavalry could open a gap in the 
front line. His argument seemed to have been a sound one 
considering the conditions of the time. In 1674 the French 
marshal Turenne, for example, protected his infantry against 
a German cavalry attack by forming a pike square with his 
musketeers in its center. 
to attempt penetration.3 
The German cavalry did not dare 
Montecuccoli retained the formation in six ranks. A 
shallower one he considered too vulnerable, a greater depth 
would have been worthless, as the pikes of the sixth rank 
reached only to the first rank.4 
The battle order, according to Montecuccoli, still con-
sisted of the army arranged in two lines, the infantry in 
each line in six ranks, the cavalry in three ranks. The 
battalion was still the tactical unit of the infantry with a 
suggested strength of 1280 men: 480 pikemen, 720 musketeers 
and 80 shield-bearers, whose task it was to 'sneak' between 
the attacking cavalry.5 He favoured alternating infantry 
libid., p.l4 
2~0, p.20 
3Hans Delbrfick, op.cit., vol.IV, p.305 
4aaimund Montecuccoli, op.cit., p.20 
5rbid., p.23f 
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battalions and cavalry squadrons although the usual practice 
was, a practice which was retained into the eighteenth 
century, to place the cavalry on each wing of the battle 
order. 
The handling of the musket, loading and firing, was 
still a slow and cumbersome process, as was the firing in 
formation. Musketeers standing in six ranks could keep up 
a more or less continuous fire only by using the caracole 
or by passing through the files.l 
. On the subject of drill Montecuccoli still . adhered to 
the ideas of the previous period: the soldier should teach 
himself the handling of his weapon and keep himself physi-
cally fit; he should be trained in groups to practice the 
simple evolutions used: turns, opening and closing of the 
ranks and files, etc. The simpler and fewer the moves 
practiced, the better, he thought, the soldiers would per~ 
form in battle.2 He saw no need for extensive, concen-
trated drill. It is s i gnificant that he devotes only one 
page of his lengthy Kriegsnachrichten to the subject of 
training and drill~ 
Of great importance were the developments, during this 
period, in strategic thinking. Because of its complexity 
this subject can only be touched upon in this paper. The 
lHans DelbrUck, op.cit., vol.IV, p.307 
2Raimund Montecuccoli, op.cit., p.163 
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gradually increasing size of field armies, coupled with the 
realization that living off the land seriously hampered an 
army's freedom of movement, led to increasing reliance on 
supply depots. Henceforth an army no longer had to go 
where food was available, but where the position of the 
enemy would require it to go. The reliance on depots, how-
ever, shortened the operational radius of an army, and 
strategy now began to aim at maneuvering the enemy away from 
his magazines or to capture them. New and different supply 
problems now arose. On the other hand, the components of 
an army now could be kept closer together. When the great 
tactical changes of the early eighteenth century, which 
required better drill and stricter discipline, appeared, one 
of the prerequisite conditions for such training - concen-
tration of troops - was already in existence. 
FROM THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY TO 1740 
The end of the seventeenth century saw art intensifi-
cation of the rapUlity of change in the development of 
weapons and tactics. The adoption by all armies of two 
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innovations was responsible for the most important and 
consequential tactical changes: the development of a faster 
firing, reliable fusil and the adoption of the bayonet. 
The fast firing fusil made it possible for the first rank to 
be ready to fire the second round after the volley of the 
third rank. Thus a formation deeper than three ranks be-
came unnecessary and undesirable. Yet, this change to a 
formation in three ranks did not come suddenly. The drill 
manual composed by the Austrian Colonel von Ogilvy, issued 
for his regiment in 1690, prescribes a battle formation in 
four ranks. The Austrian regiments took the lead by adopt-
ing this formation in four ranks at the beginning of the 
eight~::.Juth century.l The French reduced the depth of their 
formation to five in 1703 and to four during the War of the 
Spanish Succession.2 The Prussians adopted the formation 
lwilhelm Erben, "Kriegsartikel und Reglements als Quellen 
zur Geschichte der k.k. Armee," in Mitteilungen des k.u.k. 
Heeresmuseums, (Vienna:1902) Heft 1, p.l93o This article 
deals only with regimental Reglements before 1737 
2R.S. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare, (New York: 
1957) P•9 
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in four ranks in 1702.1 
The long argument about the value of pikes was finally 
settled by the adoption of the bayonet, which gave the fusil 
of the infantry the qualities of both fire and shock weapon. 
The experience of the Austrians with the· Turkfsh cav·alry, 
which was often able to break the pikes with their sabres, 
may have been the reason why the Austrians became the first 
to abandon the pike in favour ~the bayonet during the last 
years of the seventeenth century.2 The French retained the 
pike until about 1703. The other armies of Europe followed 
shortly thereafter. However, the marechal de Saxe, (1696 
to 1750), still advocated the use of the pike in his 
Reveries and as late as 1818 (!)two articles appeared in an 
Austrian military journal3 which· advocated the re-intro- · 
duction of the pike. However, the pike had disappeared for-
ever. 
Clearly, the increased firepower and the bayonet had 
brought about the thin line formation of the eighteenth 
century. Now the argument of the general value, effect and 
use of firepower became more urgent. Of the various types 
of firing in formation, the peloton fire in which each 
lMax ~ JHhns, op.cit., vol.II, p.l652 
2J.G. Hoyer, op.cit., vol.II, p.84 
3---,"Ideen tiber den Gebrauch der Pike?" Osterreichische 
HilitHrische Zeitschrift,(Vienna:l818J vol.2 and 3 
peloton fired by ranks and the battalion by alternating 
pelotons to keep up a continuous fire, became the most 
favoured method, followed in importance by the method of 
firing by whole ranks in succession. Aiming was usually 
discouraged, partly because of the inaccuracy of the fusil, 
partly because exact salvoes were considered to be more 
effective than scattered, aimed fire.l Keeping up a regu-
lar peloton fire during battle proved, however, practi-
cally impossible; after one or two orderly discharges on 
· command every man fired more or less at his own speed .2 
(The Prussian infantry, drilled and disciplined to a degree 
of exactness previously unknown, was to come closest to the 
ideal). In all armies, the troops were ordered not to 
fire without command. (The soldier who disobeyed was to 
be 'run through' by the nearest officer). The better disi-
plined and drilled a.n army, the better this rule could be 
put into practice. 
Usually, an army advancing toward the enemy had to stop 
to fire. As it was often difficult to get the men moving 
again, several generals advocated attack without firing. 
The marechal de Saxe advocated this in his Reveries3 and the 
lffans Delbrftck, op.cit., vol.IV, p.308 
2ill.Q.. ' . p.310 
3Maurice de Saxe, Reveries on the Art of War, Thorn. Philips, 
trans., (Harrisburg: 1944), p.32 
Austrians tried it in the battle of Chotusitz in 1742 but 
suffered great losses through the accurate, regular fire of 
· the Prussians .. 
The advantages of the bayonet in the fight of infantry 
against infantry were only slowly realized. At the be-
ginning of the eighteenth century the bayonet was inserted 
only just before reaching the enemy lines or in case of 
cavalry attack.l Although the socket bayonet was intro-
duced around 1700, firing with fixed bayonet was not used 
until the Prussians introduced it in 1732. 2 It is of 
interest here to note that - as in the case of the pikes -
actual hand to hand fighting with fixed bayonets rarely 
occurred.3 
There was little difference between the armies of the 
great powers in regard to tactical changes and innovations. 
In none of the great armies did the generals fully under-
stand all the implications of the new developments: the thin 
line formation, the uniformly armed infantry and the in-
creased firepower. The first army to draw the right con-
elusions from all these changes was the Prussian army. 
1 This, of course, had been the original purpose of the intro-
duction of the bayonet: to replace the pike as a defence 
against cavalry attack. 
2J.G •. Hoyer, op.cit., vol.II, p.90 
3Hans Delbrtlck, op.cit., vo.l.IV, p.309. The Prince de Ligne 
reports that he saw this happen only once during all his 
campaigns 
Within the span of about half a century Prussia had 
risen from one of the insignificant German states to the 
most efficiently ruled and strongest of the smaller powers. 
It had been blessed with a period of relative peace from 
the end of the seventeenth century to 1740 so that its fi-
nances were not taxed by wars. (Although Prussian con-
tingents took part in the War of the Spanish Succession 
and in the wars against the Turks - on the side of the 
Habsburgs - she was not unduly burdened by this). A sue-
cession of three strong and able rulers had managed to har-
ness the Pruss ian Estates much more thoroughly than :.the 
Austrians and even the French had managed to do with theirs. 
In addition, the Prussian rulers had given the nobility a 
purpose as servants of the king and the ·state. The reign 
of Frederick William I was especially important for the 
development of the army. This monarch's dedication to his 
army, to military spectacles as well as to the practical 
purposes of the army, forged the instrument, which was to 
become the most effective army of Europe in the hands of 
his so~ Frederick II. Frederick William I also had the ad-
vice of able generals, among whom Prince Leopold of Anhalt-
Dessau most clearly perceived the implications of the new 
tactical developments. He, more than anyone else, saw the 
necessity for thoroughly trained and strictly disciplined 
troops, in order to ensure the successful application of the 
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new tactiQs. 
Among the purely technical improvements introduced by 
the Prussians, the most important was the introduction 
throughout the whole army of iron ramrods in 1718, to re-
place the wooden ones, which frequently broke in the heat 
of battle. (The Austrians did not introduce them until 
1744 after their bad experiences during the First Silesian 
Warl and the French did not adopt them until 1745).2 
These iron ramrods contributed significantly to the pre-
cision and effectiveness of the fire of the. Prussian infan-
try, as demonstrated against the Austrians during the First 
Silesian War. 
Of greater significance were the tactical reforms and 
the emphasis on drill and discipline, which later was to 
become proverbial for the Prussian army. 
As mentioned above, the evolutions of troops and the 
moves involved in loading and firing had still been very 
slow and deliberate at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century. This was of necessity so, considering the many 
moves required and in view of the superficial drill enforced 
at that time in all armies. Frederick William and Leopold 
von Dessau realized that the effect of infantry fire depended 
1 ___ , 6sterreichischer Erbfolgekrieg~ ed. k.u.k. Kriegsarchiv 
(Vienna: 1896), vol. I, part 1, p.3~2 
2Hans DelbrHck, op.cit., vol. IV, p.306 
not only on the number of rifles employed, but especially 
on the number of rounds fired within a certain span of 
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time.1 Therefore, the greatest emphasis was put on achiev-
ing such rapidity of fire that the enemy would be thrown in-
to disorder as soon as it entered the effective zone of 
rifle fire. To achieve this, extensive ~raining was needed 
and strenuous drill was soon to fill nearly the ~hole day 
of the Prussian soldier.2 The new approach found its way 
into the Prussian drill Reglement of 1726, which repeatedly 
emphasized speed in all necessary moves.3 
This rapid fire, of course, taxed the nerves and concen-
tration of officers, NCOs and men to the utmost, as officers 
and some NCOs stood in front of the lines. Only through 
extensive drill could the decimation of the officers corps 
be avoided. 
Of great importance was the re-introduction of the march-
in-step, on the initiative of the Prince of Dessau. It had 
been used in all armies until the second half of the seven-
teenth century, but had fallen into disuse, as it was thought 
dispensable with the new line formation. Dessau, however, 
realized that it was only this stiff step in cadence which 
1--~, 6sterreichischer Erbfolgekrieg, vol.I, part 1, p.544 . 
2J.G. Hoyer, op.cit., vol.II, p.98 Curt Jany, Geschichte der 
Preussischen Armee,(Osnabr-tlck: 1967), vol.I, p.Bl_B,: reports 
by officers indicate that the training in rapid fire in the 
Prussian army dates from about 1718 · 
3Max Jahns, op.cit., vol.II, p.l663f 
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would give solidity and precision to the movements of the 
long, thin lines, as well as physical and psychological bal-
ance to . the individual soldier.l 
The Prussians did not stop at the drill of the indi-
vidual soldiers and army units. Beginning in 1714, annual 
training camps and maneuvers were held, in which several 
regiments at least were drawn together.2 During Frederick 
William I's time these maneuvers were not yet maneuvers in 
the modern sense, but rather troop revues and displays of 
drill.3 (Tactical maneuvers with imitations of battle con-
di tions 1.vere introduced after the Second Silesian War, 
around 1750). However, these military 'shows', combined 
with the strenuous daily drill, produced a well trained 
and disciplined force of such machine-like exactness that 
it was unparalleled in any other army. 
The Prussians also realized, earlier than other nations, 
that the new 1.veapons necessitated a shallmoTer formation, 
which would make possible a longer line and a more efficient 
use of firepower. From 1718 on the Prussian infantry was 
formed in three ranks for the purpose of firing, i.e. during 
firing drill and during battle. Any line formation for a 
purpose other than firing still consisted of four ranks. 
1 ___ , Osterreichischer Erbfolgekrieg, vol.I, p.545 
2curt Jany, op.cit., vol.I, p.833 
3rbid., p.834 
Dessau was unable to get accepted his more radical sug-
gestion to reduce the line to two ranks or at least to 
three ranks for all purposes. He realized that even the 
third rank was of little value: as only the first rank 
fired in kneeling position, the third rank usually tended 
to fire into the air.l Hmvever, the formation during 
battle in three ranks was better than that in four ranks, 
which ~er the Austrians retained until 1757. 2 
While the Prussians, during Frederick William I 1 s reign, 
realized the implications of the new -developments, the 
Austrian army, and for that matter, all others, remained 
rather stagnant and apparently did not grasp the impli-
cations. Two main explanations offer themselves for this. 
The Prussian king was commander-in-chief in practice as well 
as in theory. The Prussian constitutional development had 
given the monarch much more direct power and influence over 
all matters of state, as well as over the nobility, than 
the Habsburgs possessed before the great reforms of Maria 
Theresa and Joseph II. This greater central control by 
the Prussia.n monarch, combined 1.-rith Frederick \villiam' s 
nearly fanatic interest in his army, an interest, not shared 
by Austria's Charles VI, can answer part of this questiono 
l ___ ' Osterreichischer Erbfolgekrieg, vol.I, part 1, p.546 
2J.G. Hoyer, op.cit., vol.III, p.548 
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The other part of the answer may be found in the character 
and personality of Prince Eugene of Savoy. Whereas he did 
not slavishly adhere to the rather timid and doctrinaire 
strategic thinking of his time, and adapted troop movements 
to the requirements of the moment, and often gambled in 
making decisions,1 he contributed little or nothing to tacti-
cal theory or to the implementation of the new technological 
developments. Moreover, he did not make serious efforts to 
intensify the training of the troops. His aversion to ex-
aggerated drill ·and his conservatism was recognized by his 
contemporaries. Although some officers spoke out for uni-
form drill regulations and better training during Eugene's 
term of office as President of the Hofkriegsrat, he did not 
make use of the power of his office to initiate such measures. 
Although his military correspondence is full of complaints 
about corruption, administrative inefficiency and lack of 
funds, there is a conspicuous absen.ce of similar complaints 
regarding the lack of training and uniform drill regulations. 
An officer of Eugene's army considered the prince a man of 
habit who disliked changing established procedures of daily 
military routine.2 Although on~ of the greatest generals 
of Europe, he had many weaknesses in re~ard to matters of 
1Max Braubach, Prinz Eugen von Savoien, (Munich:l963)vol.V, 
p.346f and p.353 
2st. Saphorin, an Austrian officer, (1729), quoted by Max 
Braubach, op.cit., vol.V, p.232 
detail. Although he knew of the parades, maneuvers and 
extensive drill practices of the Prussian army, he ridi-
culed Frederick William's love for 'theatrics' and he did 
not seem impressed.l Furthermore, during the last years 
of his life, Eugene seemed to have lost much of his elan 
and even to have approached senility, and these were the 
years when the results of the Prussian training and their 
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new discipline became most apparent. There also may have 
been a reluctance on the part of Eugene to stir up a hornet's 
nest, as the colonels-in-chief of th~ various regiments 
guarded their rights and privileges very jealously. At 
that time radical innovations and strict control from above 
might have caused trouble and might have been of doubtful 
success. It is of interest, however, that two years be-
fore his death he apparently recognized the success of the 
Prussian_reforms, when he informed the Court Chancellor 
Sinzendorf., in l734, that the Prussian contingents form the 
nucleus of the. German armies' that the rest were nearly 
worthless.2 In spite of all this, Eugene still won practi-
cally every battle he f~ught. The armies of his enemies 
were no better trained or disciplined than his own; moreove~ 
he had most of the qualit~es which make a great general, and 
he had that portion of luck so necessary for military succes~ 
1Ibid., vol.V., p.438, Eugene to General Senckendorff, 1729. 
2quoted in Max 3Mhns, op.cit., vol.II, p.l669 
These factors may well have made him complacent. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DRILL REGLEMENTS 
The Austrian Regimental Reglements 
In Austria the first drill and duty manuals, the so-
called Exercitia and Reglements, were developed during the 
second half of the seventeenth century. Although a modern · 
army without such manuals would be unthinkable, the mercen-
aries of the sixteenth and most of the seventeenth centuries 
did not know them~ ' The Landsknechte apparently felt no 
need for drill manuals, as the experienced soldiers drilled 
the recruits in the use of the pike and the matchlock musket. 
Montecuccoli's voluminous Memorie della Guerral devotes only 
one page to the drill of troops. The soldier was to prac-
tice by himself the handling of the musket and to train him-
self in rQ~ning, wrestling, swimming, etc., The simple 
evolutions used in battle - turns, opening and closing of 
ranks, etc. - were to be practiced in groups. The po-
sitions of the pike, used to defend the infantry square 
against cavalry attack, were also to be practiced in groups. 
The fewer and quicker the movements taught, Montecuccoli 
advised, the better the performance of the army would be in 
1Ms in KA, Abt. VI, first printing 1692; here used: German 
translation, Besondere und Geheime Kriegsnachrichten,(l736) 
the face of the enemy.l However, Nontecucc·oli did recom-
mend the appointment of drill masters in each regiment, al-
though he felt it would be better if the officers themselves 
would drill the soldiers, 2 a remark which points to a grave 
defect of seventeenth and early eighteenth century armies: 
the fact that officers neglected their duties and paid 
little attention to the training of their units. Com-
plaints about this neglect can be found as late as the 
middle of the eighteenth century. 
In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries 
attempts were made in Germany and Tyrol to arm the country 
population, to. form the general levy. As the improvement 
in firearms made more uniform drill necessary, various 
Reglements were composed for the instruction of such levies. 
The first printed Austrian drill manual was issued in Tyrol 
in 1653: the Handbfichel zum Exerzieren by Lt. Col. Girardi 
von Castel, a Tyrolian war councillor and commander of the 
fortress· Scharni tz in Tyrol in 1648. It is possible that 
earlier Austrian Reglements in manuscript form existed.3 
The first _German drill manual had been composed. by Landgraf 
Moriz von . Hessen and printed in 16004 and the manual by 
lMontecuccoli, op.cit., p.l5f 
2Ibid., p.l62f 
3w. Erben, op.cit., p.l3f 
4Nax J~hns, op.cit., vol.II, p. 883 
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Castel apparently had its roots in this Hessian manual. 
Other German states produced similar manuals for their le-
vies, e.g. Nassau in 1608 and Anhalt in 1620. 
These provincial levies were usually inferior to the 
professional armies of Landsknechte, although the latter 
were neither regularly drilled, nor did they use drill 
manuals. Nevertheless, these early militia manuals are 
significant, as they provided the models for the later 
generally used drill Reglements. Although the above 
mentioned Tyrolian manual incorporated ·several new tactical : 
ideas, such as provision for a shallower line formation if 
the terrain made it possible and for loading and firing at 
a standstill, as well as during a slow advance, the need 
for the issuing of drill Reelements for the.whole army was 
not recognized by the Austrian central authorities. On 
the contrary, from the end of the seventeenth century, regi-
mental commanders began to issue their own manuals, frequent-
ly copying from each other.l 
Among the best known of these regimental Reglements are 
the Reglement fiber ein Kayserliches Regiment zu Fuss by FML2 
Regal, (1728), the Exercitium des Grafen Wallis'schen Regi-
ments zu Fuss, (1705), and the Richtschnur des Grafen 
Daun'schen Regiments zu Fuss:,(l733)3 Although designed for 
1Loc. cit. 
2Feldmarschalleutnant : lieutenant general 
3Max JHhns, op.cit., vol.II, p.l669ff 
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a regiment of dragoons, the Exercitium zu Pferd und zu Fuss, 
(1726), by Field Marshal Ludwig Andreas Count Khevenhffller 
should be mentioned here, as it achieved the greatest popu-
larity and is characterized by its clarity of explanation 
in stark contrast to the cumbersome language of the other 
regimental Reglements. The above mentioned Reglements 
and several others appeared in print, some in several 
editions., and thus achieved wider popularity. It should 
be noted, however, that these printed editions resulted 
from private initiative; most regiments used manuals in 
manuscript form. 
The correlation between these regimental Reglements, 
most of which appeared between the early years of the 
eighteenth century and 1730, has not yet been thoroughly 
examined. A study of such correlation would be necessary 
in order to ascertain the degree to which the various 
Austrian regiments varied in their drill and in their tacti-
cal maneuvers. Preliminary examinations of these Regle-
ments have shown that the main variations lay in the in-
structions regulating the speed of firing and in the manner 
of performing evolutions in formation.l 
According to the Austrian general,Prince de Ligne, 
these Reglements were usually poor imitations of foreign 
lw. Erben, op.cit., p.2lff 
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examples and their differences led to great disadvantages.l 
The significance of the absence of general drill regu-
lations for the whole army lies not only in the differences 
between the various regimental Reglements, but also in the 
fact that the Austrian regiments, in general, were not 
even well trained according to their respective Reglements. 
Regimental commanders rarely inspected their regiments, and 
thus the lieutenant colonels did as they pleased, each 
according to his ability and sense of duty. General Regal 
refered .to the confusion resulting from the lack of general 
drill regulations in the preface of his regimental Reglement 
which he composed between 1708 and 1713.1 He argued that 
daily experience taught that anything but a consensus exist-
ed in the Imperial army, that there were as many different 
commands as there were generals. Officers were confused 
by the many and different orders, with the result that they 
were unsure which was correct and supposed to have been 
general usage. Accordingly, good arrangements, which may 
have existed here and there in a regiment were forgotten so 
that officers did not even know anymore how to receive and 
salute commanding generals.2 Regal stated clearly and em-
phatically that the provisions of this manual were to be 
lw. Erben, op.cit., p.l8f 
2 From the introduction t~ Regal's Reglement, quoted in Franz 
MHller, op.cit., vol.II, p.314f 
adhered to strictly, unless commanding generals gave con-
tradicting orders. Then their commands were to be obeyed, 
but only as long as they were in command, as thereafter all 
their orders "would come to an end.nl 
The Development of the Prussian Drill Reglements 
In Prussia, mainly because of the different consti-
tutional developments, the control of the army being much 
more firmly in the hands of the monarch, the development of 
the Reglements took another direction • Here they were 
.. 
issued directly by the monarch and were to be adhered to by 
the whole army. Moreover, the inability of maintaining a 
large army had to be compensated for by creating an ef-
fective army with as great a fire power as possible and 
this required strictest drill and discipline. King Freder-
ick I was the first Prussian ruler who attempted to bring 
unity into the drill and evolutions of his army. The 
first Reglement for the Prussian army to be generally ad-
hered to appeared in 1702, the Exercice von den Handgriffen 
mit der Flint.2 According to this Reglement the movements 
involved in firing etc • . -vrere still to be performed to a 
slow count and the troops were still arranged in four ranks 
for drill as well as during battle. 
An addition to this manual, the Reglement wegen des 
1 . Loc.cit. 
2Max JMhns, op.cit., vol.II, p.l650 and c. Jany, op.cit., 
vol.I, p.616 
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Chargieren in Bataillen of 1705, already showed some of 
the tactical realizations, which were to make the Prussian 
infantry superior to others. It introduced the peloton 
fire, a method of firing which secured a more or less con-
tinuous, rolling fire and also prescribed the drill in 
firing while advancing - each peloton was to advance three 
steps before firing. Thus the Prussian army combined well 
controlled fire with continuous advance, a method which was 
to prove extremely successful in battle.1 
However, the 1702 Reglement did not yet lead to com-
plete uniformity of drill. Whereas the Reglement pre-
scribed firing in four ranks, the Lottum Corps received in-
structions in 1709 to fire in a formation of three ranks.2 
The desired uniformity was achieved during the reign 
of the soldier - King Frederick William I. The first of 
his Reglements, that of 1714, greatly influenced by Prince 
Leopold of Dessau, swept away the remna.nts of independence 
regimental commanders had possessed until then. Each offi-
cer received a copy of the manual, had to read it at regula~ 
prescribed intervals and it was expected that each officer 
was thoroughly familiar with its contents. The discipline 
of the officer corps was now emphasized and enforced with 
much more severity, as in general the accession of this 




monarch marked the beginning of the proverbial Prussian 
army discipline and of the peculiar characteristics of the 
Prussian officer corps. A new edition of this manual, 
issued in 1?18, enlarged further on disciplinary matters. 
In regard to tactics the Reglement of 1?14 brought no 
important changes. The speed of firing was still slow and 
the formation in four ranks was retained. However, the 
1?18 Reglement brought one important innovation: in battle 
the battalions were to be formed in three ranks. Thus, 
without diminishing the actual fire power of the battalion, 
the breadth of its front could be extended.l On the other 
hand, the adherence to the formation in four ranks when-
ever firing was not required, i.e. for drill and parades, 
etc., showed some reluctance to break with tradition and 
unnecessarily complicated drill and evolution. Although 
Prince Leopold of Dessau had, by that time, already realized 
that not only the number of fire arms, but also the speed 
of firing, i.e., the number of rounds fired per time inter-
val, determined the effectiveness of fire power, the 1718 
Reglement still adhered to firing to a slow, measured count. 
It was the new Prussian Reglement of 1726, which introduced 
the drastic change with regard to firing speed.2 It empha-
lMax JMhns, op.cit., vol.II, p.l659 
2Reglement vor die KBnigliche Preussische Infanterie,(Potsdam: 
1?26), H. Bleckwenn, ed., (Osnabr6ck: 1968), Facsimile 
edition 
sized repeatedly the need for speed in firing and the word 
'quickly', (geschwinde), is used in the description of 
every one of the moves involved in the firing drill. This 
Reglement provided the basis for the Prussian drill and tac-
tics of the following decades and the subsequentReglements 
issued by Frederick II did not bring momentuous changes. 
It is obvious that speed of firing, considering the 
complicated procedure necessary for the loading and firing 
of the flintlock fusil, precluded rigorous drill and disci-
pline. By 1726 both these latter conditions had reached 
a sufficiently high standard in the Prussian army so that 
the idea of rapid fire .could be put into practice. In no 
other army of that period did these prerequisites exist. 
The success of the Prussian methods of drill and discipline 
soon became apparent to observers.l 
Good Intentions: the Hofkrfegsrat 1 s Plan 
for a General Reglement 
The Prussian Reglement of 1714 appeared in print on 
28th February of that year. Intelligence about this publi-
cation apparently prompted the Austrian Hofkriegsrat to 
initiate proceedings to issue a Reglement for the whole 
Austrian army as well. Previous historians have stated as 
the only source for this move the introduction to Kheven-
lsee Prince Eugene's comment P•37f 
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hUller's Observationspunktel in which he mentions that the 
Hofkriegsrat ordered all regiments to forward a copy of 
their Exercitia and GebrHuche, (regimental duty regulations). 
Until now it was presumed that no further action in this 
matter was taken· until 1736, when a commission was set up, 
which in the following year produced the first general 
Regulament und Ordnung for the whole Austrian infantry.2 
However, this writer found several entries in the Index 
and Protocolls of the Abteilung HKR Akten in the Austrian 
War Archives which confirm KhevenhUller 1 s statement on the 
Hofkriegsrat 1 s directive to all regiments, but show that 
the matter had not been dropped entirely. In June and 
July 1714 all infantry and cavalry regiments were given 
orders to submit their Exercitia. and regulations to the 
Hofkriegsrat and several generals were ordered to give 
their opinions on the plan to issue a drill and duty Regle-
~ for the whole army.3 These documents and the replies 
of the generals are no longer extant, but the ·entries in the 
HKR Protocolls suffice to document the fact and also to 
2Regulament und Ordnung nach welchem sich gesambte unmittel-
bare Kayserliche Infanterie in denen Hand§riffen und Krie~s 
Exerc~t~en sowonlfi als in denen Krie~s -ebr§ucnen yleic -
fdrmig zu acnten aben Or~ginal ~n ustr~an Nat1ona L1b-
rary and in l~brary of the Austrian War Archives 
3KA, HKR Index Reg. 1714 -557 756 76~,1094 
KA, Prot. Reg. 1714 June - 70, 17i4 July - 361 and 386 
attest that several generals approved of the plan, namely: 
Field Harshal von Zumjungen, FML Count Bagni, fl'IL von 
Zumjungen, Field Marshal von Heister and the later presi-
dent of the Hofkriegsrat~ the then FML Count Harrach.l 
There is no indication of any immediate action by the 
Hofkriegsrat and one still can only speculate whether re-
sistance from the regimental colonels-in-chief or the prepa-
rations for the campaign against Turkey, which began in 
l716, were the reason for this failure to take immediate 
action on this plan for a general Reglement. In 1717, how-
ever, during the campaign against the Turks, Duke Alexander 
of WHrttemberg was commissioned to prepare a Reglement for 
the Imperial Infantry. He was assisted in this task by 
the then Prince of Bevern and other experienced genera1s.2 
An unsigned and undated memorandum, according to content 
written between 1749 and 1757; which deals with suggestions 
for improvements of the Reglement of 1749, refers to the 
above draft of 1717. According to this memorandum, Prince 
Eugene approved the draft, but \vhen he requested the opinion 
of several "old generals, FM Guido von Starhemberg," then 
already of very advanced age," remarked that he had devised 
a Reglement for his regiment many years ago and does not 
1HKR, Prot.Exp. 1714 July - 455, 456, 457, 458, 253, 254 
and 1714 - Oct. 257 
2KA, Mem 9- 152, fol 269f (sixth session of the·miiitary 
commission of 1748) 
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intend to make any changes in it. Therefore Prince Eugene, 
to preserve unity and peace in the army, decided that he 
could not persue this matter any further against the wishes 
of the regimental Commanders-in-chief."! The question of · 
a Re.glement for the whole army was not taken up again until 
1736, when a military commission was set up under the 
chairmanship of the President ofthe Hofkriegsrat, FM Count 
Harrach which adopted the draft ofl717 as the basis for 
the Reglement issued in 1737, a Reglement meant to be ad-
hered to by all infantry regiments of the monarc~y.2 ~he 
war against Turkey and the Wars of the Austrian Succession 
further delayed the general acceptance and applicatiqn of 
this Reglement of 1737). The composition of a Reglement 
for the Austrian cavalry, planned at the same time, was 
never realized, probably for the same reas6ns.3 
The above shows that the 1714 plan for a drill Regle-
ment for the whole army was never totally abandoned, but 
the extreme delay indicates that, aside from the war -
time complications, there "\vas neither emphatic pressure from 
the crown nor a clear understanding that the advantages of 
lKA, Mem 4-90, fol.lf 
2KA, Mem 9- 152, fol. 269f, and see p.56 of this paper. 
Other members of the commission were FZM Count Wallis, FZM 
von Traun, FML von Fllrstenbusch and FML Wenzel Wallis 
3KA, HKR Prot.Reg. 1737 August - 300. See also note 1, 
6sterreichischer Erbfolgekrieg, vol.I, p.429 
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the thin - line formation and the fire power of the flint-
lock fusil could only be realized with a. well disciplined 
and uniformly drilled army. There also, as mentioned 
above, may well have been opposition from regimental 
colonels-in-chief to what they would have considered an in-
fringement on their privileges and independence. Thus, 
the lack of central control, in contrast to the situation 
in Prussia, may have played its part. 
The Austrian Regulament of 1737 
Compared to some of the earlier Austrian regimental 
Reglements, the 1737 Regulament und Ordnung shows no real 
improvement. In tactical concepts it is more antiquated 
than the Prussian Reglement of 1726. The Austrian manual 
retained the formation in battle in four ranks, maintained 
the use of the Schweinsfeder and cheveaux de frise, elements 
which the Prussian Reglement of 1726 had already eliminated. 
The Austrian manual of 1737 cannot therefore be regarded 
as an attempt to copy current Prussian practices. Moreover, 
documents state clearly that the Austrian draft of 1717 was 
the basis for the 1737 Reglement.1 It is even doubtful 
that a copy of the Pr~ssiM Reglernent of 1726 had fallen in-
to Austrian hands before 1737 and its contents were probably 
unknown to the Austrians, at least in detail,when they 
lProtocollum e militMr S sterna 
betreffend, fol.269f 
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composed their manual in 1737. The documents in the files 
of the Hofkriegsrat referring to copies of the Prussian 1726 
Reglement in its possession do not antedate 1741, possibly 
because of tight Prussian security measures. Each Prussian 
officer received his copy of the Prussian 1726 Reglement 
against his signature, had to treat it as secret material 
and the copy had to be destroyed when damaged. Further-
more, the Prussian manual of 1726 was not used during a war 
before 1741, excepting the uneventful campaign on the Rhine 
in 1734/36. 
There is sufficient evidence that the Austrian manual 
of 1737 remained largely on paper. Maria .Theresa 1 s Denk-
schriftland Field Marshal Thftngen 1 s Observationspunkte bei 
der Infanterie2 show · that the Austrian army was far from 
having achieved uniformity in drill and tactical maneuvers. 
The above mentioned directives by FM Thftngen emphasize the 
need for uniformity in evolutions, pointing to a lack of 
such uniformity still existing in 1741. The continued di-
vergence of drill and tactical evolutions between the 
various Austrian regiments is further attested to ~Y various 
memoranda which emphasize the need for such uniformity.3 
lsee Introduction p.iv 
2KA. Mem. 4 - 42, 1741 
3 e •. g.: memoir by General der Cavallerie von Hohenembs, 
KA, Mem. 5-82, 1741 and memoir by FZM Leopold von Daun, 
KA, FA/CA, 1745, 13/10 and ad 10 
When, for the first time, the Austrian army faced the 
well drilled Prussians in the First Silesian War, it became 
evident that the Prussians were not only uniformly but also 
better trained and disciplined, the result of intensive 
training in training camps and of frequent parades and ma-
neuvers. This advantage of the Prussians was increased 
by the fact that they were led by their monarch in person 
who, aside from being one of the greatest generals, did 
not have to account for his actions to anyone but himself. 
He therefore could, and did, take risks which the Austrian. 
generals, who had to account for their actions to their 
queen, could not, or would not dare take. The Wars of the 
Austrian Succession showed the superiority of the Prussian 
army, rather than a general inferiority of the Austrian. 
Whereas the latter lost every major battle against the 
Prussians, they .were successful against the French, Bavarians 
and Spanish in most of the major encounters. 
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THE TEST : THE FIRST AND SECOND SILESIAN WARS 
During the first three decades of the eighteenth 
century battles had taken on a rigid and standardized form 
which was to become a characteristic of the battles during 
the remainder of that century. 
··Preparatory to each campaign the commanding general 
drew up the .ordre de bataille, which was then altered only 
when special considerations required it • Thus, once he had 
. . 
decided on g.iving, or was forced to accept, battle, he only . 
had to order ·the deployment of the army in the prescribed 
order, · as the order of march, as well as the Lagerordnung, 
( campi!ig order), corres-ponded with the· ordre de batai.lle. 
The deployment of the army took place under the cover of 
light cavalry, in the Austrian army often assisted by grena-
diers and tirailleurs.l This forming of the battle· order 
was a slow process, often taking several hours. After the 
avant garde had retreated, the battle was usually opened by 
an artillery duel. Often one or both armies suffered heav-
ily from thi~ artillery fire, which could, and sometimes did, 
lead . to a breakdown of discipline and morale. Then the 
attacker began his advance, cavalry and infantry, in theory 
at least, at the same slow pace. 
ltudwig Andres von KhevenhHller, Kurzer Begriff aller 
militMrischen Operationen, (Vienna: 1743), p.41 
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Henceforth, the officers could rarely do more than 
attempt to control the formation, discipline and morale of 
their troops. Their most difficult task was to persuade 
shaken troops to advance. The advance was frequently inter-
rupted in order to straighten out the lines or to close gaps 
between battalions. Rarely did it come to hand-to-hand 
fighting; usually one side broke before the clash of oppos-
ing forces. 
Of course, during such an encounter the superiority of 
a well drilled and .vrell disciplined army which could co-
ordinate regular fire with precision movements would be 
obvious. Moreover, the intensively trained soldier, nearly 
an automaton, could withstand the psychological strain 
better. 
· The four major battles between the Austrians and the 
Prussians - Mollwitz in 1741; Chotusitz in 1742; Hoben-
friedberg, and Sohr, both in 1745 - demonstrated Prussian 
superiority. The intense training and the iron discipline 
of the Pruss i an infantry ~esulted in such a mechanical exe-
cution of the rather complicated peloton fire that it could 
be maintained with precision for considerabl e t i me even 
under the stress of battle. Frederick II's maxi m that the 
soldier rnust fear his own officers more than the enemy had 
already become a fact during these wars. Furthermore, t he 
Prussian maneuvers were executed with amazing precision on 
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the battle field, although not yet as speedily as during 
the Seven Years War. In contrast, the Austrian infantry 
was unable to maintain orderly fire and formation for an 
extended period, frequently began firing against orders, 
and in most cases did not show the stamina or maintain disci·-
pline as the Prussians did. 
The Battle of Mollwitz~l lOth April 1741 
The Austrian army under Field Marshal Neipperg was 
caught by surprise by Frederick II and was still in the pro-
cess of forming the battle order when the Prussian artillery 
opened fire and inflicted heavy losses on the Austrian 
cavalry of the left wing, which had camped closest to the 
battle field and thus was in position first. This tempted 
General R8mer, commanding the Austrian cavalry of the left 
wing, to attack the Prussian right wing, although he had 
orders not to move before the whole army was in battle for-
mat ion. He dispersed the numerically inferior Prussian 
cavalry, but was unable to break the coherence of the 
Prussian infantry lines. After a running fight, lasting 
about two hours, the Austrian cavalry of the left wing, its 
general killed, was completely disorganized and had to 
lThe following sketches of the four battles are based on: 
k.k. Kriegsarchiv, ed., Der Osterreichische Erbfolgekrieg, 
(Vienna: 1896 to 1903), vols. I,II and VII, 
Grosser Generalstab, ed., Der Erste Schlesische Krieg, 
(Berlin:l890,1893) and Osterreichische MilitHrische 
Zeitschrift, 1813, vol.III,l825, vol.III and IV, 1S27,vol.IV 
retreat. The Austrian -cavalry attack had not been support-
ed by infantry. A belated and poorly executed attack by 
the Austrian infantry of the right wing petered out under 
heavy Prussian rifle fire before it even came close to the 
Prussian lines. General Schwerin, who had persuaded 
Frederick to leave the battle field during the initial 
Austrian cavalry attac_k, now orde;r-ed the Prussian infantry 
to attack. It advanced in perfect order, as though on a 
parade square, the infantry firing continuously and regu-
larly and the "rifle fire rolling without pause· like con-
tinuous thunder."l At this point the discipline of the 
Austrian infantry began to crumble. The Austrian battal-
ions had opened fire too soon, against orders, and could 
not be persuaded to advance one step. An Austrian offi-
cer wrote: "It was pitiful to see these poor recruits hide 
one behind the other so that the battalions stood thirty to 
forty deep and the intervals became so wide that one could 
have penetrated with whole cavalry regiments~Q At that 
point, before it came to actual contact between the two 
armies, Neipperg, fearing the complete destruction of his 
army, ordered the retreat, which was carried out in fair 
order, nearly unmolested by the Prussians, who had suffered 
lRelation of an Austrian officer quoted in Osterreichischer 
Erbfolgekrieg, vol.II, p.242 
2~.' p.241 
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equal-ly heavy losses. It should be pointed out, how~ver, 
that most of the Prussian casualties had occured on their 
right wing during the initial Austrian cavalry attack. 
After the battle, Field Marshal Khevenhffller advised 
Neipperg to rely from now on mainly on the small war, for 
which the Austrian light cavalry was superbly suited, and 
to avoid battles, as Mollwitz had shown the unreliability 
of the Austrian infantry.l 
The Battle of Chotusitz (Czaslau) 17th May 1742 
The only other great battle of the First Silesian War, 
at Chotusitz, showed again the superiority of the Prussian 
infantry in drill, performance and discipline under heavy 
stress. The battle opened with a Prussian cavalry attack 
on the .Austrian left wing, which developed into a long; 
drawn-out ;. melee, : during which the cavalry of both sides gradu-
ally moved away from the actual battle field. In the mean-
time, the attack by the Austrian right wing on the not yet 
fully deployed Prussian left wing began. After an initial 
success of the Austrians, who threw the Prussians out of the 
village of Chotusitz, the day might have been won, had not 
the discipline of the Austrians broken down and their cavalry 
and some of their infantry dispersed to loot the village and 
the nearby Prussian camp. This g~ve Frederick time to rally 
lKhevenhffller to Neipperg, 19th April 1741, quoted in 
Osterreichischer Erbfolgekrieg, vol.II p.657f 
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his troops and; in by now proverbial fashion, to launch a 
counter attack in perfect order, keeping up a murderous 
fire during the advance. This forced the Austrians to re-
treat and to leave the field of battle, unmolested by the 
Prussians, who, too, had suffered heavy losses. It was 
not only superior Prussian drill and discipline against ill 
trained and ill disciplined troops which led the defeat of· 
the Austrians, but also the heavy losses suffered by the . 
Austrian infantry during their attack on the village. 
These losses were largely due to the order given by Charles 
of Lorraine, the Austrian commande~-in-chief, to· the Austri-
an infantry, to advance without firing. This, against · the 
rapid fire of the Prussians, was sheer madness. 
The outcome of each battle had hung in the balance for 
some time. This vJas mainly due to the fact that the 
Prussian .cavalry was by no means superior to the Austrian· 
at that time. In both cases it was the counter attack of 
the Prussian infantry, so perfectly executed, which broke 
the morale and discipline of the Austrian lines. 
The battles of the Second Silesian War were less con-
elusive f6r the purpose of this chapter. The battle of 
Hohenfriedberg was fought by Frederick against an Austrian-
Saxon coalition army under divided command. The Saxon 
(left) wing was defeated before the Austrian (right) wing 
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entered _the engagement under hopeless conditions. The 
• 
battle of Sohr was lost by _the Austrians mainly because 
Ch8rles of Lorraine moved too slowly to make use of the 
opportunity to surprise the Prussians in their camp. 
In both these battles the P.russian cavalry, now much 
better trained than during the preceding war, proved much 
superior to the Austrian, which had not learned the lessons 
the first Silesian War should have taught them. In both 
battles observers ·praised the superior precision of the 
fire and evolutions of the Prussian infantry. 
The shortcomings of the Austrian army as compared to 
the Prussian were not only the lack of uniform drill regu-
lations, but also the lack of the intensive drill, the 
lack of strict discipline and the persistence in outdated 
tactical doctrines, in shor·t, the failure to understand 
and act upon the implications of the new developments. Of 
influence, of course, was also the inf~rior generalship of 
the Austrian commanders. As a result of these shortcomings 
the Austrian infantryman .. was not the effective fighting 
machine his Prussian counterpart was. He was unable to 
withstand for an extended period the psychological stress 
of battle and could not be kept under the control of offi-
cers. 
THE INTERMEDIATE PERIOD : 1737 TO 1748 
THE MOVE TOWARD REFORM 
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As the 1737 Reglement was insufficiently adhered to, 
it did not achieve its purpose. Besides, much more was 
amiss in the Austrian Army than the lack of general drill 
regulations. Several of the Austrian generals, as well 
as some of the ministers of the state, realized these de-
fects, and Maria Theresa was certainly aware of them, as 
her Denkschrift shpj~. The Austrian War Archives hold a 
substantial number of memoranda, proposals and reports 
from between 1736 and 1748 dealing with these shortcomings 
of the Austrian military system. Many of these short-
comings had either developed or become apparent during the 
third and fourth decades of the century. Two reasons seem 
to account for this: the increasing age of the President of 
the Hofkriegsrat, Prince Eugene of Savoy, which resulted in 
a lessened control of the army and its administration; and, 
secondly, the emergence of the efficient Prussian army under 
Frederick William I. The former fact made more apparent 
already existing defects in the structure and workings of 
the military administration and allowed these weaknesses 
full play; the latter showed most clearly the. need for reform 
in the field. 
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The documents mentioned above show that the need for 
reform in all aspects of the military system was clearly 
perceived by some officers and officals. In these docu-
ments criticism was directed mainly against the following 
aspects of the existing military system: corrupt and cumber-
some operation of the Hofkriegsrat, favoritism and cor-
ruption in the appointment of officers, lack of general 
regulations and drill Reglements, lack of discipline and 
sense of duty among the officer corps and the army in gener-
al, and, finally, the unsatisfactory system of financing 
and recruiting. Occasionally, some criticism was voiced 
against existing tactical practices. (See below: Thftngen•s 
Observationspunkte). 
Although most of these memoranda do not relate directly 
to the development of the drill Reglements, but deal spe-
cifically with other facets of the military system, they 
are, nevertheless, of interest to this paper as they show 
the extent to which reform was necessary in the Austrian 
military system. In addition to these military reforms, it 
became necessary during the first decade of Maria Theresa's 
reign to reform the whole system of administration of the 
state. The very complexity of the Theresian reforms of 
1748/9 explains some of the shortcomings of these reforms. 
Too much had to be changed in too .short a time. The develop-
ment of general army Reglements during the years immediately 
following 1748, was only a small part of this enormous task 
of reform. Without the direct and interested involvement 
of Maria Theresa this aspect of reform may well have been 
neglected or at least remained as ineffective as the earlier 
attempts. Considering this, the introduction and subs e.-
quent enforcement of these Reglements, in spite of their 
shortcomings, represents an admirable achievement. 
The critique of the Hofkriegsrat voiced most frequent-
ly, was directed against its procedures of conducting 
business •. During the thirties civilian councillors in the 
Hofkriegsrat attained an undue amount of influence and au-
thority, often self acquired. Field Marshal Khevenhffllerl 
criticized, in a memorandum of 7 September 1740,2 the fact 
that many decisions were made by the civilian Referendarii3 
alone, without consultation with the war councillors, some-
times even without the knowledge of the President; and these 
decisions were presented as the official decisions of the 
Hofkriegsrat. In the same memorandum he complained that, 
even when he requested detailed reports on current business, 
he often received only information on minor matters, and, 
not infrequently, statements falsifying the actual decisions 
lVice-President of the . Hofkriegsrat until 1744 
2 KA, HKR 1740 - September - 842, Exp. 
3officials responsible for certain subjects 
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made. These conditions developed during the last years 
of Prince Eugene's presidency of the Hofkriegsrat and con-
tinued under his successor Count Harrach (President from 
1736 to 1762). Khevenhfiller strongly criticized the still 
continuing practice of purchase of commissions, and the mal-
practice of permitting officers and even non-commissioned 
officers to file petitions and complaints directly to the 
Hofkriegsrat, by-passing their immediate superiors.l An 
unsigned document, possibly by the same ·author,2 and a 
memorandum by Francis Stephen of Lorraine, later Emperor 
Francis r,3 which contain very similar complaints and pro-
posals for improvement, seem to show that such conditions 
as existed could not be rectified easily. It is obvious 
that a supreme administrative office, run in ·a manner such 
as described above, is not conducive to effective implemen-
tation of reform, or to the maintenance of discipline and 
esprit de corps. Accordingly, discipline and esprit de 
corps had deteriorated drastically during the late thirties 
and the forties of the eighteenth century. A memorandum, 
lKA HKR 
' 
17lr0 - September - 81;.2, Exp. 
2KA 
' 
Mern 9 - 56, 1738 
3KA, Mern 9 - 58, 1738 
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unsigned and undated,l complains that this 1 Libertinage 1 had 
developed so far that even privates not only neglect to sa-
lute their officers, .even generals, but also do not allow 
even the presence of an officer to deter them from acting con-
trary to regulations ("etwas Verbothenes zu thun ••• "). Offi-
cers, in their turn, neglect to interfere, so that a complete 
breakdoWn of discipline has resulted. 
Francis of Lorraine, as newly appointed commander-in-
chief of the Austrian army in 1738, blamed the lack of good 
officers, who take their duties and profession seriously, on 
a deviation from old and proven practices and conditions. He 
believed that in the past there had been a great number of 
good and dedicated officers to whom it had been a pleasure 
to work themselves up through the ranks, and who had been 
perfectly satisfied to reach the rank of captain, to obtain 
a company command, and, eventually, through meritorious 
actions, to be appointed to staff positions. Favoritism, 
which had, for some time, been the practice of the Hof-
kriegsrat and the regimental colonels-in-chie:f, he blamed 
as ': having caused many good officers to quit in disgust. 
At present, he complained, officers complain of being unjust-
ly treated unless they a.re promoted to the rank of Lieu-
tenant colonel or even colonel. This way, the emperor "has 
lKA, Mem 6 - 102. This document can be assigned to the ~eriod 
between 1738 and 1749 as it refers to the organization of 
the infantry battalions into 12 pelotons, as laid down by 
the 1737 Reglernent, but changed to 16 pelotons by the 1749 
Reglernent. 
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now more generals, but fewer officers." He advocated that, 
in future, merit alone should be the yardstick for promotion.l 
It was necessary to rectify these conditions before 
general drill regulations, or, for that matter, any regu-
lations could become effective. The comprehensive army re-
forms, undertaken in 1748 and the following years, were to 
be satisfactory in this respect, especially because of the 
support and understanding of Maria Theresa and the organ-
izational talents of Field Marshal Leopold von Daun.2 
The experiences of the First and Second Silesian Wars 
had convinced many Austrian generals that the intensive 
training and discipline, as well as the existence of general 
drill Reglements in the Prussian army, had been the main 
1KA, Mem 9-58, 1738. "AlleruntherthM.nigster Vortrag ••• ", 
unsigned. Author identified in opening paragraph through 
reference to the writer's recent appointment to the po-
sition of commander-in-chief of the army.Incorrectly as-
cribed to the Prince of Sachsen-Hildburghausen in: k.k. 
Krie~sarchiv, ed., Der 8sterreichische Erbfolgekrieg,vol.I 
p.41 
2Leopold Josef Maria Graf Daun, born in Vienna in 1705 as son 
of FM (field marshal) Wirich von Daun, a proven and re-
spected general in the Austrian army. Leopold Daun entered 
the army as VolontHr in 1718. 1726 promotion to Lt.Col.,l731 
to active colonel. 1737: GFWM <Generalfeldwachtmeister).l739: 
FML. 1740 colonel-in-chief of the later infantry regiment no. 
59. Participated in War of the Austrian Succession with dis-
tinction. 1745: GFZM (Generalfeldzeugmeister). 1748:member 
of the Military Commission and entrusted with the compo-
sition of the new army Reglements.l751: director of the mili-
tary Academy at Wiener Neustadt. 1754: promoted to FM. 1757: 
victorious over Frederick II at Kolin. 1758: commander-in-
chief of the Austrian army against Prussia. Grand Cross of 
the Maria Theresia Order. 1762 to his death in 1766 Presi-
dent of the Hofkriegsrat. 
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reasons for its successes. (This writer, however, could not 
find any evidence that Austrian generals thought the 
Prussian tactical concepts at all superior to their own.) 
As early as 1741, after the disappointment of the battle 
of Mollwitz, Field Marshal Thftngenl issued his Observations-
punkte bey der Infanterie, apparently on initiative from 
higher authorities, as they were addressed to the army in 
general and not to a specific regiment.2 The conclusion 
contains an order that these directives have to be followed 
strictly and that any questions regarding them have to be 
directed to the commanding field marshal qf the army. 
In these Observationspunkte, guidelines for the main-
tenance of discipline and order during a battle are re-
peatedly followed by the remark "that not everyone does as 
he pleases." To prevent the breaking of lines, as happened 
at Mollwitz, reliable subaltern officers and even captains 
( " . ••• ~n case there should be some left over •• ~), should be 
posted behind the lines, on the flanks and in the center of 
each regiment or battalion, to redress any disorder which 
lAdam Freiherr von Thftngen, 1735 colonel-in-chief of infantry 
regiment Neipperg promoted to GFWM in the same year. 1741: 
promoted to FZM. tilled in action at Hohenfriedberg in 1745 
2KA, Mem. 4-42, 1741. The Observationspunkte vor die 
Cavallerie, (KA, Mem 5 - 82, 1741) by General von Hohenembs 
correspond closely to these directives and appear to be just 
an adaptation of Thftngen's Observationspunkte to the needs 
of the cavalry. 
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might develop during an engageJilent. Anyone leaving the 
ranks should be stopped, or, if necessary, cut down.l The 
lack of control over the troops during the opening engage-
ments of the First Silesian War, also becomes apparent from 
Th6.ngen's order that the wounded should be taken only to a 
· point directly behind the lines, and that those who took 
them there should return immediately to their places in the 
firing line, not as it happened at Mollwitz, where two or 
three men led each wounded soldier to the rear and never 
returned. 2 Looting and plundering was also strictly pro-
hibited by these directives, but, seemingly, with little 
success, as this order was not obeyed during the battle of 
Chotusitz,3 with unfortunate consequences for the· Austrians. 
The Austrian practice of using PlHnkler · - forerunners 
of the tirailleurs - in front of the line of battle to 
harrass the enemy, is explained in detail- Thtingen empha-
sizes that platoons used for this purpose should stay close 
to their own lines and should not be used in flat and open 
terrain, as such a platoon, when forced to retreat, could 
easily lead to a retreat of the main line.4 This use of 
lThtingen, Observationspunkte ••• , parao. 1 
2Ibid., para. 5 
3Thftngeh, Observationspunkte, para.9 and see above p.57 
~htingen, para. 4 
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tirailleurs was a distinctive feature of Austrian tactical 
practice during this period and was not used by the Prussians. 
The depth of the formation in battle was not raised to 
an argument in the decade prior to. 1748; at least, this 
writer could find only one reference to this question among 
the proposals for reform and the memoranda on the state of 
the army. An unsigned document, which, although undated, 
can be assigned to the period between 1737 and 1748,1 makes 
strong recommendations to adopt the formation in three 
ranks and the organization of the battalion into eight pelo-
tons. (Neither of these proposals was adopted by the 1748 
reform commission). The reasoning of the author was that, 
as the battalions were always below full strength, dividing 
them into twelve pelotons each, would result in a weak pelo-
ton fire. Moreover, he felt the chronic lack of officers · 
and NCOs would present difficulties in assigning the re-
quisite number of them to each division and peloton. Al-
though rejected by the 1748 co~mission, this proposal of 
the formation in three ranks is of interest, as it presents 
the rare example of a suggestion to adopt the formation in 
1KA, Mem 6-102, General Anmerkung dealing with the formation 
of battalions, methods of firing and attack and with disci-
pline.As it refers to the composition of the battalion accord-
ing to the 1737 Reglement(l2 pelotons), its date must lie 
between 1737 and 1749, when the new Reglement divided the 
battalion into 16 pelotons.As it also refers to daily di-
rectives from the hohen GeneralitHt regarding desertion of 
soldiers from the line of battle, it can be pr~sumed to have 
been composed before the end of the Wars of the Austrian 
Succession. · 
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use in the Prussian army since 1726 - a formation not adopt-
ed by the Austrians until after the battle of Kolin in 1757. 
The author of this document, like Thftngen, proposed to 
wait as long as possible before opening fire against the 
enemy - until one can see 11 the whites of their eyes." How-
ever, his suggestion to use only fire by peloton during an 
engagement in open terrain, fell in line with Prussian usage. 
He suggested that other methods of firing, that is, with 
whole or half ranks, etc., should be used only to defend en-
trenched positions.l He also advocated the advance in step, 
starting with the left foot. 
Although the memoranda of this period, preserved in the 
Austrian War Archives, describe the various shortcomings of 
the Austrian army, the remedial measures proposed are re-
stricted to the suggestion to enforce existing regulations, 
including those laid down in the 1737 Reglement. The above 
mentioned document at least proposes a few tactical inno-
vations. 
After the Wars of the Austrian Succession, definite and 
urgent proposals were made to issue a new duty and drill 
manual for the Austrian army, for both infantry and cavalry. 
The writers of such memoranda clearly realized the need to 
combine the issuing of such Reglements with actual enforce-
1 The 1749 Reglement retained the traditional number of 
different firing methods. See appendix 1 
ment of discipline and with intensive training. It had be-
come obvious that not merely the existence of such a general 
Reglernent for the whole army, but its logical application 
and strict enforcement, as well as the promotion of an esprit 
de corps and a sense of honor and duty in the officer corps, 
was what could make the Austrian army again the equal of 
any other. 
In the course of her first reforms of the state admini-
stration, commencing in 1748, of which the army reform was 
an important and integral part, Maria Theresa endeavoured to 
improve not only the conditions, training and education of 
the officer corps, but also the social status of the pro-
fession. Combined with this was a strict emphasis on disi-
pline and duty. It w~s the efficient implementation of 
such reforms which made the new Reglements of 1749-51 ef-
fective. 
THE REFORM COHMISSION OF 1748 - 49 
Early in 1748, the exact date is unknown, Maria Theresa 
ordered the formation of a military commission to set up a 
new military system, that is, to effect a thorough army re-
form. Prince Charles of Lorraine was appointed as chair-
man and the following were selected to be members of the 
commission: Hofkriegsrat President Count Harrach, Prince 
Liechtenstein, FM Count Cordova, FZM Count Wallis, FZM Count 
Leopold von Daun, General der ·Cavallerie Count Salburg, FZM 
Count Schulemburgl and as civilian members the War council-
lors von W8ber amd von der Mark.2 
Approximately at the time when the Military Commission 
was formed, an unsigned memorandum3 stressed the need for 
the immediate issuing of a general drill and duty Reglernent 
for the whole army. As the composition of this compre-
hensive manual would require some time, the author of the 
lA.von Arneth(Maria Theresia, vol.IV, p.88), says errone-
ously tha t Count Schulemburg was added to the commission 
later.However, he was present from the second session on, 
and, in his draft of the agenda for the commission (KA,Mem 
9-75), Charles of Lorraine· had already included Schulem-
burg•s name 
2Protocollum Commi s sionis das kllnftige MilitMr Systema 
betreffend, KA, Mem 9 - 152, 1748 
3KA, Mem 9 -3lf, 1748. According to the entry in the index 
this memorandum was written by the then FZM,later FM 
Leopold von Daun 
memorandum proposed to proceed first '\vith the introduction 
of a general drill manual, and, as an interim measure, to 
issue general instructions, covering all circumstances and 
situations of major and minor importance. The draft of 
these interim directives, probably by the same author and 
included in the memorandum, deals with the duties of offi-
cers, from subaltern to ~enerals rank, during campaigns, 
in camp and during marches. These directives are, in fact, 
a concise Duty Reglement. In their attention to detail, 
they are indicative of the cumbersome formality and at-
tention to detail which was to be typical of the Reglernents 
issued under the supervision of FM Daun. 
The purpose of these directives was to eliminate the 
particular abuse, frequent in the army, wherein general 
officers and regimental commanders both shirked their duties 
and failed to remain with the troops at all times, both in 
camp and on the ma.rch. The directives stress, as well, 
the need for order and neatness in the camps and for an ef-
ficient method of communication through the officer ranks 
from the commander-in-chief to the regiments and vice versa. 
Special emphasis is given to regular, supervised drill in 
the camps, especially in firing and evolutions; to the pre-
vention of looting, desertion and other 'excesses·,• and to 
the need for severe punishment for such off enses. Every 
officer was admoni shed to prevent and puni sh such off enses 
and was reminded of his duty, honor and reputatio~. The 
main points of these directives were later incorporated 
into the second part of the Reglement of 1749. 
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Before the military commission convened for its first 
session on 8 February 1748, Prince Charles of Lorraine pre-
sent~d a proposed agenda to Maria Theresa for her approval. 
The proposed points were only vaguely formulated: 
( · ·i) to compose a general plan for the reorganization 
of the army. 
( ii) to compose a general Reglement -(duty manual) 
to eliminate the daily occurring abuses 
(iii) to cqmpose drill Reglements for the infantry 
and for the cavalry 
( iv) to standardize and simplify the accounting 
and financing of the regimentsl 
Of special interest in this memorandum are the remarks 
made by Prince Charles regarding the formulation of the 
new duty Reglement and the Exercitium: 
"I believe that one could look up all existing -
but never enforced Reglements; and, if your 
Majesty permits, also the Prussian and those of 
other monarchs •••• and a completely new one could 
be proposed to your Majesty which should be as 
short as possible ••• Regarding the Exercitium •••• 
all previous ones are to be examined, also those 
from individual regiments and the shorter the new 
one should be, the better; yet it should not omit 
anything of importance"2 




As will be shown, there is no evidence that the 
Prussian or any other foreign Reglements were used as models 
for the new Austrian Reglements. 
The actual agenda of the commission dealt with a wide 
range of topics; its aim being, as mentioned in Prince 
Charles' draft under point iii, a complete standardization 
of all aspects of the military system. The sessions rele-
vant to this paper are the sixth, seventh, eighth, thir-
teenth and fifteenth (of the fourteenth, twenty first and 
twenty ninth of March, the sixteenth and thirtieth of May, 
respectively), during which sessions the principles of the 
new Exercitium were discussed. 
After lengthy discussions on the organization, pay and 
supply of regiments, among other administrative and organ-
izational matters, the commission proceeded, during its 
sixth session on 14th March, 1748 to discuss the proposed 
new Exercitium (drill Reglement).l Previous to the commence-
ment of these discussions, FZM Daun had submitted to the 
chairman a draft for a new Exercitium, which had been com-
posed under his supervision. The commission began its de-
liberations by accepting the drill manual of 1737 as the 
basis for its discussions and by a reading of thi:s manual 
which in 1717, under the presidio of .Duke 
Alexander of WHrttemberg, in consultation· 
with the then Prince of Bevern and other 
1Protocollum Commissionis ••• , KA, Mem 9- 152, 1748,fol.269-288 
experienced generals, had been composed 
in Belgrade; and by command of his late 
Majesty, Charles the Sixth,;;..:. had been 
taken up again, and, on 17th March,l737 
promulgated.! 
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The commission then proceeded to discuss several points 
of this 1737 Reglement, and decided on changes. 
Throughout the discussions on the drill manual it is 
obvious that the main concern of the commission members was 
to achieve uniformity, to ensure that the regulations would 
be strictly adhered to by all units, and to provide sim-
plicity in the execution of all moves of drill and of evo-
lutions. The involved discussions on uniform regulations, 
even down to the details of design, cut and embroidery, and 
of other such rather insignificant points, foreshadowed the 
cumbersome style, pedantery and awkward length of the final 
product - the 1Regulament' of 1749. Among other points of 
lesser importance which were discussed were: the position 
in the battle order of lance corporals (Gefreite) and senior 
privates, the positioning of the regimental flag, how the 
fusil should be held while shouldering it, the pos i tions of 
chaplains, medics, supply officers (Furier Meister), etc. 
in the formation of a regiment drawn up for parade or in 
battle order, and, the standardization of drum rolls.2 
lrbid., Fol •. 269f 
2~., fol.269- 288 
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In comparison, points of far greater tactical impor-
tance, considering the more advanced Prussian ideas, re-
ceived apparently little attention in the discussions. 
The question of the depth of the formation was brought up 
by FZM Count Wallis, who felt that the formation in four 
ranks, as prescribed in the 1737 Reglement, should be main-
tained, as it was found to be preferable to that in three 
ranks, especially against the Turks.l The only other 
comment on this was that made by Hofkriegsrat President 
Count Harrach, who conceded that the formation in three 
ranks could be used, but only in emergencies or for Lust-
feuer (firing at celebrations), or during the De Deum, 
etc,.2 FZM Daun, like the rest of the members, was silent 
on this point. He remarked, in reference to the formation 
in line, as prescribed by the 1737 Reglement, only that 
"always it should be prescribed positively that the men 
should appear in clean gaiters whenever they are in for-
mation, 11 a rather amusing example of Daun•s penchant for 
detail. The aged Count Harrach pronounced this suggestion 
"quite good."3 
The commission decided to retain the formation in four 
libid., fol.278f 
2 Ibid., fol.279 
3~., fol.278f 
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ranks as provided in the 1737 manual, and to accept 
Harrach 1 s su~gestion as outlined above. It should be 
noted that Harrach 1 s view of using the formation in three 
ranks for ceremonial purposes only is diametrically op-
posed to that of the Prussian Reglernents of 1718 and 1726, 
which prescribed the formation in three, ranks for all 
occasions when the troops were expected to fire, i.e. es-
pecially in battle. 
An important suggestion was made by Daun, and later 
incorporated in the 1749 Exercitium: that the battalion 
should be divided into four divisions, instead of three as 
the 1737 Reglement provided, to correspond with the admini-
strative division of the battalion into four companies. 
This would enable officers, (company commanders), to remain 
in command of their units and would also facilitate evo-
lutions.1 This was, for once, an improvement over the 
Prussian regulations of 1726 which divided the battalion in-
to five companies, but only four divisions, thus splitting 
up the company units.2 
Nothing throws more light on discipline problems exist-
ing in the Austrian army at this time, than the commission's 
decision on the weapons for subaltern officers and NCOs. 
libid., fol.278 
2Reglement vor die k8nigl. Preussische Infantrie,l726,p.26 
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~he traditional weapons of the infantry officers were the 
Partisane or the Sponton and a hanger. FZM Daun remarked 
that the Partisane and hanger had proven worthless as 
weapons for defense, and proposed, therefore, to issue f~­
sils, instead of Partisanen to infantry officers.l Al-
though they conceded that the Partisans was useless as a 
weapon, the commission members disagreed with Daun's sug-
gestion. FZM Wallis and FM Prince Liechtenstein warned, 
and the other members concurred, that if one were to issue 
fusils to the officers, "especially as they are mostly 
young men," they would frequently 'amuse' themselves during 
an engagement with unnecessary firing. The empress 
approved the vote, 2 and so Austrian infantry officers and 
NCOs had to continue carryi.ng the useless Partisanen. If 
lieutenants and captains could not be entrusted with fire-
arms because they were deemed to lack the necessary maturity 
and discipline, the important role assigned by the Reglement 
to general officers for the maintenance of discipline during 
a battle becomes even clearer. 
Following the discussions of these above mentioned 
points, FZM Daun, at this and subsequent sessions, proceed-
ed to read to the commission the draft of his proposed 
lProtocollum Commissionis ••• , fol.276 
2Ibid., fol.276f 
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Exercitium. At the close of the sixth session, he offered 
to present a demonstration of the drill during the next 
session. During the seventh session, then, one lieutenant 
and two sergeants were brought in to demonstrate the drill 
moves according to the Reglement of the Austrian infantry .c 
regiment Kollowrat, according to the Prussian Reglement 
(date not specified) and according to the Exercitium pro-
posed by Daun himself.l In two further sessions, the 
eighth and the fifteenth, the reading of Daun•s draft was 
continued. During the ninth session, 19th April 1748, 
Daun 1 s draft was compared with the 1737 Reglement and, "in 
order to make adjustments to the new one according to the 
old (Reglement), marginal remarks were inserted (in Daun 1 s 
draft). 11 2 On 30th May, during the fifteenth session, 
Daun 1 s draft, with the alterations and suggestions pro-
posed during the earlier sessions, was approved by the com-
mission and Daun was instructed to complete it.3 More 
than a year passed before the Exercitium Regulament was com-
pleted and distributed to the various regiments.4 
libid., fol.295 
2Ibid., flo.299. Unfortunately, the ninth session was the 
only one at which no minutes were taken. Only a short para-
graph at the beginning of the minutes of the tenth session 
gives us the bare topic of the ninth session. 
3rbid., fol.352 
4KA, HKR Reg. 1749, 11 June, 138. Circulare an die sMmtl. 
Rgter. zu Fuss und zu Pferdt 
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The reason for this one year delay is easily explained: 
the approved draft was first circulated among various gener-
als (a list of their names cannot be ascertained from the 
extant documents), and then further meetings were held by 
the commission, beginning in February 1749, to deal with 
some suggestions for minor alterations. FZM Daun, FM Schulem-
burg and FM Wallis were ordered to bring the Reglement into 
its final form.l It was also decided to compose and issue, 
as soon as possible, Exercitii Reglements for the cavalry. 
The Hussars were to receive a different drill Reglement 
from the Cuirassiers and Dragoons, as their employment in 
the field differed too greatly from that of the latter two. 2 
The matter of greatest interest for this paper which 
was discussed during the 1749 session of the commission, was 
the question of the introduction of a new office, that of 
Inspector - General of the Infantry. In her biography of 
FM Lacy, Edith Kotasek states that Lacy himself, most proba-
bly, suggested the institution of a 'hitherto unknown' po-
sition, that of General Inspector of the various branches 
of the army.3 However, this statement is ambiguous. It 
1 KA, Mem 9 - 153 Protocollum Commissionis Militaris die 
lOma February, 1749 Celebrata, fol 28 
2Ibid., fol.36 The Reglement for the Cuirassiers and Dragoons 
was issued in 1749, and that for the Hussars in 1751 
3Edith Kotasek, Feldmarschall Graf Lacy: Ein Leben ffir 
6sterreichs Heer, (Horn:l956), pp.68f 
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is possible that Lacy was responsible for getting the idea 
finally accepted,l but suggestions for the creation of such 
an office originated in the discussions of the Military 
Commission of 1749. The idea was first presented during 
the session on lOth February, 1749 by Hofkriegsrat Presi-
dent Count Harrach and FM Batthyani, (who was present at 
this session), who advocated the appointment of Exercier 
Meister (drill masters), for each of the lands of the mon-
archy. These officers were to have the rank of general 
or colonel.2 FZM Daun suggested the appointment of FZM 
Sincere and Colonel von Angerer to supervise the implemen-
tation of the new drill regulations in Italy and Bohemia/ 
Moravia respectively, as these officers had worked under 
him in the drafting of the new Exercitium.3 He, Daun him-
self, would act in the same capacity for the hereditary 
lands and for Hungary. Charles of Lorraine then proposed 
the appointment of F}iL von Dungern as Exercier Meister for 
the troops stationed in the Austrian Netherlands.4 
It was the opinion of the commission that these Exercier 
Meister should be given a permanent position to ensure that 
lLacy was appointed as the first General Inspector of the 
army in 1765 
2Protocollum Cornmissionis ••• , lOth February, 1749, fol.29 
3Ibid., fol. 30 
4Ibid., fol. 31 
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the work of standardization and reform, undertaken with so 
much expense and effort, would be prevented from deterior-
ating.l The commission proposed the title of Inspector or 
Oberaufseher (supervisor) for these officers in the various 
lands a.nd recommended the appointment of an Inspecteur 
General who should have the overall authority in all matters 
of drill and discipline. FM Harrach added that it would 
be of advantage to appoint one man to the position of In-
specteur General for both infantry and cavalry together, 
"umb die Sache andurch in desto Genauere Verkn8pfung zu 
bringen und Vollkommene gleichheit Beobachten zu lassen."2 
Regrettably, Maria Theresa remarked in the margin of the · 
document that no action should yet be taken in the matter 
of the inspectors.3 The reason for Maria Theresa's refusal 
to accept the proposal is not clear; yet one may suggest the 
explanation that the empress feared to stir up a hornet's 
nest by subjecting the colonels-in-chief and general offi-
cers to too much control from above. 
In spite of her refusal to sanction the appointment of 
such inspectors, at least two generals cont.inued to promote 
the idea. A memorandum by Cha rles of Lorraine to Maria 
lProtocollum Commissionis ••• ,l7th March 17~9. 
KA, HKR, Exp. 1749, March ~28 
2Loc. cit. 
3Loc. cit., "Wegen der i nspecteurs i st ni chts noch zu thun" 
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Theresa, dated 22nd June, 1750, appears to ipdicate that the 
empress did not even inform the chairman of the military 
commission of the reasons for objection: 
I hardly dare to propose again the (Introduction 
of) General Inspecteurs, 'he write~' although 
they would be extremely necessary for infantry 
and cavalry alike ••• to maintain uniformity in 
the whole1army, as is your Imperial Majesty's desire ••• 
Prince Charles insists on such officers having the rank of 
general to ensure for them the necessary authority. He 
concludes: 
The objection could be made that such inspectors 
are not a tradition in our servlce •••• However, 
there had never been such uniformity in service 
matters, as are being proposed now; and thus, 
they are now more than ever necessary.2 . 
In the same year, FZM Daun also tried to persuade the 
empress to reconsider her decision, in two memoranda,3 in 
which he emphasized the need for inspectors and a supervis-
ing Inspecteur General in order to achieve and maintain the 
required uniformity. Neither of these generals, however, 
succeeded in changing Maria Theresa's opposition to the 
plan. It was not until af·ter the Seven Years War that the 
lKA, Mem 9 - 259, 1750 
2Loe •. cit. -
3KA, FA/CA 911, 1750 and FA/CA 13/1, 1750 
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plan was taken up again.l 
In spite of the lack of general inspectors, the train-
ing .of the regiments in the new drill regulations proceed-
ed satisfactorily - if one can trust the official reports 
made by Daun and other generals to Maria Theresa.2 The 
position of an Inspector General not having materialized, 
FZM Daun and other generals made annual tours of inspection 
to the various regiments. Daun's inspection report of 1750 
gives the impression of objectivity and thoroughness, and 
contain~ an evaluation of most of the officers down to the 
rank of captain. Daun expresses his amazement at the pro-
gress made in such a short time in mastering the new drill 
regulations.3 
One innovation which was responsible for the improve-
ment in the training of the Austrian army was the establish-
ment, in 1749, of annual training camps and maneuvers, which 
were frequently visited by Maria Theresa herself. Al-
though these maneuvers consisted mainly of a presentation 
exhibition of parade ground drill, especially when Maria 
Theresa was in attendance, maneuvers imitating actual battle 
conditions were held. The frequently quoted Cogniazzo 
1In 1765 three Inspector Generals were appointed: FML Lacy 
for the infantry, FML d'Ayasasa for the cavalry and FML 
von Beck for the artillery 
2KA, FA/CA 9/1, 1750 and HKR Exp. 1749, Sept. 512 
3KA, FA/CA 9/1, 1750 
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reports a rather amusing incident, which took place in 1749 
during one of the first maneuvers held. On this occasion, 
in which Austrian and Hungarian regiments were facing each 
other in a mock battle, some of the Hungarian troops, 
carried away by the excitement, began using their round uni-
form buttons in lieu of bullets against the Austrians. The 
Austrian troops retaliated by shooting their ramrods against 
the 'enemy.• The result of this mock battle was several 
killed and nearly one hundred wounded!l Such an incident is 
understandable if one considers the novelty of the manuevers 
and the as yet uncorrected conditions of discipline in the 
Austrian army •. 
In spite of the fact that the greater ·part of the ma-
neuvers consisted of exhibitions of parade ground drill, 
suitable, as Cogniazzo remarked, to entertain the ladies of 
the court during the frequent inspections by the empress,2 
they certainly played a large part in improving the training 
and precision of the Austrian army. 
1 (Frh. von Cogniazzo), Freymfltb.iger Beitraf zur Geschichte 
des 6sterreichischen MilitHrdienstes •••• , 1799), p.24 
2 Ibid., P• 23f 
THE 1749 EXERCITIUM REGLEMENT FOR 
THE INFANTRY 
91 
The Regulament und Ordnung nach welchem sich gesammtes 
Kaiserlich - KBnigliches Fuss - Volck in denen in diesem 
Ersten Theil enthaltenen Hand Griffen, und Allen anderen 
~iegs Exercitien sowohl als in denen In dem Zweyten Theil 
vorgeschriebenen Kriegs - GebrHuchen zu Feld I Besatzungen/ 
und fiberall gleichf8rmig zu achten habenl was the result of 
the deliberations of the Military Commission of 1748 - 49. 
It was delivered, in twenty-two copies, to all infantry 
regiments on 11th June, 1749, according to a draft of a 
letter from the Hofkriegsrat.2 It consisted of two vo-
luminous volumes; the first part, completed in 1749, con-
tained the drill manual (Exercitium), the second part, issued 
a year later, contained the duty regulations (Dienst Regle-
~). The Exercitium was extensively illustrated with 
copper engravings in order to illustrate the various drill 
moves and formations. As the contents of this Exercitium 
are well lmown, and summaries or excerpts have appeared in 
1KA, Library, Ch5 
2KA, HKR Reg. 1749 June 138. G. von Treuenfest, in his 
Geschichte des Infantrie Regiments Hoch-und Deutschmeister, 
(Vienna:l879), p.l06, without giving a source, states . that 
four copies had ·been delivered to that regiment in January, 
1749. 
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several works,l a detailed discussion of the contents would 
be superfluous here. Two points remain to be examined: the 
first, to determine whether or not the Exercitium was a de-
liberate copy of the Prussian Reglements; the second, to 
evaluate the significance of the Exercitium within the frame-
work of the development of the Austrian army. 
It has been said that the Austrian army reforms of 1748/ 
49 were deliberate, but incomplete imitations of the Prussian 
military system. The history of the Seven Years War pub-
lished by the German General Staff contains the statement 
that "the Military Commission realized that the Prussian disi-
pline, the firing and the art of evolutions had been responsi-
ble for the Prussian victories, and therefore, the Prussian 
example had to be followed."~ Both Thflrheim and Anger state 
definitely that the Prussian Reglement had been used as the 
model for the Austrian 1749 Reglement,3 and JHhns implies the 
same.4 Although the Prussian superiority in drill and train-
ing was realized by the Austrians, it must be pointed out that 
le •. g. Max JHhns, op.cit.,vol.III,p .. 2560f; von Thadden, ~ 
marschall Daun (Vienna:l967), ch.8; Der SiebenjHhrige Krieg, 
Grosser Generaistab, ed.~ vol.I, p.l43ff 
2ner SiebenjHhrige Krieg, Grosser Generalstab, ed., vol.I,p.l43 
3A.Graf Thtirheim, Ludwi Andreas Graf von Khevenhllller -
Frankenburg, (Vienna:l 7 and G. Anger, op.cit., vol.II 
p.l098 
4Max JMhns, op.cit., vol.III, p.2560 
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one can only speak of copying the Prussians when one inter-
prets the aim of the military reforms of 17~8/~9 as an 
attempt to achieve equal efficiency for the Austrian army 
by centralization, by stricter enforcement of discipline 
and by standardization of regulations. No deliberate at-
tempt was made to copy the Pru·ssian drill and duty regu-
lations, namely, the Prussian Reglement for the infantry 
of 1726 or Frederick II's new Reglement of 17~3. (The 
writer could not find any documentary evidence that the 
latter Reglement had come into Austrian hands by 17~9). 
Even a perfunctory comparison of the Prussian and 
Austrian Reglements will make it clear that the latter is 
not a copy of the former, neither in regard to style nor in 
regard to details of dr.ill. Compared to the precise style 
of the Prussian man1:1a1, the style of the 17~9 Austr.ian one 
is· cumbersome and pedantic - every move of the drill is ex-
plained in great, and often confusing, detail. Even the 
style of the Infantry Reglernent of 1737 was more precise 
with its short, straightforward wording of the explanations 
of drill moves and regulations. However, the· lengthy, . 
cumbersome explanations of Daun's Reglement of 17~9 should 
not be condemned as a retrogression. In Prussia, the army 
was used to uniform drill regulations since 1702, and sue-
cessive changes were gradual. Thus, years of usage and 
practice made lengthy explanations of drill moves, evolutions, 
etc., unnecessary. In Austria, in 1749, such standardiz• 
ation was an innovation, and it thus involved the unlearn-
ing of the old drill practices according to the various 
regimental Reglements and the learning of the new, standard-
ized drill moves and regulations. Therefore, illustrations 
and detailed explanations were imperative to guarantee sue-
cess. The illustrations were especially necessary in an 
army as polyglot as the Austrian. 
With regard to tactical concepts and the technicalities 
of drill, one cannot regard the Daun Reglement as a copy of 
the Prussian Reglernents either. The 1749 Exercitium re-
·tained the formation in battle of foU:r re.nksl and the drill 
with the Schweinsfedern and cheveaux de frise, elements, 
which the Prussian infantry Reglement of 1726 had already 
eliminated, Moreover, the Austrian manual retained the use 
of hand grenades, a practice, which had been eliminated in 
the Prussian Reglement of 1743. 
Although the Daun Reglement of 1749, like the Prussian 
manuals of 1726 and 1743, emphasized the use of the peloton 
fire during an engagement, the Austrian Reglement retained a 
confusing number of different firing methods for different 
occasions. This, certainly, could not have been conducive 
1an exception was the formation of the ~wo grenadier compan-
ies of each regiment, which were deployed on each wing of 
the regiment in a formation of three ranks 
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to achieving a machine-like precision and speed of fire 
such as had been achieved by the Prussian army. Equally, 
more numerous in the Daun Reglement, are the varieties of 
marching formations and of methods of setting up camps. 
Speed in the execution of the moves necessary for loading 
and firing was emphasized in the Daun Reglement, but not 
in the obvious, repetitious manner of the Prussian manuals. 
The above mentioned differences can readily be seen in a 
comparison of corresponding parts of the Prussian Regle-
ment of 1726 and the Austrian Reglement of 17~9. (See 
Appendix A and B). 
The fact that the Military Commission of 1748/49 used 
the old 1737 Austrian drill Reglement as the basis for 
their discussions on the proposed new manual, pr:esents a 
very convincing argument against the theory of copying from 
the Prussian Reglements, particularly, a.s the 1737 Regle-
ment appears to have been based on the 1717 Austrian draft 
for a Reglement. Moreover, nowhere in the discussions of 
the commission is there any expression of a desire to copy 
Prussian methods. The word 'Prussian' appears only in 
connection with the demonstration of the three different 
drill methods arranged by Daun. Neither could this writer 
find such a desire expressed in any of the memoranda on. the 
conditions in the Austrian army and on the proposed reforms 
of 17l.r8. 
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The Austrian Exercitium Reglement of 1749 remained, in 
its main points, in force until 1769, when it was replaced 
by the Exercitium ffir die sMmmentlich Kaiserlich K8nigliche 
Infant.erie, composed under the supervision of FM Franz 
Moriz von Lacy. However, important alterations and ad-
ditions were considered necessary and issued soon after the 
outbreak of the Seven Years War. The following dispo-
sitions and manuals, issued under the direction of FM Daun 
are of importance: 
Lagergnmpng, 1757 
Ordre de bataille, 1757 
General Schlachtordnung oder Verhaltungen 
bei einem vorgehenden Treffen-, 1757 
MilitHr Feldreglement, 17591 · 
The Exercitium Reglement of 1749 had not brought any 
tactical innovations. Its significance in the development 
of tactical theory in the Austrian army lies Simply in the 
fact that it was the first generally applied Austrian drill 
Reglement and that its application was strictly enforced. 
It provided the technical means to make the Austrian army 
again the most formidable fighting instrument on the conti-
nent. 
The introduction of this Reglement for the whole army 
was not alone responsible for the improvement in quality 
of ·the army -during ·the · period of peace following the year 
1Reprinted in: •••• ,BeitrM.ge zur Geschichte des 
8sterreichischen Heerwesens ••••• Erstes Heft: Der Zeitraum 
von 1757 - 1814. (Vienna: 1872) 
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1748. Daun · knew how . to inject the right spirit into the 
army and to ensure the enforcement of the new regulations. 
Herein lies his greatest merit. The success of the reforms 
can be demonstrated without having to resort to the - possi-
bly anecdotal - 1 proof 1 of Frederick II's exclamation during 
the battle of Lobositz (1756): "These are no more the old 
Austrians 1 111 
This first battle of the Seven Years War, really was 
an indecisive battle, although the Austrian FM Browne with-
drew his army after the battle, a move which has been termed 
unwarranted by some critics. Here, as in all of the en-
gagernents which the Austrians lost to the Prussians, Austri-
an generalship was not equal to that of Frederick's. How-
ever, no more references can be found in the sources to an 
inferiority of the Austrian army in regard to drill and 
discipline, an inferiority, which had been obvious during 
the first two Silesian Wars. Whereas the Austrians had 
been defeated by the Prussians in every major engagement dur-
ing the first two Silesian Wars, they were able to inflict 
serious defeats on the Prussians in several major battles 
during the Seven Years War. Even the defeats of the Austri·-
an army during this latter war were not decisive Prussian 
victories. 
1 see, for example: Max Jahns, op.cit., vol.III, p.2561; 
Edith Kotasek, op.cit., p.l9; F.L. von Thadden, op.cit., 
p.215 
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It must, however, be emphasized that the introduction 
of regulations applying to the whole army were only part 
of a general reform of state and army by Maria Theresa, a 
small, but yet important part. 
The energy and determination of the empress, combined 
with her good sense to choose the right men for the right 
positions - in most cases at least - had brought the cen-
tralization of the state, aimed at by her predecessors, to 
a near fulfillment. 
Centralized control had enabled Prussia, earlier than 
Austria, to forge an effective army and make use of the 
possibilities and demands of the developmeqt in weaponry. 
It now enabled Austria to achieve the same for her army. 
The Prussians had general Reglements since 1702 and 
had been able to improve them gradually. The Austrians 
first had to create such uniformity, then they could make 
improvements as necessity and experience demanded. 
As mentioned above, the introduction of the Reglement 
of 17~9 would have meant little without the parallel reforms 
of military and civil administration, of the system of fi-
nancing and recruiting, and without the change brought a-
bout in the social status and in the education of the offi-
cer corps through the efforts of Maria Theresa. The Maria 
Theresian Military Academy in Wiener Neustadt, the Theres-
ianum in Vienna, (a secondary school for the education of 
future officers), the further development of the Engineer 
Academy in Vienna, the care for the invalids, etc., were 
part of these reforms. These reforms thus introduced the 
conditions under which the new Reglernent could become ef-
fective. 
APPENDIX A 
Excerpt from the Austrian Exercitium 
Regulament of 1749: the Chapter regulating 
procedure of firing(Chargierungen). From 
the original in the library of the Austrian 
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f>alben ro1mm net d) t>~c Sicu~cion, mitf>in nictjt Ail bod> 1 unt> nud> gar ntcbt ~u 
tlef ·anfd)f,lge /· it1~1feic{)en t>i~ £ettte &U l)Cn>Ot)mll I Ullt> je~~r;eit t>nl'~U r.tlf)tll~ 
ten 1 t>afi fie i[)re ®d>t111 nict)t q~ratl mtt>mad)\11/ fontcm Uiejmigcn uom r~d}$ 
ten WhiJcl f~m·~n et1Utl5 thld) ~!)unlid)reit rin~d 1 tm!'> t}ie uom linf~n ~hige[ jet>et Oatcaillon etil>(\5 red>t6J i>mnit bte ~Ct)u~ £rntfient al6 \'Oeict)c i:lem ~dnt> -
· ·. fo tittr)reren @5d}a~en Auftig~n. . . · · . . · 
; . · IDer .Obrltl $ jffiact)tmeiltet: 1 obet bcr 1 fo be [fen €5teUe ucrtciff I averti.: 
li · .• ret 4U~ ~~ue~ 1 tl.,dd}e ~u lll4l'.:l)cn 1 unt> la{jct etnen turfzcn ~Lirbd ~tun 2ett .' eben. mit Dcr ~rommcl gcbent roann jet>e5 ~~mr ·an3uf~~~~g~n ift 1 t>c~glciu)m 









j __ _,__,"· .... ~,_-tnbit:~ J~~ ; IE :;o'!'m•n::m andJ aue R:•fervmt fotuob t. lid>e:tb~W~~~ e 
·:-~-·-! .. :.-... ~:--.:.::. -~-~-;~ : . . . ·: .::.:- --; .. -:::::~.-... -.--- ... - - ~. - ··· ·-·-:---:r ···---· ·-- .. .. · - • ·· · · --· - ·-· ··· · • •. -
102 






I . I; . 
:! 
103 
_...._ __ ·--·-~------·-·------------------ .. - -·- ·-·-·····- -- ····---·--·-- . ... . . 
.. 
. • 
(!}firi.ltr 1 (\t~ th1~ im Av:tncircn 61!fctJeb~nbt ~reef) 1 ~cue~ 1 unb · bergfeid)enl · 
1-oie in tier Clurgirung b\1~ ft11d)rere trh1utrrt tfi. .. · . · . 
. 5ttl Avancircn unt) Rctidrcn mut1 tlUt!f 1 befonbcrd Offici~r~l unb ttn1' 
tcriOfticierd roo[)[ red)tG untllinFG r~ben I bafi jetl\!\'~dt ~d)nu~- gleid>e Front,. 
unb <!ilieL'er ge!)nfrcn wcrt'en 1 uni> ungeadittt ~ie fir() fertig Ullld}entle Pelo·· 
tons/ r>alf> 1 oDcr gmtCje Divifion~ um \>ier @Sd)ritt. im A \"anciren uortretten I 
fo miilfen l>llttflod> Die an bert 1 fo utd.)t tm ~enig 1 m·ad)en begriffcn 1 jctler1 
a'eit geNbt Linie ()aftclt. . · · . : 
.. ro.1d Av:mcirw (t>i'!.l~i)( G£5 Rctidrett befd)i~~ef mit ordin:tir~n 1 tmb 
· fangfmlllw:n <8d)ritWt. · · · : 
ID\lmit llhl!t fici> au d) itt Nnen ~mrettl fo bttrd) . t>ie Officierd com man. 
diref ruerb~ll I nid)t confundire I r~nt'ern i>it Weucr i~l einrr ~feid)bdt I uatr 
DrDnung ()\1ft~ I iff norbig A!l 6cobtlCI)ten/ baOI IU!lnll Peloton~ nuct~ I oD~e 
mit bnfb~n DivHionen chlt·gir~t rotr\> 1 unD Der .p,,uptmann uom ~r!len 
Whi~d commandiret: e~·l)h:ge an 1 vc~ auf ocm lin~~n ijhi.Jd fcctio-1: 
macb.tn ft'lfi"e I unb TOllWl Der auf Dcm er(ten Wh'igel r~us:~n 'lalfet I i>Ct: a~f~elll 
linP~n ~lugd an~ut~1}ht{)cn commandire11:>er aud ner ~rotl)fcn Peleton red,ten 
~higdo 1 oDct nad) nem fo~~thltllltelt Chargirung5 $ ffiang Der Dritten Peloton 
fcrti!J ~ll tlhld~cn b~fc()lt 1 unt> fo fort ; mit!) in et•()cUetl Dtl~ nur bie ~\~Cl) Yilu~ 
.. gel jetltl' B:m:tillon ~JCilGU auf cinantler .Dbttd)t an geben bLlbcn I Die li~rigen 
a ocr fcf)m auf if)r uor~d)cn~c!l mebm: Pelot-on, unt> roann biefe6 al'fcu~:et/ 
iuau)~f iic.iJ i:l<i~ mt~m ~ @Jtdjii.it\ f.:i:tig. · · · . · . 
~Ue 1 (o in tler Chargirung/ befonl'er~ roa~ ~unt ~ertfq 1 ttt11et1en 1 ~n~ 
fd)lagcn 1 uni> ~curcn gc()orct 1 !U· comm:mdir~n baben 1 tmitTen bit Cornman .. 
do nidit lm1g(l1m ausfprrd)en 1 obcr tlte ~Gorter ;i~r,~n 1 fcnD~rn frifd> uni> . · 
ge(d)t"ini> comm:mdiren 1 mit{) in g!eirbf<llll nur t'a~ fe!;te fillort (forf au5fpru 
d>tnl t,dfen bmd> ba5 langfame Commando eined einigen i>llS gan~e ~~ue~ 
1)0nl Baccaillon confundiret roer~en fan. - • · - : 
· · ruJann Etur \>orb\1i1t'en1 m~rt'm "or jeber Chargirung bet)IU .Exerciren 
fo \>iel Ecbu.fj gefeurct 1 ald bcf"l>len roiri>. . . - ··. 
ru3ns tibriqen~ beb ~er Chargi.rung 1 unl:> je~em 3euer info·nt)erTHit 3u-
btobad)ten iflt roirb In ber nad)folgen~cn Cbargirung ~'J ~r[d)enl uui> genauefi jid> l:larnad) ~u rid)tm fcun. · ·· · · 
· , 
. . . 
,.. .: . • ·.i 
. .. 
·c~argicungen • 
. ~m.·mn bic" obftcbenl:>e <6dlliiffungen 1 otler bie 
Oouplirung \)Of btr Ch~rgirung oemad)et tuort)m 
tudrcn 1 uni> Ne Otficier5 r()re Parrifanli bod) an bie 
lred>te I.Eeitcn gcuomnun 1 unb fo ~abnen babetu feU)~ ~ud) cr[)obenl unt> b~d) gebrad)t roorben1 fo •lf Rfbtcr l>Of b~nm Charg1nmgen nnf ein rldnea: 
. -. . . · . • . ~ropp . 
• ••• o o o o o o - -·· · · - · - ' o , p • -- -· • •• · · · · · - --- ' • ••• ' o 0 •• , . .... . -~--- ----· .. - ----··-- ·------ ------· -··-· · · - - - · --·- · - o" 0 
· ~-11 
i .: 







~ ; ! ; i : roon bettelt Ch3rgirlt.lt!}eni . . : . . 129'· .. 
.... 
. ; · 
: ... ;! ~1 I ~Jlitl)erl · C~h-arot·'.11ll·"·~~ ···· ···:·: ::-: ;! 
. p I Co~m.an??·l ~rontel. 1 . . ,, · . b 4- v ~u• · : : !; · ~ ! ! 
Tropp ~u fd>lagen 1 roormit i>ie Officiers/ uni> Unt ,. j: : :; 
teu Officiera/ fo in i>ns erlfe ®!~~i> geboren/ in il)s 11 · ! ; 
re Chargirunga 1 Q:intbeilung bcruortrettent unb (ol _ ;i · : : 
bann b1id nad)flebenne explicirenbe .8eid)cn &UitJ: . . n: : : : 
<6d)h11Ten. gegeben mid). · · . . · · . . J · ; : 
·-
.. . " . 
••• 
. ru.lann abe~ bit Cnargirun~ gteM) nacb i>enen · -. .: ·, 
,Panb 1 <Srieff~ttan~ufangen 6cfoblen s\>irb/ fo av.er;.. j! · ~ · ; $}<\bt de{) f. . ' 
ID?an roirb tid> 
en OrJre de 
Battaille ran• . . . 




• ' I .l 
1 . 
gicm, unb nad) . · . • . · · · · 
~t~ren:.a:ummcl, .· · . . Wuf"biefCtf .Averti.lrement· lafjet er t>u.rd), t>tn·· ·. 
· · · 6e\) ftd) b"abentlen Tambour · , 
r.: m!urbd m>fagen I unb nad>- fin em· fl'einen; .f)art· . 
1. ·etrcicb. . ~~ornad} .Dber1 uni> Unter· ~ Officier!J i>ie Par.:· 
. ' 
: .. 
. I i I ; 
· . . 'tiCans i unb .st'urQ ~ Gs:roebrd in tle.nen·geroo~nlid)en· ~ J . : · t>ret> Tempis. bod) neljmen / . int r?a!f tlie· ~tfiteren: 
· . . · ~ur~en. nidJt feb on ibr ~urfH ~etuebt l)od>' 6dttett•- · 
.· 
.. ; \ 
-
.. . . . ~ . 
. . . 
Tropp.. . i{Borauf~bers·uni> Uuter, Officierd· auf ib.re· ! l 
Pofien /1UO fk en Ordrede: Battaille: AU ffeben [)abenr ! · 
. . ·nemlid). biejcnigen I fo· ill' t>aa·'irf}e (Sfieb gc(}orenr . . l . 
l>eruor in fofd)e6· marchiren 1 tliejeutgen· Otncierar - l : 
Unter $ Officierd I lmi>: Wa[)nen aber I ro {)inter i:lenl -: i . 
"inten ®lieb ffef}etl 3tt; breif3en babcnt nur auf i>ie~ , ! ein.g~tnolid) bet} ~Cf R:angirung en·Ordre de Battaille· : 
angtmerrten· Dilbnzbert)orrucfen 1 ttni> gebori~ btni: 
· · ter C!\5 t>icr-te: ~licb placiren l uni>· ()alten tlk Of.. 
: . ~ ficic:rG· D~rd) ~it g\1n~e.· · C~argirung ibre _Partifand· 
·· · ·· · · · bocb f gletd}rote. ~ud) i.'ie Unt~~ 1 Offici~r5· tbr .stu~~,; · 
p . • • • • • • • I . . .~eroe!)r 1 au d) t>te ~ubrerd t>re. ildbnen.. . ~ 
·. . . .: ·' · . · · 2u g.lcid)er 3ett l)crfleUen (id) Die Grenadiertf: 
. ,. aua uiet in i>ret) ~U~i'lern1 lUit iu'oenen. DoupJi.. I 




Otntnd)et ruorDtll/ unt> Die Grenadier$ iu uier-<8lttl; . , 1 · 
, ,tJtm formiret rudren. . ~ : : I ~ · 
r.etrci~. . · g:n~cbt · Der rectte ~higel ~arb flinrslunt>· ·ber· ~ I i 
. lhnle ~rugd l)arbs red)ta! bep~e aufl)cm unrm 2lbs · · ; 
· . - .1 (aQ I tuie in ~en eo (5~hi0ungen N. 9•· ge(aget roou 
.. . ~ . l'en. 
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roou ~cucn C~lntgintttriett. 
------------------------·----------------
. , :~~ I ID2it berl.· · Cl · ' · · · .·· .· 




- . , . 
·. · ~ .. 
'• . 
· \)en. ~el)ntl nun me[)rne Battaillon~ 1 onct oatJ 
gonQt ffiegimwt ~rpfamuten I fo l>e(d)ieijet · Dit 
@Sd)ltifiimg Dal)ill/ suo Cie IDlitten uon aUen ill! 
romm i>er Tcm!in e5 anbcrft leiOct . · tile bintcr t>cn1 
\>iertcn ~lieo flcl>ent>e ~a{)nenr;Z)bcr 1 uno Untcr~ 
Officier~ 1 Fourier· ed)lt~enl T:1mbour61 ~al)nelll 
;.tt\lgero 1 2c. nHtd)en gldcbfaUs in ibtt~ (!;intbd* 
lung Dte ~cnt:ung gel)orig m!t 1 foi>ann .fait t>et 
£>briff1 staoci)Uuctfitr Durd) bel){)abenbenTambour 
Tropp fcblagcn .. I u:cld)en aUe· librige Tambours mit einf · 
f(olagen 1 rJomit OatS H:octaillon, o·t>ec ffiegfmeut tid> 
nad) Oer ~JlHtcn fd)Iicii~t 1 auf~trt 1 roie in bene.n 
erfogtm ~d>litifi1ngd1 N. 9. expHci~ct roori>en; t>ie 
etll~rcn Al'~>~l) Qj(iei>er fon.,ol ucn Grcnadierti 1 al6 
Fuifilier~ P~ctllCim 3U gfdct;~r 3cit obne tl>eitereti 
Commando tl.ltll)r~noer .6d>hlffung gefd>tl>int> bal$ 
Bajonet in gcborigen Tempis, unt> geben fin r~ * unt> 
t~f(ht~ ~'tf ~!!Hml:lt!." ~!d)ttm~ 1 ~~n ~~ ~ug!eid> ge~ 
fd>~be 1 unt> fct)uttern l'~>ietler ; oUe~ 1 1\Ht~ fid) bin•. 
ten beftnbet/ uni> obcn t:lte m3enDung mit~ gemad)t! 
tretten aunldd) Den EG>ritt mit on 1 unD bleiben jet>er&ett in t>er Oi£bnz, unb ()et) be me 1 n>o ftd>inf . 
getr)eil'et/. folg!id)l road l)int~r Der Wlittm ficb be~ 
fin bet 1 nur btcrort5 t>ie ~~en tung auf D~m llnfl!tl · 
~ua Huf6 au lllad)~n bM. . . · 
jill ann nun Drr .:Ubtif! 1 ru3aci)tntetffe1' fiet>et/ 
baa bt~: Battai!lons ~~fd;l"iicn 1 gt~eHr mit .~em ~e~ 
gen· em Setd)ell an aUe Tambour5 1 uact> tudcbell 
felbige augleid) mit eid)tagcn oufborcnl lalfet fol 
bann Durd) bel)babtnDm Tambo~r · . 
r. etreid) fd>htgen 1 ruorauf pd) aUco en Fronte ~er{leUet I 
1• bot~ Petti met)r~lh'tle!l . . . · · .. . · 
etrcid), Do~ t{l: etnen <Stretd) m:t ~~~c\) @;d)logetn. gc6c!' 
lnffet 1 nad) tl>eld}en t>tc lefjtcn lltet) ®ltet>~r m g(Cl$ 
d) en ~uotritt 1 "orn>drts fid~ fch:ieffcn 1. roie' oben 
J . in b~nen ect;lufflmgen N. r. cro.rt~rct lt'Of~Ul; bte fia{)neu 1 unt> nHts ftd> bin ten bc~ntct 1 All gleicbet Beifauf qctorige Difianz anrucfcu 1 ~Ll nun ffidl ben UnO <8l1e~c~ gefdjfotfm I uno <tU~~ ... en Ordrc 










- - · - - -- --· · • • 4 ·_ :--_~·, ... 
·,. . .., .. · .... 
· roo11 ben en ·Chargi~ut~{Jtil · .- l3 r. · .. · i~ : . 
.. . , . . ; -~ . - ~ l : 
. . . . . . . . . ' . I 
· · f 11 comman~~·l ~~z~&~1~ 1
1
, - : . .. Ch~rg. irungen. · .: .· . ·  .. : · ·~ .-:: _:'. : · ·
1
( .·! I 
. . ' . . .,, 
. • . . . . I 
de B:maille rangirter fle[)et 1 avertiret ber ,Obriffl : . i :;1 ! 
~(ld)tmetfle_r... · .. · , . · :· · .. · · . . ... ::·1 
., . . . ; . . - . ; ... . . . . . . .• . : J. ; 
. : '1 S}d~t dJbf· ~rfle Chargiru.ng mit ~Peloton6 .auf .: .. :-J.: 
· ·.. miF~~~~~~ .· . i)~~- . eteue. ~ .. . . . . .. ;::·:; . 
auf btc etellt . . ri. f l' ..Ti. f , ..... , c: d A . .. -'a-.··.· t . 1 I 
charginlf, . · .l;a(JU t>arau 1 n~m t"" au . .... trf9 vertlu¢• · ~· ~ 
·· · 1. gnr4ell ment · · ·· · · .. . :- ' : · ·. · ' ;· ·. 
· ·wsurbd fci)logen I fo 6ali) felbigcr geetti>igdl faUt ba~ er{fe . : . 
. ;·. · . . . · ~liet> in brtl) gefdnutnt>m Tempis mit ·bem lin fen · . '· . 
.-:-. ~ _. · · · , 1Suu uorttetteni> nic~er 1 tuie tn Deucn .pant> s ~rief1 · i : . 
~,: . . ~· ·. · ' : · . fe.n N. 47· g~faget ruorben/ tuornad) 'bit ~oupt1 · 
. ~ - · ·· .> · S!tute btV t>enen errten Peloton.~ berm GrenadiertJ · 
. ;. auf bepi>en meohne~t~ f ~higch~•/ aucb bie erften-: . t· 
.. · · · , Pelotond aUer BattaliJon~ .&ugle&d) ba~ ~euer nn1 : · • · 
.'· . . I • 
. . ·. 
., . · . . . 
. •. 
• . . 
.. 
. . . 
· ·· · ' :. · · .. · ·~ . · · fangen 1 imt> commandiren : ·. · . ' ·' ... i .. · 
.. Pelo.ton Ul~Cbt' eucl) fe~tig.. ' . j ' • 
~~ . .. _.. ~ .· · , .. . . . ·. :. m3cld)c3 bel} beuen Grenadier6 I ba fit nue : · i · 
brei) bod) fh~en 1 \>on benen ltfJtercn &roet) (Siie• . 
... • ... · 
. .. .. ~ .. 
. ,. . 
. . . .. ... 
. . .... . 
• . 
. : . . · 
. . 
. . 
. ; ; .. .. 
· .. ... 
• 0 • • 
• 
"' • ' 0 • 
. 
. . I ~ • . • 
bern flebenDer befd)iebetlt-oie tn t~nen -!)nitb$®tief• · · 
fen N •. IO·· get-otefcn. IDon benrn Fuifilierti ~ Pelo. { . 
ton6 aber 1 roeJd>e uier bocb ffebenr ftlUet t>evm ~er• · . · 
fiB 1 mad) ell ba~ &roeute <Blieb mit bem. britten ·-
Tempo bergclfott niet'er 1 baa brtTen recbtes Stnt)e 
Ql1 fdneti tnt)eni:len morber I \manned ~d)Ub t)ed · 
reruten lju{fes faft anrit{)re 1 mit t>em lin fen ijufj .. 
' a,ber trittet fold)er fa(l ~is an beG morber~rolanne~ ; · 
red) ten S~nve eimvdrto 1 baa ~nueor fpauuent>~bocO . ; 
uor fid> balten·~. . . · . · · · / . · : 
· 2u mer~en : ~n bem P~Iot'on6 lll~uer Melbef . 
bo6 oanfle erfte <Sfiei> fowol oon Fuifilier~ 
: · · ttl~ Grenadier61 t>edgleicben ·auc'o tlie ~roet) 
. · ·- ~abnen~2itglol5 l'cr funndlen~e unb fed>ats 
l)ell~t jeoer Battaillon in Referve , ~eogldl 
\. . · .. d}en aucl,)! iuaun uur eine Grenadier6 ~com-
. ~- a. . . . . . ... . . .. . · pagnie b~Vll)efen~ roAre /l'~ folroe auf.beut>e 
. : 
.. 
·"; . ... ; . .. ·· .. . . . ~· ~ . . · . ·. . . ~lugcl 
. . ~ .. 
. . •' 
... 
----.-.. •·, .. -- .. --.. ·-- ----· ....-....,.-..,.- ----------......;. 
• _, '•· •· ~ • ,,.,. ... , ..... • ,.., ·-I' • • '·' •· •' ' • ' ' • 
· '· 
...... .. . 
I 
. • 
·· ... ~-. 1 
10.7 
1. - · ~-3~ roou ben en ~ha~·girtmacn. . . 
~ . . . -~II Commando. J ~i~ tler I . · 
~ .. 
J . . . . 1 ~romd.f Chargirun.~eil._. · · ·. · .. . 
.' - ·~1 - . . 
: . ~ 
: .. ,. 
.. ·: 
. . · l .. 
: ·.J . ; 
. . ! . .• 
., i •. . . . 
' . 
:j I . . .· . . . 
. I • 




. . . 
~fugel ~er Battail!o:1d ~crtbcifetl unt>. gefldi · .· 
Itt roirt> 1 r~ie untcn bto i>enen D.ouplirunl 
gm anatmtrfcJ i;l. : 
. ~iefe ·obm b~fagte !lUei} fc~te <8lietler bet Gre; . 
naditr!J 1 untJ t>Ht} !Cf2ti! \!ihe.Der ber Fuifilier~ rucf~n 
&u~lcicl> im i>titMl Tempo in unau5gcfefjten eld>rttf 
ten \)Ornh1rrt:S gefd~luin~' unt) Dergc(taltm tint bali 
· Der liuf~ ~ufi ucn bcm rolann Det:S Atuevten (Utiebe~/ 
an feH1cs fnvent>cn k?ort>er s ~J2anneo red)ten ~uti 
dntunrtd linea t>ergeffalten angefeflet roert>e 1 t>ali 
bte <6d)Ub' @)pi~e <lll t>e5 roor'ber s IDl~tnueG stnoe 
f\l(t rli{)re; b~l~ 'btitte ~ltet> fetzet fciu~n S!ineen au d) 
liuf6 eim-odrtd an feiues roorDer ~ ID?amuJ-recbte~ _ 
fiuut fid) et1uad tocnigcd r~rot6 l)altenD 1 unD bletl. 
btt Det red)te Wufj uon beotien illfie.t>crn &ttruf bini 
bao tl~itte antrcttenb- , . ' . . : - · ; J 
. !I I
ter Den lin fen ftd>eu 1 alfo aucl) Dat$ uierte (!}lie~ an 
:.. · ax..t.r~~• "'n · ·. · : ...- . · ·.:.. '·. · · ~ 
...._,:,J,j .... D"' •• • • t 
· · XJa fcbfagen bie &rueu le~fen C!3lieber btr Gre· 
nadierd/ttnt> t>rt1J btntere ~.Hieber t>er Fuifilier5 !Uf . 
g!eid> frifd> auf bntben IDlann i>ergeftalten an 1 bali 
t>ad illcruebr bed &roel)tm Q31id,ed Der Grenadierti 
tiber fdnc~ fnt)cnt>en ~orDer 1 ffilann 1 rodciJer ~u 
Dtr ~eit ficb mit bem Sfopf etroad uottl>drt8 bu1 
c~ct i un~ Dad ~ctoel)r ftnfen ld(l ; ba5. Dritte ab.e~ 
recbtd fcllled morbcr ~ ~Jlannt:S l)inau~ I bod) fo Utel 
tl)uulid)t hurd anlttfc!)lagetl fonmte 1 bas fernere 
Commando crroartenbt auf bie ~ttlroie in t>enen · 
.Oanb ~ (!}ricffcn ge1oiefen ; ·bad &ruet)te <!JUeb Oec 
Fuifilier. Peloton~ fd)taget <lttd) ftifd> iiber ftinelJ. 
roort>cr ~ID2aunc5 seopf l)inau5 lUObl Qtl/ bit ~tl)~t} 
£ef2term t>crfdben Qilie~er aber fcblagen an 1 wte 
bco bem le~tcn Grcnadier6 1 <81ici> erroebnet • . 
. ~ 




. . :' 
.. . ~ 
. .- .; 
·! 















2u merr~n: ru3annnun obne &u feuern ba6 ~61 . 
fdCiCll commanditet rour~e I fo rotri> bat1 (Bel . 
lutbr in cincm Tempe;> bod) uor ficl) gebracbt/ 
obne R1c~tDUU9 eine~ ·~tt[ed I Dad_ er(le 
· . . ~heo 
: 
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roou beneu Chargir_unaett; 
Z) j I. = · · relit ber 
. 53 I Com~ando. ~roiuei.J • t '. r · ; 1 • 
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t>ein Bajohet lUiebcrum in uorge()abte Pofi.. ·· · ~ ~ turt roie eo \)Ot be~ 2!nfd)lagen u~ruefen." ... ~ ·!1 1 
, ~ener.: , · ,. :-; i : 
· -!jier tf)UCU fi~ etllelt ftutten 2UO t\n bent (5d)lld' . . r-:~ ~ j j 
. fe~ 1 ooer 2t'ngel/ uut> nacb gegebenen ~~uet 1 brinl · - · :\ ; i \ 
g~n felbige mit 2uruetrettung ~eo lin fen ~Pfi~tf ue$ ;; · ~ 1 
ben Den remten Oao ®eroe[)r bod> 1)0t fi<b ()a [tent>/ ::- :I' 
int t>rilten Tempo bring en fie e!J mit 3uruetrettun~ . ~ . ! 
b~d red) ten ~uftc& in glermer Bal:mz !ltt Ne red}te . .- , .. · 1 
@;etten 1 t>etfl~Uen t>m .Pabnttuifd)ent>ie ~fL'ltUttll . · :; .I "' 
aua I eroreiff~n i:lie ~)Mronen I offnen felbtge·/ uill>. . . ( ; ~ 
lat>en/ .tuie ill t>enen .Oan~s CSrteffm N. ·I4·/I)·/ :, ; 1 
r6. i i7.1 r 8. 1 & 19. an~eroil!fen roo~Den ; bad Aiueu~ i:; :! 
te CSliei> ~er Fui!ilier-.Pelcton5 {lel)et nlit bod> snebl :.: · 
menDen ®erocf>~ olcid> nact> gegebenen ~euer auf/ · U :· 
uni> ))etrid>tet a lied /tl)ie ooen befd)rie6en; fo bait> • tl, . 
otlabett I bringet ein jeDer mit gefd)tuinben Tempi~ . ;. :. 
obnt Commando t>as ~eroebr auf Die e5\!)ultert un~ f; : 
lU«llll fold)~6 UOll <:Uen erfolgrt I thi)ten fi~ fidl roiu !;; 
bcr auf il)rt Diftanz, iebod) mit ber ()auptfdct)lis . 1,:: 
d)cn ~mttercunat oau fold>e~ fo g~fd)tuini>t al5 e~ l! 1 
uur· tnmter IDlenfd>en s moglid> 1 unD ol)ue i>ie mhtf l:1. 
belle Q(broartung Deren Tempis befd)Cl)enmug; DatJ . . jl '~ 
.. erfte ~ltet> etl)ebet lHl~) erfolgttll ~euert5i'opf/ Ulli> 1:; i (.Btll)tf)t 1 roie uor ·etll)el)net. - · ·. . 1i 11. 
·. ~Uf bieft ~t't Continuiret ba~ ~CUtt' 1)0U bet}l II . ~en ~lugelnpje1Der. Bat~ai~tc:m , uon l>etwl Officierd/ · ji 1 1o in Den en e oton6 1te,)en/ commandiret roeri>entu 
1
.j! 
. bi~ nad> Det ~Jlitte auf ote oben erfaote &tuev ~al>s . 1· 
nensPc:lotond 1 roelclJt bier nid)t t>et .f)rt>nuno nad). . ·:! 
feuren 1 fonnern in Referve ucLbleiben; .roann OatS !; 
Dretnebeni>e Peloton jet>er Battaillo11 abgefeuret 1 i: 
mad}en {id} t>ie er{len Peloton~ jcDer Battaillon tutu. - ll 
Der bcborig fertig/ unt> roann DaG ~ierAtl)enbe abs- ) 
feuret 1 fd)lagen Die erlleren PelotonG an I unt> fo . . - ~~­
fort; au d) mad) en ftd) Die erfi'(n auficren Peloton(f 
ber Grenadier6 auf beot'en ffieotment~s \llugeln ~Uf ' ' 
· - 1lt J , glei(ij · 
-------........ ~· .... :. . .:·.-~--__,.,,....._....,...,......__,...---..,..--
,_ 







roon tJcnen· Chargirttngnf •. ~ . ,) 
·:~1 · · d J relit berl · Ch ·· · .j3 1 comma~ ~·~~fot~d. · .·. . . · argtrungen. · . 
·' 
• 
gleiro mit i>enen trflen PelotontJ bnen Battaillon~ · 
tuieb~r fertio I fo oft !>aa ~euer repetiret roiri> I · 
i>amit fie aber ( i>a fie nur jel)en .Ortd in \)ier Pe. · 
,lotono ffebett/tuann ~tUCO GrenadiertJ, Comp:tgnim 
l"orl)onben ) il)r ~euec fouteniren 1 nemlid> · aU.e~eit · 
tine Peloton ·mit ~etane·nem (!Jetue~r Ua(\~11/ fo rh1)f 
· ten fie l),,t:J Commando unb ~euer· thl/lUie e~ beQ· 
i>enen gan(j~ll DivHion~ gefagct n>irb. · · · · 
109 
·. 
· -~U,lltn.liUll fofci}e5 aroet}: Oi>~rmtf)rlllafen burd)f 
oemacbet roori>en 1 unt> ein an~ere6 'Seuer tltlOefan~ 
gen tu~ri>m foU 1 fo I art bcr Dbcifi' ~311dH!neiffe~ . , ' ' 
bet) ~bfeuerung De5 leetcn Pcloton6 1 nemltd} De.~ 
roier!ebenntn be~ Fuifilier6/ · . . : . I .- . 
. .. . 
. . 
. . : ... 
. . ., . . . : 
~ . :. : 
· . 
I• t'angrn · · . ' 
· !murhl (ctjlagen 1 tuddJ~~ bemerF~t 1 bafi fidJ bati ~mee:. · 
enDiqen foUe I r&>orauf i>ie ·er(feren Peloton5/ Da fie . 
fid> fci>on ferttg gemad)t 1 unD anfd)lagen 1 roiebea · 
nacb Commando i>e6 Officierd alit uni> .i>tn .P·abn 
. . . ,. . 
" ~ ... ~.: l · ~~·fi~B @Sf;eb. 
· unb · ke(erve · ' · 
·IJ!<t:!}t eud) (m· · 
tlg. 
in t>ie dtube fef~enl aud) fd>tl!te\'ll 1 unb .comrnan-
dirrt biunuf D~f· Db riff, ro3~d>tmei(ter :., · Q 
. . 
•. . 
.... . . 
. . ' . . . 
t. i 
. . . .. 
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· IDiefe · ~ertigmad;.ung bffcbfebtf "om cr(ten 
CSift~ folgeni>rr ~'laflen. ~l6: .. 
· ·. i. Tem.po. ffiringtt bcr rolann bit red)fe ~(t~b 
.. ·. · · · · an Da5 €d) loB 1 nen IDaumen auf 
· -. . :. ben ,Patm feg~nb. • 
· 2• Tempo. @Spann~t er i>tn -!)abn mit bent er1 
bobeil~l·l ~Uenbogen1 augl~id) einen 
mucrer b~runtertt>drt8 ntad)ent>• . 
S• Tempo. reringet er b\1'6 ®eroebr bod> uor 
. . ·fid> oerat> in t>ie .Pobe 1 iWt red)ten 
.' . ', · . IDa umen auf ben .Pabn (tlm lin ren 
Deuen2htgen gleid) anfrocirtd an De·m 
C::Sd}aft balteni>; Die ~roel} Referve1 
Pelotonti aber uert)alten fid) 1 roie 
~eo .oenen Pcioton61 \j(Uem ~ef<u 
. · .. . · - seft · 
. -.. . 
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."' . ·roon benen Chat·giruugelt.·' · · · .. 135: 1 
- . . I . . / . . . . • i· :) 
~I - . . r ~JUt berl . . . ..  Ch. -. : .· . . · . . : -; -. l :·.,;,1 
E' l Commando lltroliid·l .. . . . argirung. :. : ·; ! ;: ;: [ i I': 
-~· : l. , . ··I ~get/ jel>oeb mufienDi~fe Dreu Tem;, . · ·I·. 
. . . : . ~ , · · · . po fo gcfd}tuiub 1 1mb ofcid)fam nu~ - L
1
}1) 
.- .. · · . : · : · · · . · . · · tn einem gcnhld)et r.>erDen. · .. :•: ! 
· . , . .. · :i)er ,()bri{bru3ttd)tmciffer commandiret rodttr: • : .:· ~: ·i 
e"~a"t an! . ~tefeo bcfd)iel)tt uon allen ijcrtig ~ gemad)ten · · - ~: !: i 1 
\\0 II &Ugle.id) frifd> auf [)afben 'Wlann I 'fo uid mogttdJ . ~:< n 
nad) bee rolitttl tmt tute gtfagt 1 Dttti ~eu~r AU creU$ :?. ·i 1 4m 1 roof>eQ lU ertnnercn 1 Dajj befont>er5 in ben en W · ~ 1 : 
Referve ~ Peloton6 -bad erlle ~fiel> ficl> roobl' in~· . · if· ·. ! ·. 
. . ... 
. . . 
• l . • ' ~ • 
·. ·. ~ . . .  . ; 
... .. . 
. ., . . • . ·. . 
·' . .·.. { ·. : ;.~ 
~e~c~ lege 1 tuort>urd> ea afl~rt>fno6 euu,tt.1 gebuis · :; ·I 
t~}= fommet 1 mitf>in i>'l.~ a:~ d) envcnt>e ~tuevtc <.Brtet) . ,.·. ~ ~- . 1 
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· · ~efcbieb~t r->ie oben crrocbnet ltllit einetu fd' · · ! . i 
fd>en IDruder/ nacl) gcgebenen ~etJe~ bringet ba~ . · · 1: ; 1 
. er.~e ~liei> gleicl) 'benen ubrigett ba$ ®etuebr ~OQ)/' . . I; ; ! · 
· · tu-te e!J uo~ Dem Qlnfcf)lag getuefenl foi>aun brtnget · · ··. . 1 . , 
· · e!J l>a6 {!:}etucbr on Der red)ten Sciten in Die Balanz, ' !' ; • 
t>aB t>cr .S~olben bb1ten auf ber <ftt>etf/ unt> ·nte · . .. :: 
~~ni>u·ilg uomcn eine ~tueru)e .[Jan£> uon t>er <frben . · I! : :~ 
· (lel)tl bertleUet llen ~abn ttuili:bet bit ~f,llllle/etl · .. · !i< 
greiffet bte ~atronen I ofnet folcbe I fd)uttet 8unbl if .~· : 
_ ~trattt auf/ unt> fu)lielfet bie ~fanue 1 i>ie g)atros · · It :, 
m:n .aber 0u[)artent> 1 unb mellen i>a6 er(le <.Biiet> . . ~ •: 
tnuenDer i>te 2<li>Ung ~u mad} en 1 (o f>~bet . e~ mit · -p .. 
ber lin fen .!) ani> oas <Seroef>rJ ge~cn ficb in Die .Po$ 1.1 . 
btl mit Dcr rect)ten tlllf oem <finfct}n!tt OetLStPlben~ jt 
~t!t~~~~~>e.p:~~~~~,b~lil~~t~ ~~~~e~~~:~~~ f~>rrc~~1;1 ~~fi . I i: 
i>er ~olben an>ifctmt bem l>interen 1 uni> t>elfelbm · ! 
S)1ebei1 s ~J2tlnne6 auf i>et C!:rben ruf)el unb ber 2.:tuf 
nnterficb gegm i>it·. ~ri>en fomnte 1 mit Der lin ten 
·· · ,Pant> ttroat;j obe~ ber Wlitte i>l1S (!3eroebr ergreifl 
·. - ~ fent> I unD Dergefl\11t baltenbt i'at1 bie IDlimt>ung bet} 
· Dem finren 5t'm>e ettuas [)eruor febe 1 m•ld)et Dte get 
· . ; fd>tuini>e 2ai>ung 1 uno roann fold>e beid)eben 1 fafs 
. . .. . fet mit Oer red)teat .p,tnb ba~ ~eroebr oben uuter 
· . IDem Hajonet, unD erl)cbet c!J 1 fo fang D~r ~rmm · 
reid)et I llllt l1er lint en ,PanD gr~llfet AU gfeid)er adt 
.~immfc~ bi~ 'l!l tlie ~!!~cc:~~~ ~ ~e~ert. unt> bringe~ ~Q 
. . 
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mit einem 3tt9/ gefdUt \)Ot i>oo red>te Stnt)e 1 roie e~ 
norbero getueien. Uub ill &u beob<ld)ten/ baB man 
fid> rool)l tttld> bem reel) ten ~higd rtd>te /uno bo~ 
®ctue()r mit ~em Bajonet in einer (5ct}nttr 1 gera~ 
· i>cn Linie riner 1ule ber oni>ere 1 niitbin einc~ ntd}t 
bol}cr ober niebrig~r /tuie i>o~ onberc gct)alten tuer~ · 
t>c 1 bie ti~rige brct) ®Iieber bcr Referve' Peloton~ 
t.'errid)trn ibrc S!abung gnuobnlicbcr rolatTen. _ . 
. .. ~ 
· ~nbier i(lnod> AU ecinnereu 1 bafj 1 ~ann ntefil · · 
rcrt Battaillonsl o(6 eined 1 exerciret 1 ober 
· ~hargiret 1 fo(d)e bie Petoton~ ()olb ~ o~ea: .· · 
. gcmf~e Divifiont1 ~ ~cuer 1 je~e in:> bcfonl>ere · 
mad>en jebod) I fo t~iel tf)unfid> I bie Battail· • 
Ion~ ouf ein.onbcr ~CI)tuug ·gef>en 1 bof} fid) . 
btl] o_Ucn cx~rcirenben.Bactaillono boo ~eu~~ · . · 
ausretd) cnt>tge. · · : 
. : · ·. ·IDa au ecrorgen 1 b·au meiffcntb.cU~ dniger ~~6~- · 
gauq uon compteccn ®tnnb fid) errdgnen. 
, . · · t>otfte/ au d) t>urd> Die fid> befint>ent>en ~ron1 
fen/ ttnt> aumrboll>m fle()ent~en iiDad)ten I 
· 1tn1> Commando ~ie Peloton5 meif!~nd t>eu 
· geflolt nefd)tudd)et f-:vn roerben/ t-au bie~ 
. fe6 Peloton-~t>ucr ~U fd)t'Octd) antHrrd) (cl)n 
WUtt'e I fo \Uitb ill einer Atlion Ulll fo lllebl 
rcrs bali unfen au!Jemer~te [)olbe Divifiondl 
~euer !Unt <Bebraud) genommen roertlen 
. mtlfien. · · · · , 
(Bt~·fd)mi.e [)inge~en 1 roann bie Peloton6· !u 
fed)~ lfieben 1 unt> acht ffiei~cn breit fel)nt> 1 
:ran au d) mtt balben Pcloton5 a us jeben Di-
. vi!ionen l)On _,eren 6el)i:'cn ~lugdn ge!)en t~ec 
. . allittcn chargiret rouDen. Unb ~1'1>\lr :, ·. 
· ~uft>eo ,t>brift m3ild)ttneiflers Avercufement: 
tiTan wicb mit ~a lb~n PelotomJ ana Di·::i/iontn ~har- ~ 
l
gircnJ unb Dar,luf fct)f,1gen lo)j'enten ~13~ircd tuirt> 
· bel) aU~n Diviqonen ~uql~id) t'urd) ~ic Otfidc:r5 an~ 
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· • mad)e euc!> f!:r:tig 1 suorouf fid> t>ie l}intere anm> · .! 1 · } 
~~u~~r erfterer Peloton bebori!) fertig macbenl uni>· ; 'i. 
1
: · ; 
an bie uorDere uorrucren; . Dn6 ~roct)te' CBtiet> aberJ ; : ; l 
·tuann bat'J erfte mit uorrocirro ant1 gm>e ttnge(eCjten. · ' · (8~1\Hbr fci)on rm)etl suo abcr nid>t bel)i.'c uort>ere- · · · ·. ;. :. ! i (Sltet>er biere~ Peloton aufo red)te·~nl)e gt~i1> nncb . j : ; · 
auogerprocbenen Commando~ · iroort niet>erfaUen t . i, . ; ; 
.unt> bao All>t~te ®liei> t>nti ~t11>et)r nuf be~ @5ct}ub• · i:· : : ; 
tet nb~nfet 1 tuie bieruntcn ~. 4· gefaget tuirt); f61 ;- ·· ' · ; 
., 
bnnn commandiren b;e. ~rfferen me iter :· eld)l»gc- . . , . ·i 
! i. · ·an/ ·tucld)co alfo Dte Fertig 1 gemnd>te biutete AtUet)· · · • ! : .I 
. . (8lie~~r nUererf1crcn Peloton~ l>Ctl)itrtm 1 !Ugleict) .· · · : · : } 
nber comm:mdiren t>ie b~u i>enen inucrcn ~!ugefl : · · l , .i 
:Pelotond aUet Divifions nad) t>em fonfligcn Char. ' ' 
.gintngG 1 mang :. ~we pte t)nlbe Peloton macl)t CtiC~· · ; ! 
,f-:&:tig 1 unt> tUonn biccmtf t>te erflen f>alben Pelo- . i · ; 
.. .. . .ton~ nbfeuern 1 mtiJlen. Die ·6nlben ber ~roel)ten Pe•. 
, · · loton6 antc~)Iagcn 1 i>ie [)alben t>c.rer britten PeJo ... 
· · ton6 · aUer Divifion6 nber ~c.~ fe~tig macl)ii11 fol . ! i 






bat~ bie ()iutere l)at6e Peioton~ liif~u~r:t [~betl'fie­
gefd)\lJillb rofeber 1 un~ fd>ultern/ unt> &ugleid> tce1. 
bet t>ao Atueote C8liet> nuf 1 unt> mact)et fici> ferthJ , .. 
. t>as etfle ®lict> aber bleibet fnt)en 1- unt> macl)et ~d) 
Augtetct) mit t>em ~tucpten fertig. 1 tuie oben N •. r • 
expl,iciret t\>orben.. · · · • ·. · 
. ' · rolfe nun t>at'J ~eucr uon bei)bcn ~tiigetn je' 




.- .Der DivHion gegen · ibr~: ro?itt~n i>urd> t>ie bint~re 
l)albe Pelotons h1Uifet 1 nffo 6efd>~cbet es nud) bel). 
·nenen. t>ort>eren l)Giben PelotonoJ· Ull'i> mu;Tetl Die· 
erft~re ()albe. Pelotons anfd>lagen 1 roann t>ie binte ... 
ren -!)elften _ t>er u!erten Peloton6 feu ern /. bingegttl · . . t 
roann bas 0cuer ofters t>urd}gemad)t roerben roiUt ~ 
.muiTm fid> bi~ e.rfferen bintert balbe Pelotond tuie1· 
·tltr fes:tia mad) en /. roann ~it t'ottlere .Pelftt ·bee-
. . uierten Peloton· anfd)lagen 1 unt> fo roeiters 1 bie· 
Grenadiers mad)Clt alf)ier bie Referve, unt> sucrt)en. 
bet) Cfnbioung Diefe6 ~euerG Ourd) ben ,t>btiff.'· 
.ro3Rcl)tmeit1er oe.borig ~omm:mdiret., . 
. 
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.I 
S~tt6t a<bt, man 
tuirt> mit h'ilbe 
Divifion~ tlllf · 
bereteUt chu· 
. ~'3,1nn nun ein an~eres ~cuer roue angefmll · 
gcn ronben/ \lvertirtt oer ~briJtsfmatJ)tlllelfft~ . · · · 
. , .. . . . . . 
.. · 
1-
· giten. S!affCt tH\c,mf ~urd> bcpt)rtbmbeil T~mbou~ · :. ·. 
'· .. . : 
, ... ~ 
. . .· 
,, . . . I . . . . 
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r. ~~~r~tn · · · · • · · · · 
fWurbct fci)[agett/ fo bas 8ddJcn iff tines jebeti ~euer6/ 
• . tueld)e(j bur d) Officiers commandirenl>irb 1 um mtl 
I ~~~i~~:.n 1 glddHuie : cin .. lan~e~ ~tirbel bie .~·~uer · 
-. 
Stuevt·e· Chargicung mit ~afi>en.. · : .. 
Divi6on5 <lUf ber 6td(e. ·. · 
- mor biefer Chargiruug ifl AU tncr~en I i>tlfi .  
meum ntel)r~re ah1 efue Battaillon · ~nfammm exer. · 
·ciren/ vic Grenadiers {)O) bief~m [)\llben Divifion~~ 
· ~euer in R.eferve bleiben 1 roann abet nur eine'Bat• 
taillon exerciret 1 oiler chargiret 1 un~ · Atl>tl) Greoa· 
dier-Comp:tgni en I) abel) anroefcut> tuorcn/ fo fonget · · 
auf Dcm rcct}tcn ~higcl bie erfte balbe Grenadier• 
Compagnie bi~f~s ~euer an/ bie er(tt .f>clftt \l~t: ._. · 
&iUCt}tcn Comp:tgnie llUf !:len linren Sjhind berfc£# 
ben folgct I b~trmtf foi>attn bie ~rott)te .pelfte i>.e~ 
crj1cn 1 un~ b~l·nad) '>i.e &tu~ute .P.clfte ocr &roevren . · 
Compagme , unb cnNrd> l>as Foutfilier, ~euer au~ je"et Batcaillon uon t>cuen er(lern bLllbcn DiviCion~ . 
gTt'id) folgct. . · , 
ruJann tlbcr tlUf jcben 3luget nur elne 6nl5e · · 
Grenadier· Compagnie flc!)et I (o fnnget Die gant2e · 
.Pelfte btermtt ouf ben ~lund ba6 ~eue~ an 1 uni> . · 
bleibet \lad erfle ~liei> in bicfem f>al~en Divirion6~ · · · 
~euer nut aUein in Rderve follJobl l>Oil Foufilier~/ 
ars Grcoadiero /tl>Cilen Die ~af)nen Pelotons mit ibs 
rcn bnlben~otler gontim Divifionti mit~ufeurm ()\lbm. 
ro3ann nun/ ture 4)5en feb on gcfagt' tier rurt2e 
m3t1rbel ~Utn ;3dd)CII bcs ~!nfan~S gcfcl)hl9elt lUirb/ 
fan get bee Grenadier • .!Jauptmann auf t~m red)te·a 
~hig~f an &U comm4ndiren. · · 
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. ~~ · .. ... · I i'J?it ber, . 
. · .. fl ~o~mando. ~roiitd. 
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.· Chargi~tutgen. . .. 
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.>N~t ad>t, in an 
mirt> mit gc:l~e 




.. . . -
. . . . . - . . .. . . 
-·-·--
· S~al~e .Div_iiion inad)t eud} ft~hg. . .. · · · · rtl'·/ 
!Ditfrd bcfdHtU~t !)Ott bet)beu ~hrqe}n ai~er· . ~ / . . ; 
. native t)Oll t>entn Grenad_iera t>c6t·ed)ttn ~Iugeld an1. . ·• ~~ j· ,.! 
fangent>/nef>ft ant>crtn m. bem PelotonG•~euer cr.. . · : ~ · 1; 
fduterten Obfcrvaciontn 1 ur.:o lauff~t bid in i>ie . :· :: !·i 
· IDUtten auf t>ie act)te ()albe DiYi~on Ocer Foufiliert!J· -: · : : I; 
ttnl> 1uann folcbe fcuertt unb fetn ml~1~bel t>ar~rotJ f, ~~ ; 
fd>en gc(d)fr.oen t'Ol>rbcnt fo lalfet t>er Gren.ac.li~r~ _ . ,, : 1 : 
.f)auptt~taun auf. ben ~ecbten CShigtl 1\Hct>er qn' ~ :: :: 1·; 
fd)lagen/ "'ld)be}nt et nut. twu 2lbfeurcn l)cr ftcbtnl · ;: i: 
ben balbcn Div1fion ferUl} mad)t!ll laffen 1 t'O<tnn ·:: :·I. 
nun· fold)en n~d> mefebl ctlid)e nlabl burd)ge$ . :.: :, : 
ntacr)et I bcr·ID3utbel gcfd>ltl<lttt I Ullb nne{) Com~n. · ·; :I' 
. . _ do be5 .Dbrift' • m3ad)tmctftcc~ bit Refe1:ve abges ·, · l :I ' 
feu eft/ ave.rtiret i)e~ ~~ri!f;ru3ad)tmetffer. tueit~r~ :· · i ·!: 
.. . :· · . ·· :: . :· .•.. . ·.t:: 
!Otitte Chargi~Ling mit gant;e.n Di~i- -: !":L 
. . . · 6on~ ~uf b(~ 6teae. . . -!' :' 
. ' . .... . . .. ' .. ,... .. .. . . . . . . . . . . \ ~ :: 
2U· mer~en/tuann tmr eine Grena~tier.Com- .. · ~ ·: 
pagnie ann,efenb 1 fo Ofeibet fo~cbe ~ev .t>tefer Ch~r· 1_ .; 
girung neb{t bcm gan~en trffen CBl.1.ei> tn Referve; ~ 
toann aber troel.) Grenadier-Compagnien ~ugcgen r : 
r~ macl)m fie t>ie ~cuer ber .Drt>nunnnac\) mit!nu~ i . 
t>a6 ei·ffe (~lteb l'eren Grenadiers gleid)tuie uon i 
.F0\1Hiliers tn Referve bleibet t ·uub fanget Ole crlit· . l 
nanfle Greoadiet:·Compagnie auf bem: rcd)tett ~lib · · i · 
gd au~Jicid) a{5 eine g,1n~e DivHion bicfe~ ~eue~ · ~ 
(ld /1\HUlll ber ~brift:ml~d)tmeiRe~ l! 
1. ~nr~en · · . . · · -• . ! • 
~utbet fd)fagen ra{fet t. ·unb commandirtt · btr Grernt-. · f 
dier-.paul)tntann : · ~~ · 
@3anQt Divition mad)t en({) fertig. · . · ' 
~d)lagt an. · . . . . : · · ; 
~Ul(.r. · 
:i)ieft6 . ' 
.I 
! 
\.... . .. · i 
r ··· . 
' 
------_._~~..-....----. ......._..-_~-~--...--.---· . · ... - . . 
==,::r--=--=-='f-='-=-==·--=-= 
' - .. ' ~ 
·r-4a ! ; · ·. . . ·· · ro.on b~ft.en. Chat·gf~unaett. ~ . . · . 
. . ·' 
•• • 4 • • •• 
. ' 
. J 
" , . . . 
·. ·Jjco,mando.j:f'i~1~!~~ .· . . : : . Chilrgirt;llgen. . '. 
--- ---~---------------~·-----r ._ . IDief~!j bcfcl)iebct ~on bepbrn ~hintln nad> 
. ber r;]litten 1 tuie in Peloton~:ober l}amm Divirion~$ 
- ~cuer 1 unt> Damit t>atf nailae Batt~Jion. uom ~euet: 
. , 
nid)t er.tbloffct/ aud) fiialid}er continuiret roerbetl 
eonne f f~> bat ber .Paul)tmann uom linr~n ~higd I 
alo tueld>~r t>a!J &ruet)te B~uer &U nfltd)cn [)at lnid)t 
~ , ef)ent>cr t>a~ SertiC;llHld)en au co~m:\ndiren 1 altf · 
1. 6!5 _'Oe~ <,1;rf1e Dal$ !ji!UI!t: commandirtt/ rod(be5 au c!) 
1 , t>re u(lrtSJen bur d) t>ic Battaillon~ &u Qbferviren bt_l~etf.. · 
i · jillof>ct) ~u ~eobad)tcn i boa meber bet> i)tef~ns 
~euer 1 nod) cmbcrcn Chargiruugm 1 oDe.: 
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· General· Decharge Die Officie·r~ 1 fo uid}t 
!U comm:mdiren baoen 1 im erfhn ®I lei> . 
tlebcn f>lcibcn 1 nod) nieD~r$fn9cn 1 foni)er!J _ .·· • 















.... .. . uuuermcrft bid fn Nt5 i>rftte ®lie~ &utue · : 
aic~enlttnb fob <tiD bas ~euer 1>orbe1>1 t-oie~ 
. t>erum in Da5 trih ®liei> uo~tretten •. . ; 
· m3mm_ nun t)a5 Divi1ion6~Weuren fid> enbigen 
.. · foUe /llllD Der .D~ri(t • imad)tmei{ler fold)e5 t>u~c() 
· 1. t4n§CU · 1 • !mur~d . ~u befct)luffen ave1·tirct 1 ~ommaudiret er fobam1:: 
Ref'erve tttdttt · • 
eucb {crtig. ·; 
C5d)(agt an. 
. ~n"r. · · 
~ 
' ~a~t a<tt 
ID?an 11itri> nut Q)liebcrn cm5 
blllb£ Div}fio· 
4 nm c:~arg•tcn. 
' ' 
. .  
• ~iefc5 befd)febet 1>on bent er.{fen ~Cieb 1 Ullb 
Grenadier~ /l'Jie obcn gefaot 1 roann fold)e in .Refer .. 
vc geblieben. . . . · . ; . 
~<td> oeenbi';'lftlll bicfen i1cuc~ <tlfo aYertiret 
ber ~brta~'M3~d>meifter: . . . · 1 
~ ~ 





ffiferte Chargirung . mit ®·Uebern auG 
balben Divilions; ; 
2U ntcrren I albiet bfcibetl aUe Grenadier~ till 
lefn fn Referve, mit bin b('t6 er(le (B(ieO in felne~ 
,t)f~nung (lll)tet: mit~ufmrtn ~(lt! i ; 
-. · ~UI 
·-
"- ' _ _, __ ,__ ___ ,__ ______ ,---....-------- ---------
'. 
, _ 
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l:4:~~ . t j·; 
. ! !'! . 
. ro·on btl1tlt .Chu•gituttattti 
. . . . 
<:-..· 
: . ~~~~ ~~~~~-~~~~~ib~er~, ~. ~. ~; ~~.C~~~-.~. ~.~~.~ .. ~.-~--~ ..~. :·~~ .~. - ~~_;: ;~. -. ~ l .J:!: 
. -~ Co~mand~. ~toii'ldr . :" .. . r 0 • •• Jargt~~ug_en. . . . : ~~ .. · ... ·. t ~ U 
~~ ~uf i>iefe~ erf<lgte A vercicrement laffet bee . . · ! 'J 
; .. .. .. . ·£>brifbmlad)ttnti~c~ ourd> ben b~o tid} b<l~en~en . t.!l 
. . , . Tambour . . . . . .f ~ · · ;. ~ l 
r. ~ur~en . . . ' . . . . • ~- . . .· . r· !; 
~litbel · fd>hlgen I tuOr(lUf bcr .f><lUP.flll<llln· CUf. !)en ftd}~~ll · ·I,; 1 
. . · . · _ ~hlOel _bet F~uiCi~i~~-~ ~~~mal)~liret! . . · · . !· .. · · · 1:;~ 1 
" . 
1. . . 
.. . .·. :: . ·... · ·: . S?,~lbtD_lVtlion, · · . .. . :.- . '· · i· . · · l : ~i 
·. · • · < • ·· ' :· · •• . • · ••• . · .• ·un~ nad) eine~. ffcfnen .·Pauf!~tt~B ! . .· ·. . ~ ..• . r'! 
· · .. .. ::.. · · ·· . ;. ~a5 \)fette @Hie.b mad)f' eucb fe~fia·> . .·. · ! ~; l 
. . . . . . . . ' . ~u(~iefc5 fe(jte ro3ort sc:~thJ trttt b~6 &\U~t>~ . H .
· ! • . ·. te t unt> t>rnte ®ficb mit bem linren ~uB uor 1 e·m• . t : 
• . \Udtt~ .nebcn i)~~ mott>Cr$IDlann6 red)tel~/\lnb fett!ell . ! ~ 
· ·. . . .. : . .. auf be~ red)te stnve t>arnici>er /I)alten tbt ®eroebl: : ., 
.. · : : <. · <lUf be~ (6d>ulter roobl l)od)l u.ub gerab 1 uni> .[affett · : · . 
·. · · · ba6 ~elud)r mit bem S~olben in ~·e~ lin fen .f) ant>- ; ' 
inroenbig De~ lin~en @;c{)cneeld I forotit eli Der ligre 1·: 
2lrnt unqe~ruungen ~ul\lfJet 1 gcrat> ab(inf~n I l>'<ltJ i
1
· : 
t>.ierte @}litb aber mad}et fid) burtig ferti\t/ ·t~ie · • 
·oben gefo.gtf &U!lfeid) mit bent ftnreu ~UU. IUO{)[' . F . 




. . . . 
· ' 
• • ~ • • ' •• • 4 :-. • • •• . • 
ret lUetterli : · . ~ · · · 1 
· · · · · ·6cl)f<lst an~ · · ·· . . · · . · .,.,: 
. : 
. ·. 
• 4 •• 
. . . . .. 
· : · mldd)eli nad} uor~~fd>tiebenet ~rt befd)fe-~et. · · 
fi>er .f>,urptlttann beli lin fell .~lug:ls · com• ·· ! 
mandiret augleicb ticb recbtG ~uenbenb. , :-' ·: · . ! 
S,albe Divilion. · · · ·. . :· . · : · .·· .:· ·· . i 
..  ro~eFte5 ®lieb mact>t tttcb fertig-; .· · .. · ! 
· Wofghcb tuann i>er uon De~ er(fen bat6en Di.; i 
vifion Dati Seuca: i>iefer bel) ber !tUei)ten bnfben Bhl~ · 
gd~Divifion Dati 2ln((l)laoen 1 unb ber l>,trauf~foll ·· 
genbe 1 ba~ Sertig $ mad)en ·commandiret/ unb Del 
gefc{)mfnb ~u commandiren rro tuirt> man tin bel. 
ffdnNge~ ~~uer untcrbaltcn ; t>ie 21bfe~ung lletd} · 
gegcbenem ~cUt:r 1 unt> S!ai>uug befd}itbet 1 1uie, in . 
~mt Peloton~~~euer geAeigtt ll>OrOen. . · · i 






. -~---- .. , ., 1 ' . -~ --- . -.. - . . 
·--.-
. , .. 
fO'Oll benetl Chargitttn~en~ ,. 
•1 
. fj Commando. I :i~~tt · Chargi~tmge!i~ -··c. , ~: . . -
·- ~~l6 .t>rin~ ®fteb fet>cr [)alt>en_Divilioi1, mann 
· . \>a6 \>ierte (Blid> feuret./ uni> Da~ (~Jetucbr abfeQet/ 
flcl)et geral> auf 1 uni> ma~l)et fid> gefd>n>inb fe~tig/ 
uni> fofort nad) oobefd)nebener ?met~ geoet i>tefe~ · 
~cuer \>on b~vt>en ~lligeln l>cr FouifiliertJ nacb be~ 
. ,, . 
I •' 
. . romren/ aUe ®lieDer bcfont>cr~ bint>urd) 1 &tueo 1 
. . ·· ober fo\>iel ma[)ll!ll ~~ anbefobren 1 unb ll><lun e~ 
x. ~attgen oecnt>ioet lveri>c foUell~lfet ber..Obrifb~ctci)tmeiffe~ · ( . . -
I , . . · . 
Grenadier 
maibt cud) fer~ 
lig • . 
elblagt an. 
~eut~. 
· ~urbel fd)lclge·n 1 bamit fid> bie @lict>er· &u 1ueiteretit' 
~cuer nicbt me[)r auf i>qG lleUt f~~tig ntRd)en I UlJb 
t>ie bereft~ fer.tto~ncmact)ten ben .Pai}n in bie ffilU • -
()t fefien J uni> fd)ultem ; tuobeo nod) an~urucfen 1 - · 
Dafi tuann t>al3 ~rttte ~liei> in . i>enen balben Divi. _ : 
fion~ oefeuret Ji>a~ Arocvte <81iei> and) t"Oie t>a~ t>rit1· · · 
te aufllebct /ll!ti> ~d) fertig mad)et. IDa~· erffe 
<8hei> aber bletbd m aUel~ ffebenDen Chargirungen . 
· auf bem red)ten .stnl)e ltegen 1 ttnt> nt<'!ct}et fetne · 
·~eue~ 1 unb ~at>ung jet>~rAeit auf t>enen S'tnven. 
ru3ann t>a~ ~WH continuirct I fo -macl)ct ficJl baS 
uicrte ®hei> ferttg 1 roann ba6 erfie feu crt 1 uut> ~a~ · 
. brittt 1 un~ !t'Oct>te Q)lfeb faUen ute~er 1 roann abe~ 
~cr imtirbel gefd>fagcn j commandirtt fo~ann ~u 
. ~bti!tsru3~1cbtmei(rer. · · _ . · :·.- . 
. .· ·. 
' 
£>icrmit. feuun aUt <Biieber -~ertn Grenadiert9 
~ugfei(o 1 baS erffe lat>et fnl)eni>er auf ~rt 1 tuie 
fdJon oben angeroiefeu roorben. ·· 
au mer fen I nuf t>iefe ~rtt ruft aibfer CSlic.bcrf. :·. 
roeifi au~ f)alben Divifioneill unD tute biers 
ltnten nad>folqet/ nu~ gan!ien Divifionen • 
gefeuret roirbt ran fotUI>b( in bafbcn / ·unD · 
· ganfjen DiviCienen anftatt <Bliebern tnft 
balbcnm~t()m gefeuert tuerbenruni> fanget 














.. · .. 
. roori ()en en Chorgi~ttn~eti 
. . ·, 
-~~--~~~-·~d------·~--·--------·-· --~------------~ 
· ~~ c · · . d J rolit ber l . ..  . 
. ~ omman o.l ~~ontcl·l __ ~ 
.... 
.. 
'· . . 




· S;>a6f ctt1;t mit 
C!ilicbcrn an! 
llilll~tll Divi~ 
fi?nen&uchar·l . gamt, . 
1uie mit ~!te~etn beob~d>tct. · .. 
·. rolantt fid} biefe(J 3eue~ mit benen G~~n~diertJ 
·. geeni>iget/ averti~~t fetnen1t>cr ~l>riiis~Rd)tmei{f:r, 
. . .. 
• . ... ! ... . 
.. .•. . . ... 
. , .· . 
. ~ . 
' ' • o I o ' • ' ' o 
· ~i,nfte Chargirung . tuff ®lfe~ern auG 
. . ganfJen Divifiond.. . .. . . · . 
... . . . " : . ~i . . 
ft' s " t.tnb nad' n~of"'enb~. B · · _ : . . · ·· :; 
r. ""'t1r.zen 'J r u . . . . , 'r· : H ~lifbd . . . . . !t 
· .commandircf bet .f)aupft1tann bt~·rtd>ttn ~luoet~ 1 · ! : 1 
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uon bc~fn Fouifilier~ 1 tl>e~len gleicl)fnl$ alb.icr ~ije .' ;· .1· 
Grenad1ertJ tn Re~er.ve _btetben._ . _: · .. .. _."': .·· · · ~. · ..... ... i:fi: . 
®anue D•v•fion. . -. .. . .1 .. ,: 
. · .. • 
' .• ~ 
: . . 
1




, 1.>e1~t a~t nti\n 
. l»irb tntt o~m· 
~rn Qlliebern 
llllf bcr etcae 
ch~tgifCR- . 
... . 
- , . ·. i 




. ~a6!>iette.®Ueb tth'laJt cUdJ .fetti~ • . :~ ·-'f.l' 
. . . I,, . 
.. e;d)lagt ·an.· ·.· · . , <l l! . 
. . ~ener. . · ~ 1: 
. imetctmi auf bie ~rftunb ro3cifttl1Jfe 5e~ t)ent 
~Iieber 1 ~eue~ Der [)al6en Divifiond ~on · bei)Den 
~h'igdn nad> Der WHtten befd)iebet 1 unb ~ncb mit 
oeneu.Grenadicrs fid) en~tget nad) uor()ero gefd)l<tl 
gencn Iangen. ru3urbel/ als l'Oeld)c6/ tuie gcfagt 1 
o6ue jeber~ctt eine ~cinnemngj an mctd}en 1 1u Qb· 
fervirtn t{t.. · . - · · . · . . 
m3eiter6 ~ve~tiret bet ,D~ri.fbimad1tt1ttilf~r~. · 
, ,. ' . 
. . !. : 
r 
. 1 . 
r. 






. . . . . . . ': 
6ed)(te Chargit•ung mit gan~etl : · · ;· 
@llie~enl ~uf be~ .'5teUe. ; . . i' 
. ~itfetJ gef)ef bfe 'ganoen Battaillon , obtr mu I 
- atnteue· an/ obt~ t\>ie Ucu~ mnn nemuroen au!fGetU$ 
. . <fttl 
• . 
. ; 
--··- -- -----~-----~---Wiii>\~..,..~~ ........... ~~,c....~.: .. .:;,'": ··:::-:;-.~.·,:;~~./ 
. .. . . ... .... ·····- ... . 
,_ 
' i 
' .. •  
' 




-~lc . d .f IDlit bed- . rl1a·t~2t·~·1tl1/l"tt·o: ·. ·: 






~~ . . . cret I uni) conunandiret ber. ,t>~ri!l s ru3od)tmeUfe~ .. 
. . ferucr. · . ~ i . · · 
,Q;,m4e Bathil- . .'. · : · i :-· · 1 
'Jon ttas Ditrte . . i · i ., · 






nm l>orl)ergcr)eui:leu Q.Htet>ers~euern .ange!daet 1 itt·· · 
allen. glcidlformig ~"- mactwr eommet 1 aufier baft. ··.. ·1 
· t>iefe.G ganfje <Biieocr 1 ~~uer t>urcb ~en .Dbt•i(f,· .·. ~ , 
m3adJtmeHter commandiret n'erDe-. S)1ad) gegebes . 
• r, 




I . I I i , .. 
I I 
. . · . 
· .Dal bl'ifte 
. ~Cieb flblagt' 
lUI~ . . 
1 ~ruir •. · 
0 • • :\ 
• . .. 
nem ~eurr i>e5 fe~tcn 1 ober l>terteri <Blie~e~ 1 roann . 
folc!)cd nemlid) uacl) be111 ~cuer bitd ®etl>ebr a6fe~· . Q_et 1 rtcbet Das btitte ®hcD ceraD auf 1 unb macbet · : 
lid> oefd>tl>inb fe1·tig 1 auf bie- ~rt/ll)ie b~t) ben en:· .. · 
. .PcuJi>sQ:>ric-f,w N, zo. gefaqet.. !e:mn commar~i-· · · 
ret ~u ~l>tilt ~ ruJncbtm~iflef fem~r. · · ·: . . · .. ~ 
. . . ... . .. . ·. . . . s . . ., . ~ . ; . . • ·.' . . . 
. . : 
IDie[es ®liet> nt<'icl)~t ba~ ner.1u"~e 1 roie ·o6e!f · 
bet) i>cuen <Bric~er 1 ~eunit feb on gefl"get ro~rt>en 1 
.un'> nacb · tlb.ge{~uertem ~~·itw1 ®lie~ 1 ·frebet ~a~. 
&t~Cl)te ~.tieb auf lttn.£'1 mac{)t fief)_ ferti31. foDmni 
i : I:. 
i : 
. . commandJret'i>cr ~bnjl~ID3acl).tme.tffer.. ! . 
.. ·. ~al· · ·awrgh >~ ~ ·. ' · , .: . · . ~- · / · ~ . . :. 















n.. u ner ~ rocrtfhUrgettunb mttd}ct nncb gcge~cnem ~euer br5 . : 
&1\'Ctjten ®lict:e~ 1 Dt1s e.rtie ficb fogteid) rnvent~e~ · . 
fertig l_tuie oben N. I. in ~cr Cha~girung brt) tltlll · 
erflen 01tei> tn Referve gcfaget IUQrt-en. rolorauf · 
. fo~o~m ber pbriftsroJad)tlllCi(fer tl>!e_bc~_comandi~et~ 
' ; 
• . mad) gegebencm fofd)en ~me~ 'brfngct-bitf~tJ 
~rffe Q>licb Da~ (ge~ucbr! roie oben ange~ei11et 1 !Ue 
S!tlbtmg 1 unb. foNlnn tl>tc~erum 1 mann bie £a~uug 
befd>e{)cn 1 ten S'eolben \)Or bad ·rc~ilt~ St'nue anfef · 
fienb 1 unb mit Ocr~Jhiubung 1 unt> Bajonet fcbrcc.')s 
~OdJ · ~>on\'r.rr~ biiiHn~ 1 !Vie fol~;e~ ~~m beo t>cm 
. . . . . . . . . r,~q, 






. . · . -. 
L 
: · ~~c· : . d - ~~it ber I . . .. Cllr.at·g· t" 3"1· 1~11- ~~- -l· l~·. J ;. /: 
· ~- ~mm:m_ 0.' . ~~Ollld· \ . • V'-' T • • · . : ;} 
·· I - ~~ - Peloton;~mcr gefagct tuort>en. ~e.c DbrHbro3~dJb · ii' 'i:
1
r 
. Grenadier . mei(lct commandiret ferne~ . -· · - >I ; 
. n~a<U.t mcb fer- · · ~· .·· · ,. >-l'l. trg, · . , I ·•; · 
·. ~~;~~~!_an. ·I · .au· merlen. ,' . ~uf biefe obige1 ~if ·, t.i~ . n~dJ 1J• . 
__ . uorfa!lmi>m l~~tt~tnben tn~it (\tat>en 1 unb . . : :i /1 
' ·. . ungrat>en 1 t>ao Ill : tuaun .bte ffi~tl>en burd) . : ·; 
· ·· ·. · ba6 Battaillon uor()cro ~Cl) t>er <SteUung ttl . I ~, · . . .. 
. .. . . . 
-. 
. . . . . 




S~abt adJt1 man 
:auiri) im ~\van 
.. 7 c!rtn,lrr~b Rcti· nrtn mu Pelo· 
to_nS chargi• · 
ren • . 
. I 
bie er[fen tutti> ~\Utl)ten abgetbtild ruort>~n/ ~ :· i 
mit er(fen ffidben$unt> ~roea)tcnmeif)en~ID!ans · : :! 
itern au6 jci>em CBHct> gcftucret tueri>cn/ ' ·I' 
unb roc\·t>cn cl·fttid) i>ic g~Nbtli auG bem ·. ,: i 
uierten ®li~i>/ fobann i>it ungrat>en au6 bcm · · ·' ! 
· nemlid>en ~lieD/ unb fern era "ie g\·aben unt> ' ·' ; 
unqrat>en auo i>em ~rittcau unb fo bi~ ·in b_(\\3 'i 
I
.· · erfte ~liei> c~mmandiret. . ·. · · · . ;.. 
·. ·~ilnn tnt.n otiigeG ~euer . 3tUet)lt1,1f)l burrngec, · : ~ 
mad)et 1 unil ntd>.t _mebr auf bet- ~tdle cbarg~ret · ·f. . 
_roerben foUe l fo avertird t>cr .Dbttffs imtld)tmctller: f: 
eiebenbe Chargirun3 I tt.tft Pelot.o~1G .. 
im Avanciren 1 unb Retititei1~ · . -




· · IDer .Dbrifbimad)tmtifler (a fit~ auf baG 1Her1 
. / .· nebigt Avertiffc::ment ·t>utd) i>en T.1mbour mit ~~ 




. ·. ,. 




. unt> nacb Den en bel) be mtt .()an~ 1 ~rieffen N. 48. 
. . <l·llge~eh)ten t>rel)tll Ternpis be[)~riO AUgftHb f~1JU(S . j 
. tt . ,.. tert: tueiters l~11fct ~er ~~riJi~ ru3acl)tnu:i(ter tuod) r 
1.-.;; miY · .. .. 1 
do.uplirttn unb g~ci~ barauf ben . -·: .. . ~ . 1 
. ~t.tJrche fd>lagen /ttCld) ruelcbent AWtbtcn @5treicl> nUts/ unb . . ! 
. ... jebes !Ugleid> mit t>cm lin fen ~ufi au~ 11mb bet! 
<6d)ritt antrittet. f.Der. douplirre Marche aber l>on 
allen binter ber Front bcfinOlid>tll Tan~boura snit · 
· . , einnefdJlagen n>irb ; t>a~ Dattaillqn marchiret mit 
. . :t . · · ·. · · gle&~f · 
_.- ---........_.._ . . 
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nfetd)ell/ jet>Od) ttict)t &U {lCfd)lUiD~m ~d)ritten ill, 
ger<t~er Linie a uti 1 fl) 1 t>af3 fid) Me ID?mmfd)aft 
nid)t t>r&nge /Uocb eine ,.t)(fnuno ir~nbsroo ntllCl}e. 
· ID3ann t>er .D6dft 1 ru3t1d)tmri(fer fie bet 1 bali . 
fold)c6 <tUf dner bequemen 1 ooec grn>Hfen DHt:anz 
angclcmoet iff tlaft er· bntd) ben beu~ab~ni:>en Tan~ . 
bour, lltld)Nme er [)e\)01: ~tHJieid) ·an t>ie ant>eren 
. . Tambour5 ein Sdd)en mit oem ~tam ge~c~~nnun · 
· · &u Hbtl>eigen · · · . · · · .. .. · 
'· m?lir~el fct>lagenl tuorauf t>on 6cui.'en ~hlgetn · t>ie Grena; 
. dier~ I un~ iet>e~ Bat~aillon.~ie ~~fle Peloton~ . com· 
-·: 
mandiren. · - - : ~ 
·. '· 
. . 
Peloton, · · i · .·• . : .: 
. ~uf bao ~ort Peloton bfetbet jebe~ · Peloton; · · · 
fo e~ angebct/ (febent tie ~utfe gtrU>tt'inbe tubem .. , 
einanber gcbra~~t/ uni> nau') finer fldnen fait :unr · · 
\lermneen~en Paufe t~iri> commanditet ~ - . · 
. ~(\d)t eud) fetttg. < . . . ·- ~ .. I. IDiefe6 befd>iet)et· 1>on b~nen ·&we'u ~~e~te.ren .. q)Ucbern \lOll ben en Grenadier6/ unt> "rep letl(eren ber FouifilierG 1 ll>CH~n a~ermalcn in i>tefem Pelo. 
ton~s~euer i:laG ganfje erfte ®lict'IJ \>On Grenadie1·51 
Ull~ Fouifiiien1/ ncbft ~en funhebtnOen. unt>· fedge~ 
bennett 1 alG ocnen ~·ll>nen PclotonG/ in Referve ueu 
blciben ; aUe C8liei:lcr t>er conunandittm PelotontJ 
aber bringen t>aG CSeroc[)r f.:rtig tn<ld)enb bocb t)O~· 
ftd> 1 mit bem Unterfc!)eii> tt>afi Oa6 crfle in Referve · 
btetbent~e ®lieb nicbt tlen .Pat)n fpauue 1 t~ie · J.)ie 
binteren C81iei.)er. ~~rne~ tvi~t> commandiret ; 
. :Marche; - . . . _·: . . . , ;· 
Sffior~lufbie fe~tfo gcmad)ten Peloton~ mit. ~iet 
'led)ritten 9Cfd}rl)ino berau6 tretten 1 unt> im f1inf1 
ten <6\l)ritt f~tllet ba~ errte unt> antcrte <81iet> bet) 
ben en Foui!ilier • Peloton5 1 f>el) tlenen Grenadier($ 
}Wet £Heiniu ~~9. f~ft~ ~lieQ. ~mf ~~9 nctJte .Stri~et 
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fpannte ~eroebr bod> \)Ot ft<i> mit b~m roaumen auf . ! ·li f!:; 
bcm .Pabn balt~nD 1 gleid)luie tlUcl> Das Atuel)te fnt>~ -;f. i 
tll~t b~l) beuen Fouiiilieur5 tl)un muu I ba~ e~{le i r I ' 
®Ueb aber/ fo nid}t fcucret/ bringet fc>ld}e5 mit. tlem !J. • ' ~ulb~n . uomen an ba~ re(otestm;e cmfc~ent> 1 auf .( r: 
bie ~rt /li>ie e5 ill i:>er flebettt>en ~eurung sefct)ebcn: !':; i . 
bterauf roicD ·roe~tc~G com~~nd!re~! · · · : i l S_d)t~at. ccn. . · ·- _:_ j)fr 
' • f I l ·. :~~~:,: bllfl~ fftltlf ~Cjlbl~ ~0~~~~ ,a;~:t . r: I 
·. . bali erfft ®lieb fo gecm)ct roiet)er [)urtiR auf/ unt> : : I 
ni()met bas· ~etuef>r 1 lueil etJ uicf>t gef~uert r be.~ · · i 
f)orig auf i>ie ~d)ufttr 1 . Die binterm <BHebec . ~ · ' 
aber I fo gefeuret I l>rinqen ne6fi: 8uru~ I ~ret~ · i: = 
. tung be6 lin~en ~uiT~~ neben oen red) ten Dati (ge~ ti; 
n>el}l' geretb UOr fid) bOd) nel)llltll\) I ft>t>ann tnif ·.- r; : 
belli me-d)ten ()inter i>em 2ittren I jrttocb iilliiTeii· bfc I H 
leateren ®lie~er ctroas gtoJTere (Sd>ritt ltuie i>atJ t 
· &n>tt]tt llhtd)en/ bel)orig nn i)ie red)te C6eitenl ber$ 
fteUen t>cn .p,tbntuni.' uerricbten bic 6eborige S!nt>ungl' . · ;:: : 
tuie oben bel) bent ff~[)cnben Peloton.~euer gefaget i · 
roorl)cn 1 nu.r luit i>em UntetfcUiet> 1 baf; fotuobl . tnt I. 
Avanciren/ nl~ Retirir~n ba5 <B~me{}r ttid)t fan · i . 
auf Der €ri)et1 nelJeu bemJinPen ~ufi g~fe~ett fons 
bem in Oer .p,1ni> auf Der lturefl @Seitenl beo· belt .· 
~abung getr,toen rocrt>en muOt unr> t'J(Hill fie bar$ 
mit fertig t glcid) o[)ue Commando fd>ulteru 1 tl>d$ 
d)es nUe6 fo geid.H-ointv ells e6qu~ tmme~ iuogJitfJ/. 
gefd>ebm foUt. · . .. · . 
Su mer fen: ~lll· fall bati ~en March co~tinuirl 
te BattaHlon tud)rent>er 3cit tuette~ ~ora van· 
ciret tudre 1 t>a~ erfie ®liet' 1 un~ fofg!id)ell 
aud> Ne abgefmerte Pelocon~ aUe~eit i)eltl 
Battaillon gleicb &U marchircnl Ulll) nad) 
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l)nben lt'l>eld)e~ foruobl iln A v:10ciren1 a{~ 
Retiriren jebeL'3tit AU beobad)ten. ill· 
. Wuf Dtcfe 2!rt folgen aUe ubrige P6loton~ t'er1 
ge{f<llt 1 l>ofJ 1 roann ~er Officier be~ ertteren Pelo· . · 
ton~ uom rec!)ten ~higel llht~t curl) fc~tig, net · 
\>Oill Unrm ~higcl l>~t5 EJtc9c1J mit t>em ru3ort Pe:. 
~ 1oton, tfnD l\HlllU Q;rffcre·r Marche 1 Oer 8L'I>el)te t>atj 
· ge~tig, mad)en 1 f~mcr De\: Q;rjrere I) as 21nf(l)las 
gcn 1 Der Bnw)tC Marcht / .tmt> lU1lllll le{itlict) <frfle, 
rer beta ~cue&: 1 StUCl)tcr 1 ober .b~r uom linrm ~lui 
ge[ 1 ~~~~~~fC~Iagl!u · commandirct llUOJ'tlUf ~ie &lUCQ · 
. . ..... 
I . ~ · ~higel t>cr Grenadier, c\>cr roann fdne \>Orl)anDet~l · · . jeCer Battaillon~ ~CU1lU ob,ld)t an geben bttl>eu; \>te · 
· Offici~rd in Dcnen irbriocn Peloton6 beobad}ten ein · 
gfdciJc~ /unb fonnen ficlJ nod> ltnl fo betfer 1 uno 
lcicbtcr regulh·en 1 1vnnu ficb fofcbe nod) ibrem uorf .. 
gebenDen s.>1cbcn ~ Pelocon ricbtcn 1 uemli'-? 1 roann 








etrci> frrtig. _ 
ea;tctst •m~ r 
<SdJ~itt UOtAumarchiren befe{)Hget roirD 1 com man· .~ · 
dirct ~ec nebcnff~l)enDc folgenoe Officier, Peloton, · 
unt> roann bie uorgebent>e anfi'l)laget 1 bte nad)foiJ 
gent>e fid) fc~tig mad)ct; folgficf) 1 roann Die uorgeJ 
l)enbe fcucrt: I Diefed SJ1eben ~ fhbenDe bie be~lgte 
C5cbritt marchiret 1 unb fl) fort.. ~ · · . ·. 
. , fill,tnn nun folu)e!.1 auf ctefe Qfrt burd}oU~ ~roeu1 · 
. · . . mal ~urcl)gem~lcl)et· 1 unb t>ief~5 ~euer im A vanci. 
x. ld·ngen ren ftct> en\>igcn [oUt fo ldft ber ~btifbru3acl}tmei(hc 
ru>urbd . · . . 
fcbla11m ltuetd)cr nur i)ie <i:nt>iouno t>es ~euers btl . 
~cutet 1 Das Battaillon ob~r ~<tnnod) im Marche bfeil . · 
bet 1 bi5 oer .Dbrt(! 1 ?.mact)tmcifler einm ru3inf til it 
~em ~egen gibet 1 tuo alle Tamboura Den douplirs 
ten March ~it fd>f~lgcn auf[)oren 1 unD commandiret 
fol>ann Der .Dbrt{f $ mJ,tdJtmejffcr on b(l~ Bat~aillon, 
o~e~ toa6 oum Exetciren (tU6~uaet • . 
. .... .. . . 
•. 
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.·. · l ~euer~ ~iefe~ ruirt> auf t>ie mrt 1 roie im flel)eut>m . · f.l 
. ·: · . · PelotonG $ ~euer N. r. gcmad)et 1 mit t>em Uutcu ! ;~~ 
_ . · · · · · • . · fd)ieb/ i:hlU fold>c5 beu t>em Commando &um ftrtig~ · ;:. 
· · maci)en ncb(lf<apatluung t>e5 .(1af>nd Da6 er(le ~~eo , 1!;: 
.. . 
. 
. . 1'. 
.·, 
l 
•• • 0 
. ~ 
' . 
. . ~ . . . . 
.. · ... 
i>urd)au~ au bad red}te Stnl)e llietletEnt)en muuH ;· : 
fdJieffen unt> fatlcn fnt)enber 1 unt> tuann ~e bamit r-: 
fertigt lafiet-t>er - ~briff~ iill\ld)tmetfle~ . . U 
r.~oppet· · · · h 
ten ecreicb fc{)taocn 1 auf tueld)en batf ganQe erlfe ~lieb auffft~ . · i ·: 
. .. ()etlnn'>· fd>uftert. ruJofle man abcr biefe Referve· . ·· 
nicbt abfeurcn h1flcn I fo if1 <lU<\) nid}t not()ig ei~ . j'. 
nen R\3ut6cl fcblagen ~u l<1{~n1 foni.'ern ber £>btlff$ · . 
rulael>tmc.i{t~r . befiblet Ocm bet)i)abenl.)m T~mbour ;: 
Tropp ~ll rd)lagen I lUelrl}en aUe iibtigt Tambours mit ein~ j 
fd)fa~en; bali ll:1ttaiJlon mad)et ffied)t~ s umeebrt I · i. 
auf .Qlrtt tuie ·L;et} J)cncn .Pan~ 1 CDrietfen N. 6, gel l (aget 1 unt>" retiriret tid> mit gleid)cr Front , un~ it' i 
ordinairen langfamen edJrttten; i>a~ : Pclocon/ an \ . · i 
wcld)et bas ~euer (leben gebliebett/ bebar.tet Front . li 
bcrge(ttllt! bof} 1 roann bet) ~nfar.g_bc6 Tropp dn· f. 
Peloton · \>ter ®d>ritt uorgerucfet /ltnb im ~nfd)lag · 
· ~igete 1 .fold}CS <tb3ufeucrn J ·b~r. Officier, fo bierauf .i 
·: · tn Commando fo[get 1 Das C6ennge fcrtig !U mad)ett 
. . . obne \>Ot~uruccen commandiren mufi; treffcte fid> c~ 
· . 
· . · aber 1 baO ~rife red e(}cn abgcfeuret bdtte rtuo t>aeJ 
&tueute fob~um fd>on uorgeruaeu uni> ~um ~nfd>htf 
gcn bcreit fel)e 1 litflct cr anfd)lagen;/ au d) Feuern , . 
unb commandiret bcr britte OLltLlllf folgent>e Officier. 
· Peloton· .·. . .. ·· 
.Fronte Ullb 
~~(ld)t euct) fertig. . ' , 
. :l)a bfeibet folcbed beo i>em i'So1·t Peloton flt$ • 
bctl/ bcl)i)e ~liffe gfdd) neben cinanocr gcbract)t I 
unt> nach einer treincn Paufe 1 i>a ~erftellt 1 unb 
mad)t cud} fertig .commandiret I'Oiri> 1 fo l)crftlUet 
ficb fofd)cs auf .bemliut~n ~ufi ftn~6/ ~leid)tui~ fof• 
d}e5 bel) bcm Redriren auf ocm hn fen ~uO fed)t~ 
befd)i~bet 1 uno avc~t> 311 gfeid;~f 3~it bet~ <!Jctuel)e 
~ 3 · ge(c!)rl)mb 
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Tempo abcr befd}ic()et ooUeomtnent ruie-bel} ~CltCit . ._:_· /.~i,· ,r;l_; 't . 
• • • • ... ~ • •• 0 
' ... 
.Pmtt> ~ ®rieffen N. 27. gc(ltget tuir~ · _ · 1 
~uf i>icfe-'2{~t femm aUe l'el01:on~ bi~ auf i>fe ·. :·:. ·· 
. . , . ... Refet·ve in t>er uorgcfd)riebenen £>rDuung in i>ent · · If:(; 
.· ~ : ~ "· .-_ ... : · . . . R.etiriren btn'ci)/ unt> alo nun t:iefes tleutr ficr> en~ifietl ::; :·: 
·. . :: . :. folltletf! ocr ..Obri(! 1 REad'>tmei{ler · 1. ru3urbelfti>lal : : L 
. gmt .nad> tueld>m · Da~ ~eue~ anHtr auflloret 1 Die · ~ . L· 
Retimde jeboc~) mtt @)c!}lnguna Cell Tropp continui.. · i :· i.· 
rcr 1 bi~ t>cr £>[)riff • m3;1d)tmdflet fitbrt./ i>aO c~ ,. ; . . 
auf i>tt Di!bnz, lvQ er co gut ftntCt/ ge!,tllg~t feQe/.. !.; i ' 
6tftl)let barauf . · : ' . : ·. · !·' 1 
.~u fd}lagen/ lttld) ~lHlciJeit \>as ganr2t B<lttaillon fid> f ! · 
lin~G auf ben lir.~m ~bf\1r1 berftdlet 1 un~ roiei)eC ::I 
~U9ldu> uorrodrt~ IMrchiret; i>er .Obri(t s ID3ad)t~ _ ~ 1
1 
: !.· . 
, .. .. 
. . ~ . 
• . I•. •. . .. meHhr gibt fot>onu ein 2eid)en mit i>em IDegen t . , 
nuf-mdd)eG ·all( ®pi,'lleut Auofeid> 111 fd>tagen auf~ :·- : · : 
.-· . . . . . •. . ; .· . , . l)ore·n, un" commOtndirct bar.n i>as Battaillon. :; 1:;: 
. · . ~au. : . · .... · ' · .Pier nmfi al1~5 fog(eid) auf t>er ®teU~ (liUe · j.:, 
~ : · ·' , . .. f!el)en. . ~er ~brill$ i.m\ldJtmeiffer Rber comm:tn• · · 1: : 
' · · · diret tueitet: · · ··-:. .. if 
'·· 
s 
·~rneB Q31ftb ,u·. - · · · :: . i . . · - • !'! 
Re(erve mad)t . ·.. · · · - ~ · . · · ; · '.J i · 
eit({l fertig. · ·, · · , · , ·:· · · ~ . . . ' · ._ :· j, _ · :L 





~a{lf amr. · . · 
~)~an ll)irb ntit 
b,1tbcn Divl· 
fion~ intAvan· 
circn unl> Rcti- -
rirm c~~rgir€. 
· ~iefro 6efd)iebct 1 ·rule f<iJot( ot>cn on~c!eiget [ : 
wotben. . .. - · · . . , . . . ·: · 
~C~techargirung niit varb~nDfvifio~G ir: 
. fm Avanciten 1 unt> Retiraten~ · : ; . 
· f£>Ct' ,Dbti!f S ~~\lCiJhllfiffe~ a-terti ret; . . ·: 
. .. ·- :. 
, . . . . " t • : ! 
.. . . :· 
:" . /-. . ; 
· · - ~ . ··· ~;r~ ~;It~ ~t0mnd)i, 11n~ bt;ba!b~tt foro)ltll .. 
. A van~iren 1 al~ Recirirennunldd> nucl) "Ue 16tr~ld) 
I gefd)lagen 1 tl>ie bet) Oenen Pdoton!J ge fa~et mor1 ' . . .. o~n/ HU~ tff. nlot~~ no\lj ~" metf~n ( oau ~1e R.efetv~ 
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S;<t~t ~rot. 
ID?an lttirl:l mit 





unt> Ch:u·girung oli)i~r im A vanciren in Nm ncmfi$ 
d>en b~lf~he 1 Jodd>e im fhbent>en , balb $ Diyifion6# · 
~tuer gcf~tget t\>l)tb~u. ; · . 
· ~1eunte Chargirnng mit ghnr.~en. Divi-. 
i1ion5 im Av~ncit:en/ un~ .:Rc::tiriren. ; 
ro·cr ,Pbriff~rol<lclHmdll~r~aveniret eb.en!n,tjfig: 
.. . · .. 
.. . · ... 
. 
. . 
. . . 
0 ·. ! 
... 
. · · IDefcbtet>ef ~retd)foUst t\>ie beu l'et~eti. Pelo~o~t!;· · · 
itt ~lnf~buno be5 A vancirm tmt> Rc:tirircud 1 unt) .. . 
ber £)rDnuug uocb flUte ooen bel) bmt flebenben Di •. · · 
vHion5 $ ~(UCL' 1 gl'[lt_get. t\>Orben. : · · . · .. · · .. · - ,. 
muc iff bet) bem Retiriren I utib ~l'Uern nnno.d) 
. ~u bl'obod)ren 1 i:lofi in t>enen Divilion6 ~er 
· ~,1uptmann ~on i)em Hne~n oter inneren · 
~litgel ;a comm:mdiren ba~e: Divi/io11, roann 
t>er Q:rtle ouf t>em nd)ten ~ltigd {id) fet:tt{J 
llHHben la1Tet 1 unt> tucum l'tcfer Q:rff~re ani 
3u(\·l}lagw bcfi()f~t I commandiret n· auf 
\ bcm linrcn ~ltigcl r,·ont , t-uorutit tid> nelll$ 
lid> Nc DivHion auf t>em lin fen ~higellinf~ 
umfe[)rct 1 uni> lll6 nuntlcr nuf Dem redltm 
· ~lu~ci feuertJ!nffet t>er mtf t>emltnren~lug~l 
· fid) fcrtilJ llh1cben/ uut> t>ie jemge Divif!on, 
fo ncb en Oct erftcit red)tm 1jlu-~ers cwJle()ett 
commandirct Divifion , unb fofort l,batnit 
baG Divifion5 ~ ~cuer in eintr <Bldd)()eit Ull$ .' 
terbatten tucrt>en fonue. · . . · . . 
fact) bcm Pdotons:Chargiren im Recirirenttle~s 
gleid)Cll aud) mit bencn .P•llb ~ DivHion~ 
abet i{i ~u mer fen 1 t>ofi 1 roann tlie ertre Pe. 
· Joron auf t>cm red) ten ~lund Frr;nt: mod)et/ 
ber .o~1~1ptnh1nn \)Oil t>er f'clocon auf ~em 
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. . . 
, \ :, I 
nit trfle auf t>em rect)tcn ~hi!lel fici> fcrtig 
· nta~l>et 1 bie <tilf t>em lin fen ~h1gel fief) ·en 
Fro11tt linCa um l)l!~ficllen /l>er Officier ne~ 
ben ber erfl~n auf '>em red)tm ~ltrgef. flef)enl · 
ben Peloton commandiren utufj : Peloton, u·nt> 
tuann ble ~rfle auf t>em red) ten ~higel t1n1 
fclJlaget 1 mod)et Die glefd> ueben folcber {fcs 
• ()enr.t Peloton- Fronte l!.in~o umCet>t:t:/ i>ie 
auf ~em lint en ·rshigel a~ce mocl>ct fid> f~r .. 
thJ 1 uno fo fortl)int>urd) (iUt PelotonGtoDet: 
l}atbe DivifionG 1 bi~ gegen ocr ~Ulitten /luie 
fd>on oben gefoot 1 unb ifl}>ieier red)te ~lugd 
· au uerflcben f>~t> t>enen D1vifion~ 1 fo red> ttl 
· · · gc(lellet fconb 1 bet) t>cnen ~tne6 ~ (fe~ent>en 
. · aber ergibet fid> fold)e~ vice verfa. · 
. ISebeube Cha~·gicung nlft gan!)en ®lfe~ 
· . be~n hn Avancicen bas Q)~ed) ·~·eue~ - . 
.. . . . · . : · &U llHtd)ell. . ·. · . . 
~ .· . . , . . · . (f~ ayertiret be~ ~brifi $ rulac!)tmeifle~ ~ ... ;-, 
.~a~t ~eM·. ,_ . . .. ~J?an nmi> i>R! · · · .. •· · ·; - · · 
. - . . . . ! ~reel) • fiencr UJ«d):n. ~htf biefeG Avertitrement pfiauQeu t>ie binte1 
· . · ren (!jliebcr ~on bem Battaillon , uno Grenadiertt 
· · . au d) l>ol.i Bajonet o£>ne Commando, unt> fcl}nltern .-
. . gleid) miet>n·/t>Luouf lafiet ~er ,t>brift~m!acbtmci{re~ 
• I 
' .·· 
'· etreicf>, un~ gfeid) l'Mnuf . . . · · · 
Ma1che fd)lao~n I uut> trHtef auf ben je!lt erme{)nfen @Jtrefcf) 
"' 
.. ' \.- · .. 
· .. -. -
· ,1Ue~ unb jebe~ ~U!:lleid> mit oem linrcn ~nO in g!eis 
d)er Linie t>cn ·March an 1 unt> :l'yanciret t>,1d ganee 
' Battaillon, ot>~r ra>aG ucmlid>ett chargirct 1 in ega len 
@';chritten 1 unb ~ritten in @5d)nur~gerab baftent>en 
<SH~becn 1 lUll> aUe T;tmboura (d)hi~m ~en M:u·ch 
tin· · . ru3nnn t>er .D~l'ifl , ~'ld)tmeiff er fiebct 1t>afi 
es ~ett aum f~uern i(lt gi6t er mit ~em ~egen dn 
3erm~n an bit T:tmbour~ 1 tu~ld)t. em fur aU~mal 
I ibr mu~1 beffcinbio auf iome £)brifi ~ ?madltnteifh~ · ~-· gerid)tet b\lben 111li[l!lll auf tueld)~s 3dct)en fie ~u . 
. . . . u . fd)lll~ 
. . 
' . 
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~obatb c~mmandiret ·roirb 'lldttai!lon ," fleT)tt · 
bll~ gtl:t!2e B:!tc;~illon, oDer \'UOS llCiltltct} ch~rgir~t/ .-· 
-unbe!ucg:td) ftide mtt bet)nm ~~tificnncbcn ehh1llDet 
gldd) l uno er commandiret : IDag vict:te <DUct> 
tliMI}t etHL) fct:ti!JI t>a faUm t>te erflen brcV ®lie~ 
t>~r nut mL'th'~ttuug ocs!iur~n ~uffeo auf ~as red>-
te S'~nue niei>er 1 t'Oie ·bet) Dtm ftel)wben <U.lieter~ 
~nte~ ocr a oct 1\)0ti>cn/ nur mit tcm cin~tgcn olbie~ 
bel) t>em ~recb ~ ~cuct ficl) e~eignenbtn_Untcrfd)ieD/ ~ · 
DaB /1l>ie l)ic brel).®lieDer nic'DL'tfnUcn l fie beta Q>e~ · 
tucl)~ uon De~ <0ct>ultcr Oct) D"5 re<IJt~ S~nv~ brin~ · 
gm 1 Da~ ertte ®lieD fold)~$ gerat> fcl)rccl) s oocb auf · 
bdf6en ~Jlann 1 uul> Dr.~ ~\UCl)te uno t>ritte tuol)l · 
At-uifdJen bcr i)~~H)cn l>er"or mH titr ~Jlunbung ~ll 
· b"lteu l)~lbent un1> tuirD btcfe~ gemact)t 1 tuie N •. f7• 
in ben en .P~1ut> ~ ®rielfen e~plicirct Hl: Die qrena. · 
I dier5 fallen oH>ier bet) bem . uiencn (gfict> ~ ~euec nia>t ntct>cc 1 meilcn fie nur brel) bod) ffc!;cn 1 !tUb · baG t>rttte illlici> l)On Dcncn Grenadiero mit bem · t>t·tttcn ®Uet>. D~cm l~uiftliers fol>ann erft !U fcaern · · l)at; t>er £>briib~ad)tmdfier commandiret roe iter: ~ 
~efcl)iCb~t tuie m bef <Bliel>er $ Chargirung nuf 
. bet ®teUe. · - · · · · . 
• pierauf gibet bas t>ierte ~lief>. &ugteid) ~eueu· 
uni> tHtl.i) fold} en bringet cs Dos <Uen.,ebr l)Ot' fief)! . 
fobann in i)i~ Balanz berileUet tlen .pal)nt unb ~er1 
rid}tet t>ie £a~ung1 tl>ie ~eQ t~em {)olben DivHion~~ 
~~mr vie lefztcn CHiiet>et im AvanciHn getl;~lttt unt> · 
!U moclHn txplkiret morben; Die t)ret) errten ~Jlies 
~~r flcbe·n auf 1 Da~ <Sct"ebr u1it bcu6en .Pdnben 
gerao s {)oct> mit b~r ~1lini)uno obm ~or fict> be[) all 
tcnb 1 rool>on t'as t>rttte Q:>iicl> Altgleid> ben .Palm 
fpaunet I unD t'cn ID~lunten tlarmtf bcl}altct. roie 
Gren~tlic~·~ <lUf _b~VNJJ ~liiu~ln ~(ingen auf ~a~ · 
• • · · · · (;Q_J!lm~Ib 
. ~ 





flJon velien Chat·girun~ett~· . i 11)1)- · U, (t 
• . . . . . . . . I . • ' • : I i ~ : 1 
~~ I ·-- ,-:;jd ~ , ro?itber h .. ·· · · · . ... . ·.-. ' ·' ~!· , · ~ . a Commando: ~" : .. C aroitttHlC\Clt;· . :-:- ·; :: ··; ·~t · Pi I i 
. I ~ . . ' ,....roiitd. 1· ·.-. · · . b .. u " . . . , ... · fl; f f 
, . . Commando-mlcrt Seuet: fogleid) i~r ®e1uel)~ 1>i>tl . · ~'F ;~f .~ee @>d>urter geNt> 1>or rid> <md> in t>ic .Pobe b~l~ ~~!W 
tcnb 1 tuo5t!t) oas t>rttte CBhet> AUUleid> t>en {?tll)~l . .. J,:l ·= 
,. · · ~ · · ... · : : ! · ·! . : fpanutt 1 tueld)e~ abl!t t>te_ t~or.~crcn !1\H!t) ®liet>ec 1' , < t>ermalenuod> nrd)t l>emct·rttcillgen/.font>em ett\HtCf • : · :· ~ ! : · . . 
. , . 
. .· . 
t ' ~ • • I • ·. ten f. 6id lUtiter~ Die. ®lic.Der AUnt ~eUt\: com1mm~i~· - ~; ~· :( 
ret roert>en.. . . . . . ···t . 
1
1 
• · • · ~er .Dbrlff 1 roJacl>tt~teiff~~ I,lffet ~m.d> ben bet}_' t r · ~ 
. . fid) b~l~ent>en Tambour !. . . : .. . : ... ~ ··: .. _ ·: ; ;;'( 
·I. etmt{l, : . . . : . : ... ·. : .... , ~ , ·' l . ii 
1
.:: 
· · · ·• · · =uni>· glei'd> b<lt'<lttf 1uie~ea.- · . · · . .: ·.: · ' . 1; ·. l · , ·. .. · · .·· .· . · · 1.Ma·.~c.· he·.· fd>litg~n 1 auf su.clc{jcn u-fi~rcn ~treid) tl)i~bir aTJ~o , ~i 1. · 
' ~. .·: . unt> ieNt1 in gleidwn ®ct)citt mi.t ~em line en· 'tiqfl · . ~; i 
·' ' · · : . , .ben Marclie antrittetllllli> i>ie.ro?.annfdhlft i>llG ~e~ ~~ 1 
. : . . · :n>ebr boa> 1>or fidl tragct 1 nntbmf .m<lna t>a9 1>t~r~ · - ;: ! · 
.,. . . . . . te ®liet> mit t>tr S!at~ung fertig 1 fold)e~· nicbt &tt · ~i •· • 
.fcl)ultern 1 font>el'll t>ad <8etue[)r· \)Qt• Nr ltnfen E.ft~ . .r , 
. ten l)od> ~· gerat> 1>oc f!d) 3U bring en bat 1· fo Jn ~il J:: 
nenl. Tempo.mit. ~~d)td .. ~et\)!)l'l~'~ut>ung bed S!~is ;; ~ 
:be5/ ~.rbc6ung .t>eG (fJe\U.ebt'5 nut t>cr· linPen/-unb: · ;, : 
CBtfilfung mit ()cr ~e.dH~n' .plmt> mrtcr bat1 @Sd)lo(i. :H 
befd)ic()ett fpannen a~cr t>en .P111)1r nid)t. . : 1·i: 
, ~15 nun t>t'r .Dbritr 1 ?UJ,ld)tmeitler ncrcb cini1 ". ~; ~ 
· ·oern A\·and\'tn t>a5.tn·itte. ®lieD fmern. httTm· tuiUI ~ : 
gibct cr abermalcn .t>mcn Tambourt1 i>cu~· actd)eu ~m~ ' "· 
:'6ci)1UeiOe11/ Ulli) comma!)diret :: . ! . : .· l;: . 
~ . . 
. . ... ~ . 
. : 
. . ~tif ruelct)_c.s aUc5.lhUe_ ffc[)ct •• ; · : · . : ·. . 1· 
!)~~l~~t c;~~~i> : ..  :. · ;_ . IDa failrtt bf·~ erffcn jt~et;<Biict~r auf~a~·re~;r .·. ~ · 
te. ~m>e nictler 1 t>11d <Betl)el)r mit nent stoiben aw. 
fold)ed nnfet2ent> 1 unt> . mi-t tl~: IDUinuung unD Ua·· . 
. 
' .... 
·· I ' . ~. -. . ' 
. - ., 
__.,.,....... -~·. :· · .. 
;. 
I • 
~. . -.. .. . ~ .. 
. :jonec fd)rcd> , bou~·· 1>0tTodrt~ ~en~cbnlicb. l)~lteni) :: -
. ~~l5 . i>l'itte ~ue.t> fiibct ~~ufr 1 ~rnt,. :nHldjct 
fogl~tcb feme Ofn>o()nhd)e 5!,1~Ut~\J fort 1 ~te ;tun)' . 
. er{lerm-®liel>ec c.bcr. ffel)m auf mit bod} uor fid)· 
b~i~tgenbem ®emet)r I root1 ~1} ~ugffid) \><ld &l~erite: 
,®.he~ ~en .f>ai)n fp,'lnnelfmutj. ! · . · 1 
· · . !na5t>tittt <B! ic~ ber~nGre!ladi~r~· feu!!rtnl()fcL!· · 
:gltld)faU6J uui> ()~fd)tc{>•;t ~uf t>te ncmllct}e ~Crt I rot~· ~ 
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ksual: 
· · flcomma~do, J ~it_ be~ I· 
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. ·mer £'brijl 1 ID3ad)tmeiftet I all ~urd) ben beps. 
Chargirungen • .- · .; 





i f)abenNn T:uubour ab~rmalen : • . '. 
s:. etreim, uni> oarauf n>iei>er . ~ · I .. . .. 
{ ... 
I 
I Rattaillon : 
:Da~ ::te e>lieb 





~"~ tJ1e ®Ueb 
15t1JtngC an. 
Mar,he fc{)ht9•!lll n.H>rl:uf wfe uorbero bet)ttr i>iertcrr <Blieb . 
~l~f,tget /tvic~cc in gleid)er Front, un.t> egalen @Sd)ritl · 
Wl avanciret 1Uiri>. IDer ,t>oriff .$ IDJacJ)tmei{le~ 
commandiret t-ocitet~ ~. .. . · ~ · 
. . . - . ::: . ; . - ' .. 
. . . 
· · ro3eld)e~ · aU~d rufe b~~ be.m britten unb-t>fer~ . 
ten <Btiet> gefaget tu~>rbeu/ befc{)tel)et ; nad) gege1 
6cmm \Semr flef}et b<ls ct·{te ®liei> 1 tucld)cti bet.) · 
t>cm ~tuevt~n <Biiel> ~ ~~uer nur oUdn nici>ergefal$ 
lent tuict>er auf 1 unt> I) at feill <Be1uebr fertig gem a~ 
d>et ttuomit <fuf ben fc'vlngen latfcni>en. ~ · · , 
'· etreil{l, mll> . . . · . : 
1 M:u:c:he amuicberum avanciret ~it b. ~er Dbrl(f 1 rulad)t~ 
me mer comm:mdir~t I tiad)bem~ er bet) Or t>euen . . 
TambouL·o 1utebe~ l>Ro SeidJcn ~um . ~Jtl>cigen ge~ . 
' 
. . . 
gebcu. . , ,.. ., 
. . . 
. . 
. .. 
.Pier befd)icbet th1~ ~nfcblagen uon bent cr~. · ·· :_ 
. (len Q3Uei> \1d)cni>er mit t>em lin?en ~till bert'orl 
· tretteni> 1 rodd)cG auci) ~a~ er(le <Bite~ einf~tg uut> 
al!cin bet) ~em Q3rcd)i~cuer 1 mitbin bel} ~cinen an1 
t>ercn ~cu~rn ~u obfervirt~l oat 1 uni> mad)eti/ tuie 
gefaat/ aud> t>te Grenadier5 mtt t>enen uori>cren tl·r~v (Siiei>ern t>i~fe ~euer mit benen l:ouiCilier6 augleid.> 
mit. . . · · · ' · 
ro3orauf ba~ erne <8liet> Weuer ~ibet. : 
ID3iU mmt folct)c~ nun aud) int Redriren mal 
d)en/ fo gcfct)tc~~t fold)CG mit ben en rulent>ungen 1 . 
unt> .fJ~riieUmlfiCn 1 tuie beo b euen Peloton~ 1 unt> 
[)nlbm DivHion··CSW~t·n g~fagct roorDen/ mit t>em 
Uut~rfd>iet> 1 b{lO t'Oillln ber £)ori(f ~ ro3ad)tmeHtcc 
itn Retidren commandiret Battaillon; bag aUe3 flils 
le ftc~ct 1 unb alo et commanditet frolJI , fid> aU~~ 














1$7. · . . . .. ~ 
·., , . 
.. . . . . i': :: f I co~mando.'L~!oitl_ t>e,erj . CI~~rg_i_~;;~;~~;~-·-. ·- .--~-: · ·:..·  .... ;r;:;: 
.• I ~c<.· ll • . .' v . I }{ , 
,,,, 
(in~6 I umre()rt 'bc~{teUet I u·n~ roonn . bcu~ uiiitt :r·: I (gfic~ &um j-ertig•mslcten commat)diret roirb 1 Die tli 1: : 
uorberen t>ret) <Slieber 1 roie beom A vanciren 1 uie; : ·:: : be~&ufoUen 11mt> mit ®etuet)rl unb ~opfl1d> dn1~oc · · · >I: 
aUemal ctluaa \)Ofl'l.h1rtl3 AU bucl en boo en 1 um i>{t~ . ! 1: 
bintcre ®Heb im ~cu~m. nici)t &U b_tutern. ·. . ~ · 1l 
. .... . ~Is man ab~r nnt bem BaJoncc cmbred}tll '~ · i 
tuiU 1 tuicb gtcict> nctd> i:lcm gegcbenen ~euer beG ~c~ . . h (len ®liet>ea hit A vanci~cn colUmandiret · . . . 11,1 
.•· lo 6frfic{)/ ctUf i)fefell @3frefd)e. . · . . . · . · ; _. · ~~ I Marcbt~ . IDa~ erfte 0Hcb be\) bem ~bf~f1en uom ~eue~ · ,: ! . 
, : · · bo6 <Beroebr olfontcia') bod) \>Or fid> t unt> ferner jn . · !d ·. 
ben lin fen 2(rm 1 \uie tn tm~en .f?tlnt>:<Sri~ffcn N·4·9• · 'll 
. .. 
. ' 
' . . 
. . 
··-
. . . 
' . . . 
·: - AU erfeben 1 auf bal5en rolann follet 1 utlt> mit. oefdfl · ti 1 
tcm .Bajonet in gteid}e~ Fronce avanciret 1 roorb~!) I; i 
aber ~u ednncren ~ommet/ t>.af; folct;es nicbt ~ull r:' 
l>intcr ~ufi tncmlid> mit t>~m red) fen nur binter i>~n !1: linecn anAu~u,cm 1 font> ern mit bettJ. red) ten aU~Aeft' ·1; · je.l>od) ungc~\'lnmgen 1 rcd)t6 uor t>em ltnfett getretl i: 
ten 1 unt> auf fold)e 2!tt ~v:mciret t\\crt>en nmfil t>ie . '1! (eClten ~:ct) ~)(i(\)Cl: bee Fouitilier~ IUlli> (e!l(CU Am~t) . rr ~lieDer t>er Grenadieni/n,eilen i,)(t6 erftern>on bte~ t~ 
fen t>ao Bajonet gleict>f~ll~ t)onuart6 gcf~1Uctt tr<t~ · ·. · i: 
\1en i(>r Q)eroel)r mit b21ll Bajonet gerat> bod) t>~l: · · j: 
~· fid> mit l)ent linreu an. ~cr <S~itm ~ea @5dJaftd t1 
ober t>cm @5(bfoiJ angef~taten ID.1umen t~cm linl~n !: Q(ug gteid}l unb marchiren ofdd)falo gefd)loffener/ r 
unt> in gcrat>er Linie mit Nnc11 erjlercn1~et £>l>rifb ·i 
m3ad)tntct(hr commamli~et bierauf , ·. ; . : 
auf rocld)en Dopptlten lv!arche Det5 Battaillon, ot'~:· j 
ffiegiment mtt oroflen un~ ()urtigen \Sd)ritten 9~' ! 
fc!)[offcner 1 jebod) m1get>runaener 1 unt> jei:l~r~eit itt . , · 
gleid)et Frome avanciret 1 bi~ ~er ~brttl,s rulod)tJ 
· meiflcr .comm~ndiret: . 
· IDtefeli roirb beV bem ExerciEio afro getttad>t'J . 
lobtr t ba netd)bem ~cr ~einb . repoqfirct 1 uno ftct> l\Jiebef r~~en roolte! . . . . . . 
. , . 
fael) . , u 3~ 
- -------.· • • • ... ; • a----·--~=-,.,-, -
'-· 
i 
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~ ft.'s:.: ~ 
... ) 
. . . .. • 4 : • : · 
~~--.--~· ·-- ---~--- , ~I c d .J ~)lit bcrl ' - '. . Ch . : ~·( ·t·l·1· tr, a :. . ' . . . ~;: 
·. _ii . . · o~mn~ ~~ ~~L'Otn~l. . . . ·... . at g~~ ~ . V"''.~+ ~ ·.: _ _. .. ~· .- ·::· ~ . 
- ' ' 
-~ ... -
! . .. 
J. 
IDet> ru~rFotgun~ bed Wdn l>d · aber i(t baU~'tS.· 
ftid}lid) ihlrouf~u f~bCtt/ ~ClU rneif)cn/ unb ®lte~ec 
roobl bel)f,lmnwtl un\) jeber;ett eefd>h>fier.cr blci~en/ 
mitf)itt nid)t lltt~dtHltl'Ce~ ~rr:1renct roer~en. 
. . men biefem IDred)s~wer 1 unt> r"onn ban Rat~­
t:lillon obncbt~:d. nod) obgefcurtem er(ten (~lieb in. 
fttUfW @>d)ritrm av::mcircti {:onnen Die .Pungaris. .. 
fdlell megiment~t <lUd) mit bcm C§dbel <lU~fol!m· . 
laiTw 1\l>ie fie e5 fct>on cinMfit!)ret ·l)al'elllll>ie llUcb· · . .. 
be~ge~olWl uad> anoercn fieuem foldJe6 b~fcUcberr. 
tan. · - ... · .. · · . ·-· · · . ... · -· · .· · 
S)1ad) bcm Comrnando, ?~alt7 foUet bad (rl 
{fe ®ltet> out t>ad red>te st·nve ni~tl~ui:lm -!)1ll)l1 tSet ' 
()oriO in bit mu()e fefjetli) I Ultb fnt)ell~tl' IU.iebertirtt 
fal)ct 1 bad ~ro~t)te 1 uni) t>rittc ®lieD t-cr Fouiiiliern/ ·• 
au d) AIUCI)tC~ i)er Grenadjcr51 nl~ tuefd)e gfdd) nad}· . -
i{)rcm ~~ner tt'ict>erum Olluben 1 faUtn ~leicbf<~l~ 
auf- t>icf~5 Commando emf ~a~ recbtt Stuve n!c~. 
Der 1 bas cs·e,be[)t mit bem S'tolbeut ti.'it oben fd>on· 
oftert1 gefaot 1 an boJ rect}te 5tnt)t ra2cnt> 1 unt> Ni5'· 
Bajonet fd)reci}:!)ocb "ort"at·t6 l)attcnt>l i:lt16 uiette· Q)lict> l'er Fcuililier6t unb t'ad l)rUte bcr Grena .. · 
dietd bleib~ll mit l)od) ~inn weuer' ferti~ ~ 6aften~ 
om <B~tuel): J1~f)W// bod> o!}ne ~en,Pct()n · ~u fpoil$ 
' . .. . 
nell/ ed '"'ire bmm ou:3lntiWd> ant>~·fobfen. · i 
• ru3mm ber £){}riJ1 ~ ill3<tcl)tm,·ifh•r ftrl)et 1 ~<ifj 
t>a~ \'l'lle ®Iii:~ gd,l't'Cill unb i>Ll5 QJ~roe[)l: tl>ieNr~ 
um mit t'.em Stolben \>ornen an i:lr.s recl}tc ~m)c 
gcfdiat unt> mit i>entBajcnet f.-bred);l)OuJ ~orJJJdrt.6 
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. • auf bit ed)u!· 
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g~bt\'ld)t l)at 1 commandirt' er: . •. ! 
. . ... . - · .. l 
. . ... <- ; .. ~ . 
. m3~1dH5. bamt N~ cr(fen l)rctj ®lre~er· nad; 
t'ec tn ~cum ,P .tu~~<!irh:;rm N. 48; o.egebenen Ek· 
plication, t'~lti \>tcitc <BHii:l t1bcr ,~-i~ "in i:l~m Felo· 
conss~wer Brl) -b~m Rttidrcn qe fa get t"ortlen/ b'el 
b~rt~ l'~nn"tl'fw 1 uno b,id ®er~~br tl>ol)l fd>ttltern ., 
t\lO~<ntf l)~!.i Qt::~rce gcm:ld)et '"ir~ 1 gfcid)t~ie ~~ 
Rlbter llll~jft~~cn~ 1 fou.>ol)l ~uf cin~ 1 ~roet) 1 ~rc~ 1 · . 
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· . ®Heber t>ef uiet·ten DivHion niet>erfuUCll/ uitt> brin{ 
· .. get t>a5 er(le ®liei> t>iefcr Divifion t>o6 ®etucl)r ;us 
glcid> t>on bcr EScbultcc oerunter \>Ot: . bas ttd>te 
stm)e mit be Ill Stoll, en <\lli~Cjeni> 1 unt> mit btt\l Ba· 
jonct fli)rec!>~bocl) uol'ludrts (),l(tent>l tute in· oenc~ 
.. · · .pant>:~riclfen N. 47· gef(~gct tuornen 1 t>as ~ro~vs- . 
· . tt uni.> t>riue <Blict> bi~fer Divifion be{)olten ~noen1 
Def ibr <Bci1)COt auf t>er @Sd)ulter 1 mit bee linftrt 
. .p,lnD fo!d)e5 abfinren lailcni.> 1 mic bep Der Char .. 
girunn mit batbcn Divifionen <81i~i)emueio crorter~t 
roor::;ml unt> t'la5 uicrte <Bttet> bleibct gcrai.> flel)enl 
·gfdd>fals t>oo ®ct1)e{)r <1ufOer <Sd)ult(f bcl)~lltcnO/ 
i>1lmtt I l'Oatlll 'CS no~tig l'I>Ote I ot>~~ befo!)len t1)urbe( 
fogi~icb ficlJ Fertig llHld)en/ unt> r~uren ~" ronncn. 









Excerpt from the Prussian Reglement for 
the infantry of 1726: the chapter regu-
lating procedure of firing (Chargierungen). 
From the facsimile edition, edited by H. 








mie IOnigl. ~reU@ifcf)e 
INFANT ERIE, 
cmorin tlttbaktn 
~te Evolutions, ba6 Manual 
unb bie Chargiruna, 
Ur.1> 
IBiebtt ~ienft im &dbe unb 
Guarnifon gefd)e~en foU 1 ~ud) 
m3otna~ bie fdmtlt~e Offi-
ciers iidl fonn.&u t'rtl)alten ~ben. 
~tt'O.(ricf)en 
<.JBie i'id an T raClament 6e-
~abtct unb t>anon ab<lt~ogtn wirb 1 
audj wit bit rotunbJrnng gema~tt 
Wtrben tol. 
Orbnung balber Sn XII. ~beile 1 tin jtber !.tbtil i~_g($ 
wiffe Tituls, e(n. jtbcr Titul in gewitlf 
Articles abgefatfet. 
<6tgtben un~ gtbructc 'J)-..=-o~te:-:-b4-m-, b:--en-
1. Martii 17~6. 
t, 8~ ~ 
bt (f~~tn unb m:mrhiren, aufii·r irn Rcdri-
rtl!, af6~illll ne ohicn'iren 1 tva~ \1Cl'l)trO 
ge!agst rf11 bant(t fi~ a({~ DcsoPdres unb 
Contufion uerl)utm tonnm. 
N~. ~If ~~§~oM barauf otfc~en tucrbtn, ba§ 
brt OfficJers an i>tt gan~tn Cbargirung mit i6• 
ttm Spomon red}t marchirtft 1 unb ilit Unttt• 
Officiers bie Sfur~,@emeb~ me~( ttagen. 
II. Titul. 
Obfervattons ~etJ Formi. 
tung be5 Dataillons AUtn Char .. 
giren. 
I. Artie. . . (fnn bet~ ganQt Bat:tillon Cabtn fof(, 
unb ba~ ~ewer,r tlad> ()at, wtrb b~r 'Pfann~~cd't!~9litmen unt1ermercfet ge .. 
fcf)winbt to~ gema~tt 1 unb ba~ (!;ewt~r 
babtt) ftflt unb gerabt in ~ott~n unb mtw-. bern gel)a!ten. . 
N.B. cmenn dn Batailfon bit ,Pdnbi~riffe ge.-. 
~ad)t ~at, unb ~atauf Chargirtn foU, louffen 
bte Taf~bours md)t n~cf) i~ten ~ivHions. fon, 
betn bletben auf b1.e ~~lugtl~ 1leben , tbnflen a bee 
fle n~d) Oen Wfugel&lQuffen, menn l'ommandi-
ttft\)ttb: ~a&Bataillon foil Chargiren · 
NB. ~ieTambou~s unb~fefffers aufb~l)bt1t~IU~ 
Sd5 foUen q""m in be' Chargirung in ~. ®li~ · 
l>etn 
e 19 ., 
btrn fle~tn ,.unb awae trfllid) ljio roln~~uuie~ 
Tall1hours in 1. ®liet>cr 1 ~ttna~ bcrGrcnadier-
~feitftr unbTambour ncbcnbentOfficier, mci-
len felbigt be~ ~d.ln,entfu~ m~ Pe)Qtoru &une 
{>ccfcn,Bcuet aufDem ~lupd bOn brm Pelo. 
ton bttibtn1 unb mit ben Grenadiers in Das Ba .. 
· raillon q~atee (,tuffm. 
NB. Sn t>~n~cmb,~riffen, unb 6e"ot bM Bara .. 
ilion fld) •um chargit~n fd}litffet, tlr~en trfllid) 
bit Simmct(cute,~emacb 1, Grenadiers- ~\fdffer, 
J}trna(f) ;z. Gren:adiers Taml ours •· unD ;ulf$C 
ttit ~u1jqurtier8,Tambours, roddlt in·2.. @;fie• 
l>a ubir b4. Grenadiers - Tambours trcttn 1 
toann nd> Da~ Bataillon &um chargirtn fd}litftet. 
II. Artie. 
mJtnn bcr Major conunandir~t: 9'fann~ 
i'cd'd ab, tmb gdAbcn! \Oil·b bic \l)fannt 
a~fgeritltn 1 bee ~f~um~iYccfd g~fd)tuinbe 
Abqenommen 1 unb biurer btu~ ~d}encft 
etlot()en, al6benn man ~ut~e·r auf bit 
anne fd'ilttet, Wit fcf>on n1bd}net, au~ 
1 bay 1 wann bitq.)fannt gtfcNotTm 1 batS 
~ewebr abgeffofitn 1 unb babet) angd,at-
ttn wirb, bel'Or man ~atS @)twe~r aur l!a• 
~unq fd>wenaet. 
~Ri gan~e Bataillon muj wobf ad>t 
r,aben auf ben ~lugd- ~tnn 1 unb ba~ 
~tl»e~r mit tlarcftr ~ot.tretung ~ttS red>• 
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w(t·b' gdnl\en, unb bas Q5e\UdJr augfeid) {JCd) gebrad)t, \Vic ordinairc; ~t\.'Or man 
a~ct· fd)Ultert, mufjber ~fiigd~rolLlllll ~np 
l}altat 1 ~a~ gant5e Bataillon nuf fdbigen 
tuot -ad)t f}aben, ui1b ~ugltid; fd>ultern tuit 
in bmn .. ;;,nni>~mritten. 
III. Artie. 
~emt ba~ 4tt <Blitb ~it 3· \~orbet·ffcn 
@}lie bee doublir~t, mufj fdbigee 9\ott\uri:~~ 
ft ~efd}tutnbe tinlautfcn, u~b 3tvar bic .1• 
ertlen mtann \'Om 4-tett <Bhebe tautfm flll 
aur red)ten 4Janb L>cr crffttt 9iotu , unl> 
bit 3• fofgmbtn oUt' t'td)ttn ,.t)anb ber 4ttll 
9totte ~om Bataillon, unb fo ferntr batS 
ganf3e 4te ~fitb, bLlU ncmlid) aUcaett 1.~ot"' 
ten{tbergefprungm werben. 
NB. !Die Unttt ,e()fficiers ~utttt ben Bataillon 
marchiren fmgeraben QJ(icbe bi~ aufbie Difial'l .. 
ce l)On 6. ~d)titt uom 3ten @)liet)e "'om Batail .. 
lorr, foba(O bad 4te ®Ueb doubliret. 
NB. ~et Adjqtant mu§, roann bie .panb, ~tltft 
gemacl)et, unb bie offi~iers uor .marchiren t un• 
uermmfet bal 4te Q)lleb abt~eden, unt> emem: 
jeD en ~ttl fagtn, toO_ et &u ~d}en fotnt. 
IV. Artie. 
<5obntb ber 1\iajor commandirtt : 
9te~t~ ~Oi1t'ert~ doubliret bte eH~b~r! 
Com· 
e 91 ~ 
Commandirtt ber Ofticier \1om :!ten :3u* 
~e \10n tie Grenadiers : eincf~ umtd)rtt 
fttd>! Marc he! 5.)a(t! 9tcd)t6 um! 1\'larchc! 
~autf~t binttt· bie Unttc ~ Officiers ()inter 
btllt BatailJon tt~ld) btm Uncfcn ~h!gd ! 
(\t'Obtt) bit Gren:tdicrs in 9t"tten uni> 
<Blicbcl·n g~rlt~c bldben, bas metud)rtl'ol 
tl·~gen, unb gan~ fliUe ~t}n mitft"en) com-
nrandirtt\t'itber: ,.t)alt! Front! 1\1arche! 
~ed;ts um! Marclte ! 4(5btnn fit bis an 
bit Untel· ~ Officiers \1om Bataillon, tmb 
mit ~~tttn auf bit C5Abel ~6pi~e ~d) 
f~Ueffm •. 
.Nn. st)le Grenadiers mufi(n aufbem fin~etJ ~(U, 
gel ~d) en, m~nn oa~ Bataillon gtfd)loffen itl, 
unb ·bah ! commandirtt mitb , unb bamit bit 
Grenadiers o~nfeblbabr auf bem Untrtn ~(Ugd 
fesm fonnen, tl'enn bart Baraillon gefd)lolfen ill, 
unb man. nid)t tucnten batf, .Palt! &u c:om-
man.1irtn, foRen fdbige nid}t aUdn auf ball 
Commando : ~as 4te @Utb red)tf botrottti!J 
doublirtttute ®tie~er! ftcb lind~ umre~ren unb 
laujfen,fonDnn and)bei) J)en ®epbunoen nicbt 
an))alten, (lbe~bocf) aue~ otbemfiel) uno augleid) 
mad)en. 
~B. (!;o balt> bet 2te Sua bon bie Grenadiers na~ 
&)em lincfen ~(Ugtl tduij"t 1 roetl>en Die Grena. 
diers bom jebem ~lugd ~an ~a, Bilge l f· ffiotten 
einserbeiftt; ~fC~ UntetiOfffidcrs~ldbtn aur 
bcm 
- -----.. .. .,.. ..... -·-------
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~~m w~ttn jfizgct, unb aro.tl) nuf bem fincten 
~lugef, roes~olb ·Ocr ue Unrn' Officier ~intcc 
~em 3ten @tie be in ben 2ten Sus non bie Gra• 
nadiers »om red) ten ~lizgtl 1 unb bie anbctn bt~ben in bic ~irte unb (lufDcn lincfen ~lugd 
~an bfe Grenadiers uotn lincftn {Jii19d tlnttetcn. 
NB. ~ie ~immerftute ncbfl tincm Grenadier-
Tambour unb S}.\fciffer mRd)en mit bttlJ 1ren 
Sugc ~on ben Grenadiresaug(efc{) Uncf6 umrc~rt, 
unb bie SimmerCeute marchiren 1. ~cf)titt ~in• 
ta Das Batailton,tauffcn nad)~er IDlitte, tleUert 
Pcb gcgen bie ~ucfe in einem QJ!icbe, fltcftn im 
m(\~renben ~inlauffen bie 21).'ten ein 1 unb fd)ut. 
ttrn bas Q>mebt. Sl)er Tambour unb spfeiffec 
bingcgen lautfen mit ~en Grenadiers na~ bem 
lincfen ~tugd. 
V. Artie. 
~e•m bat Bataillon linct~,. unb rtc6tG 
um mad)et, mad;tn ~ie Grenadiers unb 4· 
trffen 8itge ntbtl Ober*Ofiiciers, Unttrll' 
Ofiiciers unD Tambours augftid) lincfd" 
unb bit ~nbern ncbff btnen <6efreuten-
Corporals red)t~ Utn I wie ordinaire. ~trs~~ 
nttcl) wann fid; batS Bataillon fd)lietTet, mar-
chirtt man mit dnem tur~en 6d)ritt 1 fd>fitffet ftd> auf bie 6abd ~ 6pifJe, unb, 
to balb tine jebe ffiotte ftebct , ftdJet fdbige 
tfiU, wobet) woll bar auf ~u feben tff, bai 
aue~ gan~ fliUe im .Bttaillon f~t) I ba~ <Be-
\l)t~r 
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wd)t' wob( getragen \l)e,·bt, bit ~rl~ bte 
.5;>~\nb~ nid)t l'isbren, unl> in 9totten ~(r~ 
r~bC marchirm. 
NB. !i)i~ Offiders nebmtn ball Sponton .pad), 
bd)alren eS Pacb, bi~ ,Palr! commandirtt mitt>, 
bit llnrtr10fficiers bingegen bd)altm baiS stur~· 
®m>d)t auf l>cr <6d)ulter, unb bie @cfreote• 
Corporals bic 8al)ntn ilbtt ba!f ®ibencfe. 
NB. 3n btr ())2ittt l>elJ Rataillons ~roif~cn ben 
+ten unb rten £ugc I mus to bid ~Ia~ gdaffen 
tl>erben 1 b~lB Die @efttt)te • Corporals unb Sim• 
m«leure euuwcn fonnen. 
VI. Artie. 
mltlltl btt~ Rataillon gcfd)totren , unb 
Front gemad)t \l)irb I mad)cn bit Officiers 
unb (Befl·~t)tt~Corporals Front nad) btm 
Baraillon, unb bit Unter~o fficiers btl) ben 
Sugen Front ~intertuert~. 
VII. Artie. 
. 2\J~nu bit ~· bint~rtle Q5fieber tid> auf 
bat 6abd~E5pr~t f~hetfen I mi!tftn fdbig~ 
gerabe unb gcfd)wmbe anlautfen 1 batS ~e­~tbr wobf tragtn , fie() rid)ttn unb gltid; 
11lllt fld)tll. 
. !i)ie Officiers, ~dd)e bit S6gt unb Di-
v~fions comm~ndiren 1 lau1fen gefa)Winbt 
em, l)aben gltr~ Front unb bat.1· Sponron 
(\~t)l~ ~uj. :l>ie itbrigt Otficiers, wdd)t 
(5 bi~ 
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l)inttr ~mt Bataillon fd)Ucff~n , fauffen 
burd)G Baraillon ()ill tel· bic Unt~r~Otliciers 
in bit ~Jlittt \'On il)L·en Divifions, l)a~en 
A(dd) Front nad) bem Bataillon, unb ba~ 
Spanton l'Ct)an 8u~, fleb~n flilte, unb rid)P 
ten ftd) nad) ber red)ttn ~anb. 
NB. ClDann bit Offici~rs complets flnb 1 fic~e& 
binttt bcm a ten 1 2tcn, ~ttn 1 4ttn, 6ten 7tm 
un'b St£11 Stt!lt ein Officier , rocnn {dbigt abec 
nid)t comptecs ftnb 1 muD binttt jebef Diviiion 
tin officier t1e~en. 
i'it Unttr " Officiers bet) ben Stt~tn im 
JttnQ)Uetle marchiren ina 3rt \Blitb 1 ba.~ 
~en gfii(b Front, ff~~cn ffiUt unb tt·agcn 
ba5 3tm·~:; ~e\Ud}r ( \t10l)f. !i)it Ut.nn·-
Officiers auf ben ~lugde \'Om Bata11lon 
bftibm , \~it tie eit1g~tl}dlet I auffer, ba~ btr 
Unter~01I1cier aue b~m 4ten <BU\be mit 
binur ben Sn\1 tritt. . . 
!i)it ~eft·tt)tt~Corporals .lauffett till lU 
bae Bataillon, nd)men in wiibrenbem tin~ 
lauff'en bit 8a1)nen bod) in bem rtd)ten 
~t·m, baben gleid) Front, unb 2. Q;efL·et}t~jil 
Corporals ffe(Jm im ct:ffen, o"'t'> tm zten, . 
unb einer im 3ten <Vticbe. 
!i)fe 3immerleute (Llutfen aud) turtig 
tin, A\Uet> i~1o 1te, einer il~s 2tt, unb .o\N~> 
in5 3te ~l&eb, ntbmen b1e iabnen m. bt~ 
~lttt, 
e · 9\' e 
rotittt, ffebm gfeic{)fale ffiU 1 unb trageu 
bRG ~e\~d)r WObl. 
~ie Hautbois marchirtn ()Urtig burd) 
~. 6d>ritt l)intere B~taillon, unb t•id)ten 
fid> l>inter ben Sal)ncn tn 2 . (5liebcrn. 
NB. ~it Hautbois, Tambours unb ~feifftrl 
mulftn im·gan~cn Excrcittn unb Chargiun tliOe 
tlebtn, i)ie ~ul}en nad) btt red)tcn {)ann baben, 
unb immct parat &u ~lafcn unb Scblagtn ftt)n. 
~et· Obrifle bftibtt \,or bttn Bataillon 
in btr IDliue·n ~OL' benm j,tl)nen, unb l)at 
bit Front n,ld) bent Bataillon 6. 6c{)ritt bn-
~"n; Unb tucnn tin Obriff ~Lieutenant 
bRl'Ct) iff, marchirct et• burd> binttr batS 
Dataillon, unb bleibtt in bcr mlitte ~inter 
btncn Ofiiciers tld}tn. 
III. TituL 
CJBie bie Chargiruug auf bet 
C5ttUe im ~u5rticfen, im Avanciren 
unb Retiriren aemadlttuitb. 
... . 
I. Artie. 
~(tnn ba~ Bataillon trtvebnttr mafftn ~.~ Gum Chargirtn gefd)lomn fltlJtt , 
tun·t,nu~orberff 2. maf)l mitPelotonsauf 
. bcr ~tel!!_, bern ad) 2. ntabl mit Divifions 
auf b~roctlle/ l;trnad) 2. mab! mitPelo-
~ 2 tons 
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tons im f:!uet'i&rt:m 1 unb 2. ma(J( mit Di-
vifions irn ~uorucftn chargiret. 
NB. !i)itChargitcna mit Pelotons unb Divifiona 
im ~ulltucftn roitb batum gemad>t, roeilen , 
l\\tnn atQn epanifc{)t ffi~Uftf t>Or fi~ ~Qt 1 im 
2lu5rucfm chargittt roetbcn mu9. 
NB. ~it ~lirbem foO niema()lm rotbt~ im Exer-
cirtn nod) in Atl:ion chargirtt roetbtD ; ~t~ 
al~icf)en aud) fcin Bat3illon 4· ID2ann bod), fOill 
bctn aUtadt J. Wrann ~odl chargitcn foB. 
II. Artie. 
~tr Major unb bie Officiers, wdd)t 
Pelotons commandirtni muffen comman-
diren, tuft btl) ba:n Commandos in btr 
Chargtrung AU erfe~m iff. 
NB. 'lBie tie Pelotom unb Divifions auf btc 
~tent fief> fertig mad)en,laben unb fct>uhern foDen, 
au d) roas fonfl obferviret roetDcn mu~ 1 if} bmitl 
In beneil Generales Obfervations gcfagct rootben. 
Ill. Artie. 
3m Chargirtn 4Uf btr ettUt unb ian 
Uuet•itcfm mit Pelotons unb Divifions 
mlifftn bie Officiers aUeatit aufbae Com-
mando: ~tr red>tt ~litgd fAn get an 1 gt ... 
fd)\-oinbe unb augttid) Uncfe um 1nad)tn, 
~. ~cf)ritt ""rtrettn 1 unb fo balb ibrt Pe-
lotons unb Divifions ~um zttn mat){ auf 
b.:r Et~Ut gef~uret ~a~ en 1 augl!nblicflic6 
Wieber etnttctm, unb ~iUe n~ben 
IV. Arcio. 
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IV. Artie. 
~mn. fnt ~uet·tid'en ~hargirtt wirb , 
m~tTtn bte Pcloron~ unb Dtvjfions 0u~(cid) ~It 3 g~~ffen 6d;rr~un g.:rl]bt auerucfen1 
bte 2. ()mterffen <Bhtb~r anufjcn im ~ue~ 
ru(_fen auf bcr \5,ll1d (; 6pi~e gefd)loff~n 
~~tll'tn 1.unb1 t-oann bat1 .:rffc <6lieb nitbtr• 
faUtt 1 emri&cftn 1 tute auf ber6teUe. 
V. Artie. 
~enn bit Pclotons unb Divifions ~t=­
fd)Offen, unb attf~all't Ditlance fid) Attruce 
g~0.o~~n ()lll'tn, g~.ben tit ~ld)tung auf b~n ~~u~d~9Jlann , hncf6 umtd)ren fid> fd)r 
g~fdJ\Ulllb~ a~f bem l"td>ten ~bfa~ 1 uni> 
wn·tfen bae ~etud}r 3Ugfctd) berum 1 wo~ 
btt) bie rolimbung am ~eibe in bit 41ol)t 
gea"gen Wirb, ba~ man ftinem 9leben~ 
~ann bamit nid)t fd}abtn t,m. ~ernad> 
bat Pelotons gefd}tuinbe \Uitbtr in baa Ba-
. taillon einritden, in tuAl}rtnbem <finru-
dcn ben 41al}n in bte 9tu~t bL'ingen 1 bit 
'Patron ergrtttftn unb abbeitTen , unb, 
wenn fie ~uC"er auf bit ())fanne gefd)ut~ 
tet 1 ba6 @)t\~f~t' nUt' ~abung f~\Utncftn, 
\\lie iln ~cdtn;:8tutr. 
VI. Artie. 
6obalb bae Dataillon avanciren folC, 
03 3 unb 
e 9~ e 
tmb ~1arehe ! eommandirtt Wirb 1 mu8 b.ae gan~e Baraillon mit bern lincfl'n 8·ug 
tut·~ unb ougldd> antretcn, unb bit 2. er, 
· ~en Divifions ~ebffbmGrenadicrs, fdmt~ 
l&li)tn Obrr-OHicicrs, Untel·' Ofliciers, 
unb Ta~1bours \'9m t•ed)un ~litgd mit~ 
ftn oUg!ead) bic !eO~'tft ttnb ~ugen fine(~ 
um nac(> ben 8abntn wmben1 ffd) nad) ber ml~tte rid)ten1 itn marehiren bie 8utTt 0U? g_terd>. l)ef\tn! ben stoptf t~O()l bod) l)abm, 
f'd> md)t 1Wdllgtn 1 teine ~ud'en mad)en, 
unb fd.mur gerabe marehiren • . 
VII. Artie. 
~ie .z. ~abntn nebff ~. Bimmedeutt 
tltl5 bttn I fell (!;fiCbt ltlUtfCll 1 fObll(b bllt4 
BataiUon antritt, 2. 6d)ritte auerucftn I 
bit IDlitte t)OJll llataillon mu~ ettuae '-'Or~ 
auG. marc~iren,unb bit 8~t·t~dG ~in tvenig 
aurucf Net ben, a!ebnnn em Batatllon nid)t 
5. a 6. ill1ann bod) unb in Confufion tom~ 
men fan. Vlll. Artie. 
~Ue Tambours mitfftn1 ttunn ba6 Ba-
taillon im avanciren marchiret unb char-
g~ret, conti~uirlid) Marche ! fd){agm, unb 
~lt HautbOIS btl)lll ertltnBataillon Marche 
Nafeu, bte btt.• .Major commandirct 1 Rh~~ bann tic aufborcn 0ufd)lagen 1 unb tuenn bae Commando auegefprcd)en 1 n>itbtr Qll::s 
i · 
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anfLtngm ~ttfd){agcn, Unterbc,Tcn ba~ na-
taillon im marchc l'(~ib~t 1 UUi) bit Tam-
bours auf bm ~lugd~ mit bem Bataillon 
tid> gn·abt t·td)tm mit1fm. 
IX. Artie. !l)"e Bataillon foU: \Venn ba~ Terrain e~ 
&UlLltT~t so. e>d)rirte marchircn, bt\)Oran::s 
g~fRll~tn \t'irb oU chargirtn, Utlb man tnllfi 
im marchirm im avancirtn batS ~t\l'd}C 
n>ol)l tcRgtll, mit fur~en unb t~lll\\famen 
6d)rittm, unb fd}nuc gcrabt tn 9\ctten 
unb \Blitbern marehiren. 
X. Artie. 
~it PclotonG unb Divifions mitffin, 
ttwm bit Oftieiers eommandiren, au~en~ 
bltcflid) 1ltUe fid)CU, oUq(cid) ~en S(opfunb 
bit 2tugen n,ld) btr red}ten .\)anb wenbew, 
unb fid) rid)ten. 
. . 
NB ~ie Officiers trtttn btl)m commandirtn im 
avancirtn :~.€Sd)titte »or, unb neb men ba6 Spon-
ton bel)m ~uj, 
XI. Artie. 
~it Pelotons unb Divifions ructtn 4Uf 
tm avanciren Wit aufbtr 6ttUt, unb bit 2. 
l}inttrflen (B(ieber oifnen fid), fO bR{b ~euer 
gtgtbtn ift I auf l}albe Difiance aurucf. 
~as ertlt (6Ueb giebt ~d)tung, ob ee t)or, 
am·ucf ober gerabe mit C~m Bataillon iff, 
(6 4 4(~.-
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4febcnn ea enttut.'ber fli((e ffd>tt, burtig tin~ 
ritcf~tobcr marchirct. 
NB. ~Die ~inttrjlcn @litbtr m\•fftn im roa~rtn: 
bem ~abcn &roifd)en tlenen @lid)ttn balbt · Di· 
fiance bebnlten, ba§ fte faben fonntn, unb bie 
Pelotons muffcn im wa~renbcm faben immtf 
~ufi binrerWuti fe~cn, aud) bie ~ugen roobl auf 
tbun, ob fte \)0~ obtr &uttlcfe im Bataillon ftnb, 
afobenn fie in ordre bldbcn fonnen. 
XII. Artie. 
~e 2. binterfftn @Stieber ritcten ~arct 
An, fobalb baa Peloton ober Divifion baa 
0etud}r auf ber 6dmlter ninunt, unb bie 
4· Pclotons bom red)ten ~titgd wcnbtn 
Wieber bit ioptfe unb ~ugen nad) . ben 
~al)nen, unb rid)tcn fld). 
XIII. Artie. 
. 6oba(b .t1aft! eommandiret Wit•b, ffe .. 
~et bie IDlitte bom Bataillon tliUt; bit ~a()::: 
ntn tt·eten tin, bit ~higd~ rucfen bor,bie 
fie mit ben ~al}lltll gerabe au ttebtn tom~ 
men, al5benn fit wtebrum augfeid) bit 
~opfft unb~ugen nad) berred)ten .\)anb 
tumbm1 unb gan~ ffiUtffeben mitffen. 
XIV. Artie. 
~Lle Bataillon mu§, tomn man im re-
tirirtn chargircn f"U' fid) t·ed)te umfel}rcn, 
tUie ordin~rc, unb bee Capitaine ~on Ne 
Grc-
0 IOJ Q 
Grcn~tdiers nmtj 1· <5d)ritte \'~r ffd)en, 
ba~ ttd) b~l~ Bataillon oUg{dd) Utnh~t·~n 
flln. XV. Artie. 
C5~~a{b lvlarchc! commandiret \l'irb 1 
Utli) bi~ Tambours Troup fd)lagen 1 tl"itt 
bllB gnn~c Bataillon lltb11 Obcr~ unb Un~ 
ttrl#Officier~ ~ugtcid) an, tint Bnl}llt nebff 
z. gtmmct"l~utin au~ i>cm ;tm ~lit~c trc:;;; 
ten o\t1tt) 6d)rittt au~ ' ~it illlitte mar-
chir~t tUiftltr tt\"a6 \1ot·, bit ~litgtls blti• 
l1cn ctn tu~nig 3uritcf, bit 3tt unb 4te Di-
vifion ne~tl bmcn Grenadiers, Otliciers, 
Untcr~Ofliciers unb Tambours \'Otn tin~ 
cfen ~lugd tuenbenougtcicb bte stoptfe unb 
~lugen nad) bee lincr~n 5)anb nad) ben 
~al)ncn, bit Obcr::: unb Unter~Ofticiers 
l)intcr bent Batai1lon marchiren 1 gtcid> \Uit 
alle0cit,fd>nut· gecabt; tt·agcn baa Spon-
ton unb j{'ut·~~~~etud}r gut, geben \UOl}l 
~d)tung 1 b~lY fie il}t't Diftance \)0nt Ba-
taillon &d)afttn 1 unb bae Bataillon mar ... 
chiret gane tangfam. 
XVI. Artie. 
!i)ie Pelotons nnb Divifions nebff Obtr~ 
unb Unter~Officiers f}inur ben Pelotons 
unb Divifions mutfen, foba{b bit Offieicrs . 
: ~ieber commandiren 1 gteid>. ffiUt ffd}en, 
bte stoptfe unb ~ugen nUQfta~ nad> bee 
<B s rtd)P 
. .., 
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red; ten ~anb tvenben, fid) wobt rid)ttn , 
unb \Utnn btr Ot.fieier eommandiret; 
9ltd)te umtebret eud)! fid> ffC)r gefd)win~ 
bt mit tinem TemEo aufbemltncten ~b~ 
fn~ ~~rnmbrtbm, Jtd) nod)male gefd)tutn-
~e t•id)tm, unb bar~uf ffiUe fld)tn. 
NB. Cl13it Die Pelotons unb Divifions , tntnn fte 
Stfd)Offm 1 b11~ <Strot~t bttUmroettftn 1 unb 
t»iebtr tintucfen foR en, ill feb on im chargircn 1 
t»enn Die Pelotons unb Divifions auft>cr0td' 
le auerucfcn, gefaget 1 unb roirb nut nod) er" 
innctt1 ba§ bLlG @m~t~t &UI: ~abung Stfcbrotn' 
cfet roitb, roie ordinotire, fonfl abet im tvat,ren• 
bem (aDen unb btl)rtl fcf)ufrnn obferviret mttl\cn 
mu6, tu.l~ btl) btrChargirtm9 imavancircnbe' 
edt~ ettod)ntt ijl. 
XVII. Artie. 
~mu bae Bataillon int retirirtn ehar-
giret ~"~, unb Marehe ! gtfd,{ageu Wirb, 
ntUfj baa g~n~t Bataillon ntbfl.Ober~ unb 
Unttr;;Qffieiers gnn~'ltl(e tld)tn,bit stbpfe 
unb ~ugen n~td> ber rtdJtcn ~~nb tt'cn-
ben, auf "en Otlicier bintet~ bmt sun gu .. 
ge ad)t ()aben, mit ordinairen Tcmpos0u-
~1etd) lincfe umft~rt Front mad>en, unb, 
fobal~ bLls Bataillon mit bem red}ttn ~uft 
~utritt, \\1ltber oUgtdd) antrtttll, bit 5to~ft 
unb \lug~n \t't~b~r nad) ben ;s~~n~n ~a~ 
. ~~n 
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t'en, bie ~abnen tttittfen Wieber ~ot·rucfm, 
~ie rolttte \bicbct• et\l'a5 \'0CllU5 marehiren, 
Ullb bit ~(itgda tin \~enig ouritcf Nti~en. 
NB. :t'>ct Capitaine t>on bon Grenadiers mufi 
roiebet 3· e?cbritte ~orjlebtn, roe:m ba&Batail-
lon fief) ull,lfd)ttt bat, bafj t~ ~~uct un_, &uglei\{) 
auncten fan. 
XVlll. Artie. 
2\lenn man mit bttn Bataillon Wiffilbr~ 
tid> marehirtt bnt, commandirtt bee Major 
~att! unb \l'il·b l)trnad> aUee obferviret1 
tuie f<()on trt\le~net. 
IV. Titul. 
~ie ba6 Bataillon Quaree 
formirct unb chargiret lllirb. 
I. Artie. 
(~~nu baa Bataillon ffc{> umfebrit 
~~ bat , um bR9 QQ.arcc 3u mad)en, 
e; bt·tnget baa • teQJlieb 1ti)l. gel~\t'in::~ 
be bas (BeWd)l. an bie Uncft &itt , wie in 
ben ~nnb;;IDritfen , reifftt baa Bajoncr gt-
fd}t~ht~c au~ btr 6d>tibe, brtnget ed auf 
~en ~autf, unb ba~ C6tll'tbr nut btt)bcn 
.tAn ben 3ttg!tid> \1ot· fid), unb ~ernad) au~ 
gltid> auf bte <5d)ulttr. 
NB. ~ie Offiders uno Unttr. Officiers bintet bem 
Bataillon tiaclen1 fob(tlb be' Major commandi-
cct, 
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V. Titul. 
~ie ba~ Bataillon 3tttn ~e~ 
cftn $ ~CUtt im f:)acftn marchircn 1 
nacb ber Chargirung fid) tl>icbcr l)et~= 
fftUtn1 tnlb Wieber otfntn foU. 
I. Artie. 
l~l<fnn man mit Pelotons fd)\utncftn, 
~~. unb aum J,>tcft~~tutr marchirtn 
· foll, mtiffcn aUe Pelotons, fobalb com-
mandirtt tuirb : 9tcd}to fd)wencftt eud) 1 
augtdd> bit ~Ot'tft unb ~ugen nad> be~ 
1incftn ~anb tvenben, unb, wcnn Marche! . 
com mandirtt 1Virb 1 fd>{agtn bit Tambours 
l\1arche ! bit 3uge fd)\l.'tncfttt tid) mit ti• 
nem gutcn 6Cf>ritt. ~t!t3. Q;Ueber ttcten 
mit bttn Und'tn 3ttY jUgfeid; em, ber red)te 
~litgd~mlann im erften ~Uebe muy l)id}t 
~on bcr 6teUe fommen, unb bie 2.btnter~ 
1len <Bl.itbtl' auf btr 6al,d~6pi~t gefd>lof~ 
ftn blt&ben. ~et·nLld), fob alb ber tinctt 
~luget .. ·;mann gefd)tucncftt bat, ffebet balS 
gan~e Peloton ffiUt 1 ttd>ttt fid> gtfd;tuin, be, aUe 1· <Blitber treten, tvtnn l>er Offi-
cier l)Or btm 8uge antrttt , au d) mit bem 
lincf~n ~uj aug{dd) an,.unb toirb im mar-
chi-
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chiren obferviret, tvit im IVttK t~tift btl} 
bern marchiren ertvtl}ntt iff. 
NB. ~ie Grenadiers auf Dem . w~tcn unb tin' 
den ;jlitgd marchirtn in cintm Sugr1 unb met' 
btn nut in 2. Suge eingct~eUet, beo Formirun§ 
bt~ Batailton Quarce mit .... PelotOIU au char-
giren, unO in -bie + ~cfcn cin0ulauffcn. 
!t)ie Officicrs bet) bm 8itgen f\fdben 
AUf btn ~litgd~ \\On i~ren 8itgm, (\i~ fid) 
bte 8itgt l)nll' ge~1)\uencf~t ~aben, alebenn. 
fie gtfd>tvinbe \'or il)rt 8uge treten, unb 
\'Or fdbigtn marchirtn, \Uit ordinairc, bit 
Untel· ~ Officiers, tvdd>t btt) ben Silgen 
tingetbttftt finb 1 trtttn I fobalb bie Offi-
ciers \1ortrcten 1 auf ben ~lugd ine 1 te Qllieb. 
~it Officicrs, tl'd~e b:nttr btm Batail-
Jon ~inter dntm jeben 8ugt tingttbtiltt 
finb, treten, fobalb commandiret Wirb: 
Narchc! l)inter il}re 3tige, unb fd)Ueffen 
1ttbigt. 
~it Unterj;Of.ficiers, ~d~t 6interbtm 
Bataillon btnttr itbtm Suge eingetbeiftt 
finb I fd)Wencfm fief} mit i{)rem guge au~ 
9ltid>, unb marcbirtn binter fetbigtn in 
egaler Difiancc 2. ed)titt uom 3ten (!3fiebe. 
~ic Unttr.Officiersauf~em red)ten unb 
finctm 8higd bleibtn auf il)ren 8h.lgcl£S. 
!i)it 
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~it <8tfrt"tt::Corporals mit btn ja~­
nen1 ~it gumnerleute,Hautbois un~ Re-giments~ Tambour marchirtn auf ~tm 
redJttn ~fitgd von btr 3ttn Divifion, Wie fit itn Bataillon flcl}tn. 
i)te IDiujquetiere~ Tambours unb q)feif::~ 
fcre uon·~em rtd)ttn ~litgdmarchirtn in 
~\t'tt) Q;Ue~tr t>or Ne Grenadiers, un~ ~ie 
Tambours UOnl {inc:fen 8litgd tn o\Utt) . 
Q;Uebtr ~inter ~it Grenadiers. 
~it Grenadiers-Tambours un~ q)fdf:~ 
fere 6ingegert marchirttr auf btm red>ttn 
~lugel.~om erffen,8uge uon ~ieGrenadiers. 
i'er Obrifft unb' Obritl ~Lieutenant, 
wofern einer bt"m Bataillo:t ifh rnarchi-
ren in btr Wiitte bee Bataillons uor ben 
~abntn. 
~er Major rtittt vor· btm Bataillon, 
unb ~tr Adjutant,ben~egen tnber ~nuff 
l)(tbenb, (}inter bem Bataillon, unb muj 
balb bier, b(t(b ~a ftt)n. 
~er Capitaine unb Lieutenant ~on ben 
Grenadiers marchiren uor i~rem guge. 
II. Artie. 
~cnn ba~ Bataillon er~e~nter maaf-
fm imi\1arche itl, fd)Wendtn tid) bit Tam-
bours, uub bte Grcnadiersf foba(b fit auf 
fd~ 
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fdbigem Ot·t fommen, fd)\uenden fid) aud; 
lincftS, un.b folgtid) ~ie 4· ~.nuyquetier~, · 
8itgt \'Oln red)ttn ~lugtl. 
NB. ~ct Obti~t obfr Comnunt!eur bom Ba:-
taillon mufi im roabunl>tm marchirtn mit btl 
nen (c~ten Divifions fo rotit aurucf ~ldben I bi' 
e~ obngeftbr so. eld)dtte Difbncc ~at. 
III. Artie. 
gnann ~er 4tt m~ugquetitr"~ug fid) ge, 
ftt\uendet, un~ nod) dnige 6djrittt rnar-
chiret ~at , (}oren bie Tam hours auf ~u 
fd)lagen, Ull~ ee Wit:b commandirct: .\1Rlt l 
wornuf bit Officicrs Wie~er auf ~it ~((t, 
gde \)On i(}ren Pelotons , unb bit Unter, 
Officiers ina 3te ~Ueb treten, unb ~"~ 
gan~e Bataillon ffd}tt ga.n~ flUCe. ~iefer.­
l}alb, uttb ~amit;wenn fid} ~it 8itge wte~ 
btr tinct& fd>wencten, teine ~udtn bleiben, 
tin jeber Of.ficier fn wabrtnbem marche 
awifc()en ftinem Suge rtd)te Diftance .~nt­
ttnmu~. 
NB.fSenn ba~ Bataillon im{)Rd'ftl toiebet Front 
~at, muffen ficb bie Pelotons ~obf nacb·Dn «~• 
ten ,Panb tfcbten, unb gle~tf) ~iDe ~e6tn. 
IV. Artie. 
2Senn auf ~eden im ~acttn chargi-
ret werben rou, Wirb AUtf obfervirtt, Wit 
fd)on 
tJ IA2 CJ 
fd;on btl)m ~tcten ~ ~euer im Bat2illon 
Q!aree er\l'ebnet iff 1 besgfcid)en, Wtnn 
man auf ~tcf~n ehargiret bat, unb ficO 
wtebcr mf·t Pelotons Una~ fd)wencfen fo((, 
fd}tagen bit Tambours Wieber l\1arehe ! 
~it Pelotons fd)\Utncfen fid;, unb marehi-
rcn1 Wit fd)on erweC,net, ·bit Grenadiers 
\'Om tincfen ~higcl 0itC,tn!d) mit gera-~er Ft·ont nad) b~r fincfen anb auf tr,~ 
rtn \'origen <))fa~ unb bit 4· ugquetiers" 
suge gebtn auf ftlbige ~d)tung,-baj fit tiS 
mit ben Grenadiers 0ugldd} mad)en, wo-f\et) bie ~u~en nid)t \'on ber red) ten ~anb 
ge\uanb, baa <Bewe~r wol>l getragenwer-
J)en, upb ~it <6UtbJr i~rt D.ifianee i'e~"" 
ten mutfm. 
NB. 'lllmn ber 1tt Sug bon. be~ tttn Divifion auf 
bie n~e ffiottt »om ttcnSuge uon l>tf ~ttn Di .. 
viGoR au 11d>tn fomt, fd)rotnd'd fief) fdblgc 
red)t.s, unb folglicb bit ubtige Siase 4uf fdbfsem 
SJ,\la,. V. Artie. 
mltnn bit ~h!gdtJ "om Bataillon auf 
ibrtm ~origen <pla~t 1ltbtn 1 unb J.:)a{t ! 
commandirtt Wil•b I m umn aUt 2ilge glt"ld) 
flt1te fftbtn1 unb rtd)t Diftanee ba~cn 1 ba-
mit fi~ 1 wenn man ~ernad) filll rot~ be~ 
rt~ts fc{>wencttt1 teine ~uctm mad)en. 
VLArtic. 
e u3 e 
VI. Artie. 
iitl) bm 6~\ucncfungen mit Pcloton!i 
unb Divifions t•td>t~ unb lincfs, t•\d)t~ 
ober lind'~ umf~brt1 mufj \\'Obf bar-
Auf gcfeben werb~n, · ba6 bit guge im 
fd}\~encftn auglctd} ()trum tommen, folgti<l) 
auf tinm£t( tin Bataillon Wit~tr flitlt ffe~ 
~en tiln I aue· Pelotons muffen mit aUtn 
i· C6litbern ~ugf~id> mit bem tincftn ~uti 
antrettn1 unb 1\uenn fie fid> t·ed)te fd>\utn:~~ 
den 1 auf thlmol)l ~it 5topfe unb ~~~~ 
gen nad} bcr Uncfcn .s,anb wen~tn 1 f"" 
llafb fie ge1a}\uendet 1 tuieber nacf) ber 
redlttn ~anb ~ie ~lu~wn ~a ben, unb fid' 
nid;t md}r ru(}ren 1 bos IDt\~tbr wobl 
tragen, fid> nid)t brAngtn oi>er . bffntn, 
Uid)t P(LlUbtl'U 1 bit (}illttrtlt l5(itbtr UlUf;~~ 
fen aufbtt' ~Abet~6v.t~e gcfd;toffen btei~ 
r,m, bit ;sh~tgtl~mtanner 1 \uddjt fhUc tte~ 
l)en 1 nic6t uon ber 6ttUt fommcn, unb 
f>it ~lit1)tt' nlU[tU ftd) gerttbt 1a,wmcftll I 
nemli~ I e9 mu6 fdn Jeerl 0urucf bltiben 
cber uerlautfen 1 fonbtrn a«eatit 6d)ulter 
An ~utter ~abtn. 
VII. Artie. 
~ie Officiers mitffen al!e0tlt, fobafb bR' 
reloto!l ~atb gtf~ttuncfd itf1 ~Urtig l)Or 
abrt Bugt, o1)t~· \t'mn fid) J)a~ Bataillon 
Cll 
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en Front fd>Wencf~t, l)Urtig ll'itbt.r eititt·e~ 
ten • 2'St.,m b4t! Pelotoat anfdnqet 3U 
fd>tt''encfenJ ntbmtn bieOfficiers ba~ Spon? 
ton fhtd) , unb, ll'tlln et1 ftd> geta>lt'encftt· 
t)at gldd> btt>Ut ~u~. 3n tual>t'tnbtatJ 
e;d)\uencftn fein Officier ben IDlUnb aut• 
tbUil 1 ftftltll !ted otd)tlJ, Obtl' fid) fOllff 
wa~ ~u tl)un mad>tn mu~ 1 benn bie Buge 
unb Divifions fid) ~on fdbfl fd)\tmlCftn 
mittft.n. 
NB. ~ie Unttt,Officiers mufttn b(;~~Ut~•@e• 
roe~t rol)~[ tragen 1 pel) ~inttf ibrtn Sugen ge' 
rabt fUg(dd) fcb~encfen 1 i~tt Dif\anc~ .be~~trcn,_ fld), ~enn bie Suge, gefd)roencfet, mcf)t rubtert 
unb gan~ fiiRe fe~n. . 
BN. ~e ~eftt~>te' Corporals ~ Sim~edeute . un~· 
Hautbois bltiben, roic fte. dngetbcder, unb bae 
Tambours unb ~fdtftr6 \)9m re~ttm .unb fin~ 
cl'en ~luatl · b{eiben im roabtenben ecf)roen, 
cfungen auf ben ljfugd6 ftiUc fte~en. 
VIII. Artie. 
m3enn ba~ gan~e Bataillon rt~t9 um 
t'ber red)te umtebrt auf btr 6teUe ttd; 
fd)wencfet , timfebrtn fie{) bic Grenadiers 
\1om t•td>ttn ~lugei nebfl bmen z. erffen 
Divifions, fd>tumcten pd; 1 unb ba5 gan~t 
Bataillon tritt, \~enn Marche! eomman-
diret wi~b, augtei~ mtt bem .uncten ~uj Qn, 
t) us e 
An, unb fd)wenctet fid> red}ttS, woben atft!J. 
obfervirrt Wirb 1 \Vif fd)on tr\l'tbnet, bet) 
ben 6d)luencfungen mit Pelorons ober 
Divifions, 4Ud) Wtnn bQ~ Bataillon <l!!a-
ree tormirtt tuirb. 
IX. Artie. 
, m3enn ba~ Bataillon tid) t•ed)tl$ttm ober 
ftdJt6 Untfd}tt gtfd)\l'CllcfCt ()Llf,UUb .PLlft! 
commandirtt tuirb, mu~ bas gan~e Ba-
taiHon gteid) fliUt tft~cn 1 unb tld) \uoU 
rld>tcn , l}crnad)m~lbl~ , tuenn ba~ Ba-
taillon Front mad} en foU, bit Grenadiers 
~om ~·ed>ten ~lugd nebfl ben 2. erflenDi· 
vifions ~ugleid) Hncf~ um~t~rt Front 
mad) en 1 unD Dae Bataillon ffd> nod)mablG 
ric{) ret. 
X. Artie • . 
2Senn ba~ gan~e Baraillon finer" um 
~ber Uncf~ umtc~rt auf De~ 6teUt fid) 
fdJwencfen foU 1 wrrb ee gemad>t I unb ba, 
btl) a Ute o~feivirtt, Wit fd.>.o~ gefaget J 
4UtTtr l)a~ ble 3tt unb 4te D1v1fion ntbJJ 
ben Grenadiers bom . tincftn ~(ugd fidj 
fincfl1 umttbrtn, fid) find~ fd)tuencfen, 
unb 1nenn bas Bataillon Wieber Front ma$ 
~tn foU, red)te umtebrt Front mad)en. 
3 XLAtt. 
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XI. Artie. 
~cnn ba~ Bataillon trWtbttttr mamn 
~fe Chargirtmg gemad>t bat, unb. t•ed)t5 
unb tincfe um mad)~t 1 um ffd> au offn~n, 
mad} en bit Grenadiers ~~~. rtd)tcn 
~litgd ttnb ~it 1te unb 2tt DtvdiOn nebff 
~~er - Officicrs , Unter ~ Officiers unb 
'Tambours r~d)t£S, bit 3ft. Uttb ·4tt Di· 
vifion ntbfl Obtr ~ Of.ficiers, Untcr ~Of ... 
ficiers, <5~Wtt)tm~Co~porals U~b Tam-
bours lincfe um 1 unb bte Grenad1ers ~oan linden ~tugd nc~tl Simmerteuttn lincftS 
umtebrt 1 bernnd> ffd> bit ffiotten, wann 
Marchc ! com mandirtt Wirb , au& ber 
IDlittt ·uad> btntn ~h!gd& offntn, unb bie 
trfle9totttn bldben ~d)en. ~it 9to~ten, wo ~a& 4tc ~Ueb doubhrtt flcbtt, b~etben auf 
ber 6abd~epi~e gefd)lo1fm, bee anbern 
oWnm tid} auf ordinairc Dift:mce. !l>~lfJ 
Jte <5Ucb mu§ itbtr bic red)te 6d>ulter · 
ttwae ritcftuerte fe~m., um ~~>t 3u ~~1~ 
ben I ba§ bit ffiotten md)t an Welt tauftm, 
ober au fritb fltl>en bleiben 1 w~l,tt> bft ~erte ffd> nfd>t mit benen ~an ben ~ttb~n, 
fid) ntd)t ~ttrufftn, fonbern rol~tu~ ffel(e 
fet)U 1 in ~otten unb <6liebern gerabe rnar-
chiren , unb ~A~ ceewebr wo~l traj!~ 
mutrm. 14/et 
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~it Gre~adi~rs auf bem fincten ~(it.­
~~~ craben l'lt'S bl!lter ·bee Unter ~Offici en; 
ijmur ~em Batadlon. mBd}cn fincfe um tra~e·~ Ne cS. ed)r,itt uber ~it Itt fRottt 
ton btt 9Jlugqu!tltr~, neb men ibre Di-
. flan~c, mad) en frnd~ um, marchiren intJ 
Dat:ullor:t, mad)en rt"~t6 um 1 t.·i~tm fi(() t~ol~l anec bean •ttn Peloton \10n bm Grc. 
nad1e~, un~ marchirtn, N£S .p,l(t ! com-
m~ndlrtt ttlrrb, tt'Oh1~ lt'ieberum trtnnert 
tvrrb, bllfj Nt Grenadrers gan$. fliUt fet.m 
-~a& (Bet~rl)r wcl}l tt·llg~·n, unD in~otttn 
unb <6htbtt.•n geraDe l'Jtibtn mittftn. 
NB. eo batD btr 1ft Sua pel) Anfcf>litf}tt trttm 
llit Unttt 'Officiers tuiebet tin, mit pt borher• 
gtftanb!n, unb I>Jt Grenadier' formiren roicl)eC 
ltllt~ Buge. . 
· NB •• ~it Gren.adiers muf}tn auf bem red}ttll 
~lugd Jlcl)cn 1 bti)Ot .OQll ! commandirtt nitb. 
· ~it Of.ticiers treten f~.gfdd) au~ WtnB 
Marche! commandictt tuirD, nebm'm Daf 
Sponton, ftad) I t.ct,~dun bit Front rtd)tf 
uni> lmcf£S um 1 nd)mrn il)re Di1lance ~or 
b.tm. Bataillon wit t'Ol'~tro, unb t·i~ten 
fid) en gcraocm Q;fiebt. 
~ie ~ncer--<;lf.ticiers, wtfmt in batJ Itt 
0l"D tmgec~edrt, cr~rtJJ ~urtig tvitbtl! 
32 tin, 
• us. 
tin 1 bebnCttn bit Front red;t~ unb ·uncftS 
um, unb tragen baa ~ur~~~e\ue~rwobl. 
!i)it Q;efrct)tt ·~ Corporals trtten a~tS 
bret) 6d}ritt \lOr bie Front , nebmen em 
wAbrenbem ~uatreten bie . ~abnen ~ber 
ba~ <Bebencfe , bebnlten bte Front lmcf~ 
um ri<tten tid> auf ibre 9lotten \lon bee 
3ttn' Divifion, wie \1or~ero 1 unb ffeben bern ad) fllUe. . . ~it Tambours mareh1rtn nacf} tbrtn 
Divifions, unb btbalttn bie Front fincftS 
unb red>ta um. ~ie 8tmmerteute tautfen auf ben red>~ 
ten ~lugd I unb rangirtn fid) I Wit \'Orbero. 
XII. Artie. 
2l)enn S,)alt! eommandirtt. Wirb, ne~~ 
men bit Ofiiciers ba~ Spanton btt)IU ~uj, 
unb I \Uenn btrnad} b~a Ba~ail~on Front! 
mad>tt I gefd)tel)et ea Wlt ordmarre ,_\UO~tt) 
ber Capitaine aufm Uncfen ~Ut0t~ tid> u~~ 
ftben · unb bie 3te unb 4te D1v1fion auf 
fdbigen ~d>t baben mufi , bal)lit bit ~e~1; . 
bung mit bem gan~en Bataillon 0ugle&~ . gefd)tbt. 
XIII. Artie. 
~ie 2. binttcffe<Btiebtr muffen aufbn~ 
Commando uom Major 0ugleid) mit bem 
· lin~ 
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fincfen ~uti ritcf\~trt~ antretcn, mit qe~ 
fd)tvinbm \Utitcn 6d)ritren il)re Difiance 
~tbtfd}m ~en <.Bliebtrn ncbmcn, bit ~ugen 
nad) btr rt({)ttn .panb l)aben 1 unt) qct·abt 
f,ftiben, btrnad;mal)la gt~td; ffiUe ffebm, 
tl<f> t•i<f>ttn unb baa <aetue~t·t~ol>l tragen. 
NB. ~i.e Unttt ,ofticiers ~inttr btm Bataillon 
marchiren au d) tucfroerttJ auf i()tt Dillance, unb 
~Qbtn &U obfcrvirtn 1 ~it obCR Ctt'OtbftCf, 
XIV. Artie. 
~enn ba~ 4te mlitb fief) Wieber ber~er~ ftn foil 1 red)t~ umtt~ret ea fid> wit ordi-
naire , unb mufj 1 wenn Marche ! com-
mandirtt wirb' gefd)winbe auetautfen, 
baa 4tt (Bfieb \Uitbtr formiren, balitt) 
~aa <Bttutbrtuobl trag en, bte .panbc ban~ 
~en fatTen, tittle ftl)n unb 1id> nad} btrre~ 
ten .panb tid)ten. 
XV. Artie. 
ffittd}gebcnb~1 wenn Front! commandi· 
tet wirb, lincf5 berfidltt tid> baa 4te <Bfitb1 
-Wit ordinaire, ttnb t~ mufj teint 9lottt 
fie() · cbtr rit~rtn., biy comm2ndirtt tvirb: 
9tid)tet eud)! ~l5bcnn a((e 9lotttn im ganp 
fitn Bataillon fid) auf tinmabl ritbrtn 1 
ttd)tt Diftance ncbmtn 1 fi~ in 9lottcn 
· · 33 un~ 
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ttnb ~fitbtt'n \VCbt ric(>ten1 Unb gftic6 mue fltC)en mtitfcn1 tvit tin .Pol~. 
NB ~it Unter. OOiciers btl) Dft SuQt mufl(ll 
fol<te DHlance babtn1 ~a§ fie bo• .iui~· ®t• 
mer,r mft auf9tnrecfttm 2itm bt~m Wu§ ~aben fonntn. . 
XVI. Artie. 
mlenn ba~ Bataillon erwebtttcr rnatren t11i~b(r rtd)t formh·ct tftbet, galopil•et ~c.: 
, ~Major nad) bent red.lttn ~h)gd 1 wofdbff tr au '))~r~t l)nlten Ndbet I .tl1it aUtoeit I 
Unb tuenn baG Bataillon R~marchirtn foU, 
commandirct btr Ot'ritle: Pnefcntirtt 
b"t:S ~e1uc~r ! ~a~ <Bewebr auf bte 6d)utttr! 
VI. Titul. 
<.lBit ba6 Regiments Quaree 
mit eincm Regiment formiret 
unb chargirtt Wirb. 
I. Artie. 
~~nn bas Regiments - ~aree gt~ ~Sj mac(>t tverben foU, galopirct bn- at.- . 
tetrt Major nad} ber lntervallc uom Regi .. 
mcmt, bLdbct 5o. 6d>rittt l>a~on ffeben , 
unb, Wtnn commandit·et tvirl> 1 bau baG 
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